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Preface
The following essays are in part designed as an introduction to
the important and influential philosophical and critical move-
ment known as deconstruction. Indeed, they directly address
the frequently stated need for an account of deconstruction that
includes deconstructive readings and that thus both shows and
tells. The way in which these essays attempt to achieve these
aims, moreover, gives them, I hope, some value in their own
right; for some are analyses of important but sometimes
scanted aspects of deconstruction, its implications, and its ma-
jor practitioners, and so of perhaps more than introductory
interest, whereas other essays employ deconstructive insights
and procedures in the reading of certain "primary" texts. Being
both on and in deconstruction, both analyzing and exemplify-
ing it, these essays as a group are intended to reflect the
both/and nature of deconstruction, which is one of my foci in
the discussions that follow.
In describing and analyzing deconstruction, I have tried to
be clear and accurate, though not systematic. Systematizing
is put in question by deconstruction, and my effort here has
been deliberately essayistic, with all that that entails. Even if its
opponents claim the contrary, deconstruction neither pre-
vents nor obstructs the quest of intelligibility and truth. It does,
however, enable the humbling recognition, shared with the
Bible, that whatever truth is attained is not final or absolute.
x Preface
The readings undertaken here, and the questions asked, are
deeply indebted to the labors of other workers in the critical and
theoretical vineyards. These workers are named, however in-
adequately, in the following essays and their notes. I would like
here to acknowledge the specific support, criticism, encour-
agement, and care offered by friends, colleagues, teachers,
and students, none of whom bears any responsibility for what-
ever errors, mistakes in judgment, and infelicities of expression
remain: Bruce Bashford, David M. Bergeron, Andrew P. De-
bicki, Donald Gray, Susan A. Handelman, Geoffrey Hartman,
William P. Kelly III, Helen M. Knode, J. Hillis Miller, Christopher
P. Ryan, and Joel Weinsheimer. If for some the so-called criti-
cal crisis has set "school" against "school" and critic against
critic, even colleague against colleague, for me involvement in
heady questions of criticism and theory has been productive of
relations and friendships, and I am grateful for that. I am also
grateful for the support provided through a fellowship from the
School of Criticism and Theory at the University of California,
Irvine, and its then director, Murray Krieger—indeed, my work
was fostered, in the summer of 1978, in the stimulating and
friendly atmosphere of "Kamp Krieger," especially through the
inspiring teaching of Geoffrey Hartman and extended argu-
ments with Bruce Bashford, most demanding reader and good
friend; a grant from the Mellon Foundation through the Univer-
sity of Kansas Center for Humanistic Studies and its director,
Richard T. De George; and the University of Kansas for contin-
ued support through grants from the General Research Fund.
I want to thank too Penny Parker and Pam Loewenstein, expert
and gracious processors of words, and Colby H. Kullman,
good friend, for help with the proofreading. I owe a continuing
debt both to my wife, Jean, and to my parents. I am most
grateful for and to the persons named in the dedication, my
children: happy dissemination.
Introduction
Inaugurated in America in 1966 by Jacques Derrida's devastat-
ing critique of Levi-Strauss at a Johns Hopkins symposium,
deconstruction has become the critical rage (or, depending
upon point of view, outrage). Deconstructive efforts regularly
appear not only in avant-garde journals like sub-stance and
theory-oriented publications such as Diacritics but also in ma-
jor scholarly journals, including PMLA. At least one journal
{Glyph) was evidently established to accommodate if not fur-
ther deconstructive efforts. Deconstructive readings are by no
means limited to essays, however, although that form appears
particularly congenial to such efforts, suspicious as decon-
structionists are of the totality connoted by the idea of the book;
indeed, full-scale deconstructive labors are by now so frequent
and widespread as to preclude the necessity, or even the
possibility, of specific mention. Deconstruction has so gained
in favor and notoriety that its effects on the critical scene have
become topics of heated debate, not only in Critical Inquiry and
the American Scholar, but also in mass-media publications
such as the New York Times Book Review, Harper's, and
Newsweek, as well as on the Dick Cavett Show.
This book does not pretend to account for the phenomenal
rise of deconstruction, an issue clearly deserving of analysis.
It responds to other needs, Part One being an exposition of
deconstructive principles and practices. Whether the essays
that make up this part of the book are the reasoned and in-
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formed exposition necessary, the reader will decide for him-
self or herself. Certainly deconstructionists have been loathe to
provide any such exposition, owing in part perhaps to the
slippery, skidding nature of language, which makes it impossi-
ble ever to say exactly what one means or to get it right, as well
as to the justifiable fear that exposition will both tame (and
perhaps reify) deconstruction and so turn a powerful analytical
weapon into merely another ready-made method for the inter-
pretation of individual texts. Though I appreciate the hesitancy
and understand the fear, I think the risks worth taking, espe-
cially since polemicists (mainly negative) have rushed in where
the better-informed have feared to tread, often failing to grasp
basic points and so unfairly representing deconstructive aims
and principles.
Moreover, those obviously knowledgeable of and indeed
well versed in deconstruction have tended to slight some of the
important implications of the work of Derrida and others, when
they have commented on them. In France, and increasingly in
England, deconstruction has been analyzed for its political im-
plications, applied indeed to political problems, and related to
Marxism (I think of the Derridean interviews in Positions and of
Terry Eagleton's recent work); in the work of Gayatri Spivak
and Michael Ryan, among others, such implications are now
being explored in this country.1 The relation of deconstruction
and psychoanalysis is a major issue, of course, and is receiv-
ing due attention from Derrida himself as well as from several
others both here and abroad.2 Many other implications remain
to be considered, including for ethics and for teaching. In my
view, however, some of the most important, perhaps even
revolutionary, implications of deconstruction are for theology
and religion. The covert dependence of contemporary theory
as revealed in Derrida, Lacan, and Hartman, for instance, on
theological modes of exegesis is important and requires analy-
sis, despite the "nontheological" pretensions of many decon-
structionists. Susan A. Handelman has begun to explore the
Introduction 3
relation of Derrida, Lacan, and others to biblical exegesis, but
her work is marked, as is that of Bernard-Henri L6vy, by an
apparent polemic for Judaism.3 In Part One of the present
book, I too devote considerable attention to the parallels of
deconstruction and the biblical vision and provide an assess-
ment of the religious quest in Derrida, Hartman, and J. Hillis
Miller. Unlike some others, though, I am willing neither to sep-
arate Christianity and Hebraism absolutely nor to hope for the
complete dehellenizing of Western thought. I do hope that this
book will generate response and further explorations, particu-
larly of the relation of deconstruction and Christianity.4
I have mentioned the fear, which I share, that deconstruction
will become simply another "method" for the interpretation of
texts. A rift is presently growing, in fact, among deconstruction-
ists on the matter of its instrumentality, one rather diverse and
indeed heterogeneous group accusing especially the "Yale
School" of blunting deconstruction as a means of changing the
world by focusing on it as a way of reading which always
seems to end in an aporia. I contend that deconstruction is
nothing if not a way of reading and that reading is what we are
constantly engaged in doing. Is everything therefore a text? In
any case, as should be clear to anyone familiar with OfGram-
matology, de Man's Allegories of Reading, and Hartman's
Criticism in the Wilderness, textual interpretation is hermeneutic
and not hermetic and need not be a slave to the text, as it is
not in the hands of such deconstructionists; instead, it leads
always outward to large questions and issues. If we focus
intently on the text, it is not so as to know the text as an object
but rather so as to look through it. Guided by but not enslaved
to it, we can regard the text as a site, as an opening, and as
an opportunity.
My aim in Part One being exposition of deconstructive goals
and principles and so a defense of deconstruction against
mistaken and distorting polemics, the way of reading I practice
there is for the most part thematic and traditional (I am well
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aware of the difficulties and limitations of such a procedure).
A significant change appears in Part Two, the shortest and
arguably the most important section of the book, which offers
a deconstructive reading of two deconstructionist texts.5
Though the goal remains the establishment of the nature of
deconstruction, the means has obviously changed. In reading
these texts with the help of the recent work of Paul de Man,
some further misconceptions are cleared up. In addition, the
reader can watch in these texts the working out—and not just
hear a discussion—of the relationship between writing and
reading, between critic and text, between master and slave,
and between the declaration a text makes and the description
it offers up to a properly close reading. By this point we are
reading differently, more closely: attending to the story or alle-
gory the text tells, the story of the unresolvable conflict between
textual declaration and textual description and so of the wan-
dering of meaning and of the reader's quest of readability and
mastery. It emerges that literary texts, born of language, par-
take of a both/and nature, both preserving and undoing mean-
ing at once, though we try desperately to stop the ceaseless
oscillation and reduce the complication, and interimplication, to
the either/or thinking that evidently characterizes Western
thinking. The temptation to either/or thinking appears in decon-
structionists as well as others, and both cannot but succumb,
as we learn in "The Story of Error."
Perhaps I can clarify here my argument concerning the both/
and nature of deconstruction, as well as expose some typical
misconceptions of it, by briefly considering a critic (who is not,
incidentally, a deconstructionist) that I do not discuss in "The
Story of Error." My turn to a specific text should not be taken
as simply gratuitous, for as Geoffrey Hartman puts it in his latest
book, in an age that prefers the electronic media to the pains-
taking work of reading, Derridean deconstruction "saves the
text": there is no escaping the detour of texts, from which our
knowledge comes.6
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The text I wish to consider is William E. Cain's "Deconstruc-
tion in America: The Recent Literary Criticism of J. Hillis Miller,"
which pays impressively close attention to this important and
influential critic, who, along with Derrida, de Man, Hartman,
and Harold Bloom, is said to form the "Yale School."7 Cain's
valuable essay focuses on certain "confusions" in Miller's
work and ends with some sweeping charges against decon-
struction as it is currently practiced in this country. The incon-
sistencies and even contradictions Cain points to are
undeniably present in Miller's texts, but I am not at all sure that
he has correctly read the story they tell.
Cain repeatedly chastizes Miller, and other American
deconstructionists, for an allegedly pusillanimous conserva-
tism. Cain thus writes: "For Miller, 'radical' interpretive possi-
bilities are controlled and held in check by his conservative
instincts, which preserve what a thoroughgoing deconstruction
would threaten to undermine."8 It seems to me that what Cain
calls for in such passages is closer to destruction than to
deconstruction.9 His "thoroughgoing deconstruction" would
simply "undermine" whereas deconstruction, far more radi-
cally, insists on an undoing/preserving, or both/and, oscillat-
ing movement. Deconstruction is thus not a breaking-down of
a hierarchical opposition so as to install a "lower" term in the
privileged situation of the displaced. Indeed, deconstruction,
as practiced by Miller and others, refuses to rest with the re-
placement of one term of an opposition by the other, which
serves merely to perpetuate hierarchization. Unlike Der-
rideans, however, Cain would precisely replace one term of an
opposition or hierarchy with another, thus continuing our usual
way of thinking in oppositions. As I argue at some length in the
fourth chapter below, Miller himself rejects such either/or
thinking (even if, as I point out in "The Story of Error," inevita-
ble lapses occasionally occur). At any rate, an intervention,
deconstruction consists of an undoing/preserving that pro-
duces ceaseless reversal, reinscription, and oscillation of hier-
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archical terms. Complications, relations, and interimplications
exist, and stubbornly persist, where one desires neatness, sim-
plicity, and separateness.
The important questions and issues that I have merely raised
here are developed in "The Story of Error," and they reemerge
powerfully in Part Three, which offers deconstructive readings
of three so-called primary texts by Dryden, Swift, and Pope. I
have, somewhat arbitrarily, chosen these texts from the period
I know best. The texts chosen are important ones, and they
themselves, in their particularity, dealing with such issues as
reading, interpretation, willing, and difference, help justify my
choice, if any justification be required. It also happens that,
despite the spread of deconstruction, very little work has been
done on the English Augustan Age, though the latter part of the
century, particularly on the Continent, has benefitted from the
attention of Derrida, de Man, and others, the first two focusing
on the work of Rousseau and some others. Thus despite Wil-
liam Beatty Warner's recent book on Clarissa and de Man's
1978 essay "The Epistemology of Metaphor," dealing in large
part with Locke, my three essays may lay some claim to be
breaking new ground.10 Romantic and "pre-Romantic" texts
have now been carefully read, and these readings have begun
to suggest some new understandings of literary history. What
do so-called classical texts know and have to teach us by
means of deconstructive readings?
Part Three of this book raises, differently but insistently, at
least two questions worthy of particular notice here. One is the
relation of Derrida and de Man, and the other is the relation
between a traditional close reading of a text and a deconstruc-
tive one. As to the first question, Vincent B. Leitch has helpfully
treated the difference between two forms of deconstruction,
one deriving directly from Derrida, the other being a variation
brilliantly practiced by de Man. Leitch writes: "Rhetorical analy-
sis constitutes a narrow and powerful application of difference
insofar as it relentlessly reveals the originating differential and
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discontinuous nature of literary language. Other applications of
difference are possible, as Derrida demonstrates in his many
philosophical analyses of conceptual hierarchies Derrida's
conceptual analysis is an alternative to rhetorical analysis in the
general work of deconstruction."11 My essays on Religio Laid,
A Tale of a Tub, and An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot all show the
influence of de Man, each attending closely to the text's rheto-
ric, or figurative language. But all three also involve conceptual
analysis, the first two exploring the implications for certai  ma-
jor concepts of the texts' figurative language and that on
Arbuthnot focusing on the relation of self to other. If Derrida
and de Man are in an uneasy tension in my essays, I hope that
tension is healthy and productive. I do not choose decisively
between rhetorical, or figurative, analysis and conceptual.
In Part Three of this book I thus take up again the question
of the possibility of choice dealt with in ' 'The Story of Error'' and
suggest some of the ways in which choices are never (appar-
ently) clear-cut, never a simple either/or matter. These essays
raise, as I mentioned, at least a second and related question
(concerning the relation between a deconstructive—whether
conceptual or rhetorical—and a traditional reading), and I
should like to focus on that issue in the remaining pages of this
introduction. My chapter on Religio Laid perhaps raises the
question most forcefully. There, by means of close attention to
the poem's figurative language, I—in effect—deconstruct a
reading I myself produced some years before. What is the
relation between this later, rhetorical reading and the "tradi-
tional" one against which it is deployed? The answer is not the
perhaps obvious negative one, for I hope to have shown in
several essays here that differences within mitigate differences
between. Any traditional or unequivocal reading is always al-
ready bifurcated, divided within, equivocal, and so the differ-
ence between it and the deconstructive one is not that of polar
opposition. Instead of being on the outside, distinct, and sepa-
rate, in fact, the deconstructive already lies within the tradi-
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tional. Or is it the other way around? It appears that the situation
resembles that of host and parasite. If the deconstructive read-
ing seems obviously parasitical on an unequivocal or tradi-
tional reading, it can also and equally well be claimed that the
unequivocal reading "is the parasitical virus which has for
millenia been passed from generation to generation in Western
culture in its language and in the privileged texts of those
languages."12 If it be asked which of these readings, the tradi-
tional or the deconstructive, is prior or is to be preferred, the
answer must come that it is impossible to decide. Each re-
quires the other and indeed contains the other within "itself,"
thus no longer being a simple identity. Though the essay on
Arbuthnot in particular, stressing the sexuality of language,
deconstructs the ideas of unity and identity and of integral
selfhood as an isolated, separable entity, related essays reveal
the persistent trace of "the other," "The Story of Error" and the
analyses of Religio Laid and A Tale of a Tub showing the
impossibility of thinking writing without reading, slave without
master, God without man, and vice versa.
There can be, then, no question of jettisoning, or being able
to do without, the traditional or unequivocal reading. As Derrida
puts it in Of Grammatology, though perhaps with insufficient
force or emphasis, "[Without] all the instruments of traditional
criticism . . . critical production would risk developing in any
direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything."13
As attractive as the latter anarchy might be to some, it is not
deconstruction. Though it has received scant attention from
deconstructionists, of no little importance is the precise kind of
reading one has in mind in referring to traditional or unequivo-
cal efforts, against which the deconstructive is played. De Man
consistently plays his rhetorical or figurative readings off
against what he calls "thematic" readings.14 He is, of course,
far from being the only recent critic tO| wish to go beyond
thematic readings, which have become virtually the sine qua
non of contemporary criticism; in a number of traditional critics
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as well, thematic readings have recently come under well-
deserved attack, most notably perhaps Richard Levin writing
on Renaissance drama.15 Is there an alternative traditional criti-
cism, against which deconstruction might be played? Does it
matter?
I think yes to both questions. To deal with the second first:
To say, as has been done, that one can enter the woven fabric,
the textile of the text at any point and proceed from there to
offer a deconstructive reading is to spatialize the text, make it
static, and reduce its essential temporal dimension (about
which more directly). Further, to assume that one can enter the
text at either any point or any time is merely to repeat in differ-
ent guise the strategy of the thematic critic, who arbitrarily and
willfully chooses a theme, any theme, to pursue. Moreover, that
strategy would deconstruct the text, rather than watch the text
deconstruct itself. We approach here again the issue of reader-
text relations, which I discuss in "The Story of Error" and the
chapter on A Tale of a Tub, especially: in short, does the reader
impose on the text, does the reader subordinate his or her will
and desire to those of the text, or is there a battle of wills and
willing between text and reader, another both/and situation?
We approach too the issue of reader-responsibility, on which
I focus in the chapter on Geoffrey Hartman. The point is Der-
ridean as well, and it has been nicely made by Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak. Derrida, she writes, seeks the means of
locating the text's "navel," as it were, the moment that is
undecidable in terms of the text's apparent system of
meaning, the moment in the text that seems to transgress
its own system of values. The desire for unity and order
compels the author and the reader to balance the equa-
tion that is the text's system. The deconstructive reader
exposes the grammatological structure of the text, that its
"origin" and "end" are given over to language in general
. . . by locating the moment in the text which harbors the
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unbalancing of the equation, the sleight of hand at the
limit of a text which cannot be dismissed simply as a
contradiction.16
The navel, the moment, the sleight of hand—locating such a
point or time exacts a considerable demand on the "tradi-
tional" reading, and it implies far more responsibility to the text
than a thematic reading can offer.
Such responsibility to the text I try to provide in my readings
of Religio Laid, A Tale of a Tub, and Arbuthnot by first
seeking their "navel." This I do with the help of a way of
proceeding recently proposed by Walter A. Davis in The Act of
Interpretation. In those chapters I begin, though I do not end,
with Davis's claim that "the task of interpretation is to appre-
hend the purposive principle immanent in the structure of a
literary work which determines the mutual interfunctioning of its
component parts."17 What Davis calls the purposive principle
may be seen as the text's navel. Though Davis's argument may
smack of New Critical organicism, it is finally different, locating
a text's immanent purposiveness in its "dynamic progres-
sion."18 This focus on the text's temporal movement in a way
parallels a notion shared by speech-act theorists and at least
some reader-response critics that the reader attend to "what
is being done in what is being said."19 Another way of putting
this is to say that in reading we attend to the performative
function of language and the performative act of the text.
Unlike most other ways of reading, which tend to spatialize
texts, deconstruction too traces a temporal movement, expos-
ing the text's instability, the temporal impossibility of signifier
and signified, of literal and figurative, of performative and con-
stative ever to catch up with one another and to coincide. As
Miller says, deconstruction has to do with "the oscillations in
meaning" that result from the figurative nature of language.
Deconstruction thus shares with the position Davis espouses
a focus on textual motion and the desire to locate the text's
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navel, its immanent purposiveness, by means of its "dynamic
progression." Deconstruction differs from Davis's position in
proceeding to undo or unravel the navel that has nevertheless
been preserved and so in denying that the text's movement is
one. It is at least double.
As my readings of Religio Laid, A Tale of a Tub, and An
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot show, texts can be seen as moving
dynamically beyond and even against or counter to any pur-
posiveness that can be attributed to their authors, textual de-
scription being precisely a deconstruction of declaration. Due
attention to the text's immanent purposiveness, its "dynamic
progression," thus may lead both to the author's apparent
purpose as worked out in the text and to the deconstruction of
that purposiveness by means of the purposiveness of the text's
language. The text tells the story of this conflict. But the conflict
is not between two completely different positions, there being
no way ever to separate one completely from the other. As
Miller says in "The Critic and the Host," "The relation is a
triangle, not a polar opposition. There is always a third to whom
the two are related, something before them or between them
. . . across which they meet."20 This is sometimes called the
trace, differance, supplementarity, and occasionally God.

PART ONE
Reading Deconstruction

1. The Sign as a Structure
of Difference:
Derridean Deconstruction
and Some of Its
Implications
A major force in contemporary literary criticism is Jacques
Derrida. Derrida's star has risen precipitously since his partici-
pation in 1966 in a Johns Hopkins University international
symposium, where he took structuralism, and particularly
Levi-Strauss, to task and inaugurated deconstructive criticism
in America. The following year he published La Voix et le
phenomene: introduction au probleme du signe dans la phe-
nomenologie de Husserl, De la grammatologie, and L 'ecriture
et la difference, all of which are now available in English. In
1972 Derrida published three more books: La dissemination,
Positions, and Marges de la philosophie; these too have re-
cently appeared in English translation. His monumental Glas
appeared in 1974, and he has subsequently published such
books as Eperons: les styles de Nietzsche and La carte post-
ale, the former already available in English translation. That
these books and various essays, several available in English,
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are changing the face of literary criticism in America is readily
apparent.
Not surprisingly, deconstruction has come under frequent
and determined attack in scholarly journals as well as in the
popular media. Among the charges in these attacks are the
claims that Derrida and his followers are needlessly obscure
and that deconstructive criticism is nihilistic and deeply anti-
thetical to the so-called humanist tradition. Many of these
charges stem, in my view, from a misunderstanding of Derrida,
whose work is admittedly complex, whose arguments are often
convoluted, and whose style is increasingly difficult. In this
chapter, I hope to shed some light on Derrideanism and to clear
away some of the confusions surrounding the theory that so
many regard as threatening and dangerous. Though my effort
will be limited, I hope to provide the kind of general introduction
and consideration that has too rarely been attempted on Der-
rida; most discussions in which Derrida figures prominently
assume a basic knowledge of his thought or else proceed to
offer an alternative without themselves evincing a grounding in
that thought. In the chapters following, I shall consider at length
some of the implications of Derrideanism and look specifically
at some of the major American deconstructionists.
One cannot hope to understand Derrida apart from his un-
doing/preserving of the concept of the sign central to modern
linguistics. Modern linguistics is often said to begin with Ferdi-
nand de Saussure's Le cours de linguistique g£n6rale. Proba-
bly Saussure's most important argument was that no intrinsic
relationship obtains between the two parts of the sign, the
signifier and the signified. In his own words, "The bond be-
tween the signifier and the signified is arbitrary the linguis-
tic sign is arbitrary. "1 This is due to the differential character
of language. Because the sign, phonic as well as graphic, is
a structure of difference, signs being made possible through
the differences between sounds, that which is signified by the
signifier is never present in and of itself. As a result, word
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and thing, sign and meaning can never become one. "In
language," Saussure writes, "there are only differences, with-
out positive terms. "2
Derrida plays constantly with this discovery that the sign
marks a place of difference. But whereas Saussure and Saus-
surean semiology rest with the binary opposition signifier/sig-
nified, Derrida puts such terms sous rature, that is, "under
erasure." He writes a word, crosses it out, and prints both word
and deletion, for though the word is inaccurate it is necessary
and must remain legible. This idea of sous rature is an ana-
logue of the undoing/preserving play that everywhere charac-
terizes, indeed creates, Derridean thought and so distin-
guishes it from Saussurean.
Derrida's careful analysis of the sign and of the Saussurean
idea of difference leads to several important, indeed far-reach-
ing insights. To describe the structure of the sign, which, he
sees, is always already marked by both deferring and differing,
Derrida coins the term differance (both meanings occur in the
French verb differer). This notion of differance Derrida defines,
in Positions, as "the systematic play of differences, of the
traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which ele-
ments are related to each other. This spacing is the simulta-
neously active and passive (the a of differance indicates this
indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot
be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposi-
tion) production of the intervals without which the 'full' terms
would not signify, would not function."3 The possibility of the
sign, substituting for the thing in a system of differences, thus
depends upon deferral, that is, putting off into the future any
grasping of the "thing itself." Space as well as time bears in
a fundamental way on the concept of difference, for the tempo-
ral interval, the deferring into the future of any grasping of the
thing, divides irreducibly all spatial presence. In the movement
of thought, elements are never fully present because they must
always already refer to something other than "themselves"; or,
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to change perspectives, if perception of objects depends upon
perception of their differences, each "present" element must
refer to an element other than "itself."4
In the early essay "Differance," included in the volume
translated as Speech and Phenomena, Derrida writes, indeed,
that
Differance is what makes the movement of signification
possible only if each element that is said to be "present,"
appearing on the stage of presence, is related to some-
thing other than itself but retains the mark of a past ele-
ment and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark
of its relation to a future element. This trace relates no less
to what is called the future than to what is called the past,
and it constitutes what is called the present by this very
relation to what it is not, to what it absolutely is not; that
is, not even to a past or future considered as a modified
present. In order for it to be, an interval must separate it
from what it is not; but the interval that constitutes it in the
present must also, and by the same token, divide the
present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present,
everything that can be conceived on its basis, that is,
every being—in particular, for our metaphysical lan-
guage, the substance or subjects
Whereas, then, Saussure recognizes that meaning derives
from the difference between one element and others in the
system, Derrida grasps that differance works within as well as
between elements. As Jeffrey Mehlman has remarked, "Der-
rida's effort has been to show that the play of difference, which
has generally been viewed as exterior to a (spatial or temporal)
present, is, in fact, always already at work within that present
as the condition of its possibility."6
As is indicated in the passage quoted from "Differance,"
what opens the possibility of thought is the retention in the
"present" of the "trace" of a past element that was never fully
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present. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak calls the "trace" "the part
played by the radically other within the structure of difference
that is the sign" and proceeds to term it "the mark of the
absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of
the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experi-
ence."7 Perhaps Derrida's clearest account of the "trace,"
differance, and their relationship occurs in the following pas-
sage in Of Grammatology: "Without a retention in the minimal
unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other
as other in the same, no difference would do its work and no
meaning would appear. It is not the question of a constituted
difference here, but rather, before all determination of the con-
tent, of the pure movement, which produces difference. The
(pure) trace is differance."
Though the crucial points seem to me to lie in this passage,
I shall quote the following sentences since they clarify this idea.
The trace
does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or
visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the condi-
tion of such a plenitude. Although it does not exist, al-
though it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude,
its possibility is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign
(signified/signifier, content/expression, etc.), concept or
operation, motor or sensory. This differance is therefore
not more sensible than intelligible and it permits the
articulation of signs among themselves within the same
abstract order—a phonic or graphic text for example—or
between two orders of expression. It permits the articula-
tion of speech and writing—in the colloquial sense—as it
founds the metaphysical opposition between the sensible
and the intelligible, then between signifier and signified,
expression and content, etc.8
In claiming that "without a trace retaining the other as other in
the same" difference could not do the work necessary for
meaning to appear, Derrida unarguably goes well beyond
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Saussure. Indeed, Saussure's own arguments regarding the
differential nature of language require Derrida's notion of differ-
ance as their logical conclusion, for as Alan Bass has written,
"Any other alternative, any attempt to save the value of full
presence would lead to the postuiation of a point of origin not
different from itself (an in-different origin), thus destroying the
essentially differential quality of language."9
Because the structure of the sign is determined by the
"trace" or track of that other which is forever absent, the word
"sign" must be placed "under erasure." Derrida writes, "the
sign is that ill-named thing, the only one that escapes the in-
stituting question of philosophy: 'what is . . . ? ' "10 Without, of
course, establishing absence in its place, the "trace" destroys
the idea of simple presence, the desire of which, Derrida
claims, characterizes Western metaphysics. As he says,
"Without the possibility of differance, the desire of presence as
such would not find its breathing-space. That means by the
same token that this desire carries in itself the destiny of its
non-satisfaction. Differance produces what it forbids, makes
possible the very thing that it makes impossible."11 The idea
of origin, the reader will already have gathered, is similarly
destroyed, for origin is always other than "itself," the idea of
origin depending upon the production of temporal and spatial
difference that must precede any origin. Denied, too, are those
other central oppositions of metaphysics: not only truth/error,
presence/absence, identity/difference, and speech/writing
but also being/nothingness, life/death, nature/culture, mind
/matter, soul/body, man/woman, good/evil, master/slave,
and literature/criticism (several of these I shall explore in Part
Three, below).
It is not enough simply to neutralize these and other opposi-
tions. Derrida insists that there is always "a violent hierarchy.
One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically,
etc.) or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first
of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment."12 But
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only first, for another necessary step follows, in which the re-
versal just effected must be displaced and the apparent win-
ning term placed "under erasure." To reverse trie hierarchy,
then, only in order to displace the reversal; to unravel in order
to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. The "trace"
creates this ceaseless undoing/preserving oscillation. The un-
doing is no more necessary than the preserving, for without the
latter another term would be privileged in a new hierarchy,
simple opposition being maintained though reversed, and the
"trace" ignored. With the "trace," however, as we have seen,
a "thing" is not defined by its difference from "another"; differ-
ing from "itself," a "trace" of the "other" always already being
present, it cannot be simply defined. The point may be illus-
trated by citing Derrida's 1966 deconstruction of L6vi-Strauss,
in which he undoes yet preserves the Iatter's well-known binary
opposition engineer/br/co/eur: "From the moment that we
cease to believe in such an engineer . . . as soon as it is
admitted that every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricol-
age . . . the very idea of bricolage is menaced and the differ-
ence in which it took on its meaning decomposes."13
Obviously, as Spivak observes, Derrida is asking us "to
change certain habits of mind: . . . the origin is a trace; contra-
dicting logic, we must learn to use and erase our language at
the same time."14 At stake, we may say, is the question of truth,
and I want to explore briefly the implications of Derrideanism
for truth. In brilliant analyses of Plato in Dissemination,15 Der-
rida associates writing, the structure of difference marked by
the "trace," and so "the disappearance of a present origin of
presence, with the Platonic concept of epekeina tes ousias (the
beyond all presence)." Because Plato posits what cannot be
directly viewed (i.e., the sun) as the origin of the visible, Derrida
is able to demonstrate that the presence of the thing itself, the
unity of referent and signified, is inseparable from the concept
of grammatical difference. If the origin of the thing itself is, as
Plato asserts, the invisible "beyond" of all presence, the thing
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itself can obviously never be present. Truth defined as absolute
presence, as presence of the eidos, thus becomes simulta-
neously possible and impossible. As the "trace" requires, the
thing itself is doubled, true and not-true. This duplicity, born
with the "trace," is "what makes truth possible, thereby
destroying truth." Contradicting logic, Derrida thus undoes/
preserves "truth."16
It may be helpful at this point to take up very briefly another
crucial—and related—Derridean idea, and that is the notion of
the supplement, brilliantly treated in the sections on Rousseau
in Of Grammatology. The French word supplement is like
differance in having two meanings: it means both an addition
and a substitute. Focusing on the supplement in Rousseau's
Confessions, Derrida reveals a parallel to the work of the
"trace" and differance. Space does not permit me to describe
Derrida's reading in detail; suffice it to say, with Barbara John-
son, that that reading is "indeed nothing less than a revolution
in the very logic of meaning."17 The logic of the supplement,
so to speak, complicates such binary oppositions as Rousseau
creates between speech and writing. Thus, instead of oppos-
ing "A" to "B," as in logic, we see, as Johnson says, the work
of supplementarity, by means of which "B " is at once added
to "A" and substituted for it. "A" and "B " are neither opposed
nor made equivalent; they are not even equivalent to "them-
selves." Johnson admirably summarizes Derrida's reading of
the supplement in Rousseau:
While Rousseau's explicit intentions are to keep the two
senses rigorously distinct—to know when he means
"substitute" and when he means "addition"—the
shadow presence of the other meaning is always there to
undermine the distinction. On the level both of the sig-
nified and of the signifier, therefore, it is not possible to
pin down the dividing lines between excess and lack,
compensation and corruption. The doubleness of the
word supplement carries the text's signifying possibilities
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beyond what could reasonably be attributed to Rous-
seau's conscious intentions. Derrida's reading shows
how Rousseau's text functions against its own explicit
(metaphysical) assertions, not just by creating ambiguity,
but by inscribing a systematic "other message" behind
or through what is being said.18
A text thus differs from "itself," containing both a declaration
and a description, and they war with each other.
An important immediate consequence of the never-annulled
"trace," of supplementarity, and so of truth/untruth, is the
ubiquity of textuality. That "the central signified, the original or
transcendental signified" is revealed to be "never absolutely
present outside a system of differences... extends the domain
and the interplay of signification ad infinitum. "19 Bass is thus
correct in stating, "Once one has determined the totality of
what is as 'having been' made possible by the institution of the
trace, 'textuality,' the system of traces, becomes the most
global term, encompassing all that is and that which exceeds
it."20 According to Derrida, nothing escapes textuality: there is
simply nothing outside textuality, outside "the temporalization
of a lived experience which is neither in the world nor in
'another world' . . . not more in time than in space, [in which]
differences appear among the elements or rather produce
them, make them emerge as such and constitute the texts, the
chains, and the systems of traces."21 Derrida proposes, in fact,
a "double science," a science of textuality. Once we rethink
the metaphysical concept of "reality" in "textual" terms (there
are no philosophical regulations of truth, the thing itself being
a sign and all "facts" being in "fact" interpretations, as Nietz-
sche argued), we are left with a world of texts, all of which
possess a certain "fictive" or "literary" quality.
In this pervasive breakdown of the relationship to truth and
reality, literary criticism is not more exempt from textuality than
philosophical and scientific works. Whether or not it has always
done so, criticism now decides the meaning of a text. Criticism
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too is a desire of presence. But "meaning" as a privileged term
refers to something outside textuality, outside the system of
differences: "a text's meaning is the truth that is present 'be-
hind' or 'under' its textual surface that criticism makes fully
present by placing it before us."22 The "trace," of course,
makes meaning so conceived, like truth and presence, impos-
sible. To repeat, there is no originating, privileged signified
outside the system of differences and so no "meaning."
The deconstructive critic, in practice, tries to avoid the
strong ultimate temptation to seek meaning as truth outside or
before the work of difference. Such a temptation is inevitable,
for we naturally want to resolve contradictions and to break out
of the endless chains of substitutions, which "condemn" us to
endless interpretation. We desire a haven outside contingency
and temporality, which "meaning," "truth," and an originating
signified offer. Indeed, the fact of differance seems responsible
for this situation: it generates the desire to do the impossible,
to unify, to locate a reference outside the system of differences
that will bestow meaning, "making equal" as Nietzsche puts it
(his term is Gleich machen). In any case, author and critic
share the desire, and the deconstructive critic must be acutely
conscious of the desire in both the authors he studies and in
himself.
As Spivak writes,' The desire for unity and order compels the
author and the reader to balance the equation that is the text's
system. The deconstructive reader... [seeks] the moment in
the text which harbors the unbalancing of the equation, the
sleight of hand at the limit of a text which cannot be dismissed
simply as a contradiction."23 The deconstructive critic, there-
fore, aware of the differential quality of language and recogniz-
ing the fact of the "trace," seeks the moment in any text when
its duplicity, its dialogical nature, is exposed. Here, as else-
where, Freud anticipates deconstructive procedure. In The In-
terpretation of Dreams, for example, he suggests that the
reader or interpreter should direct his gaze where the subject
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is not in control: "There is often a passage in even the most
thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure....
At that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot
be unravelled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowl-
edge of the content of the dream." Derrida extends this point,
modifying it: it is the case that such a tangle adds nothing to
our knowledge of the content of the dream-text in terms of what
it sets up by itself: "If, however, we have nothing vested in the
putative identity of the text or dream, that passage is where we
can provisionally locate the text's moment of transgressing the
laws it apparently sets up for itself, and thus unravel—decon-
struct—the very text."24 The deconstructive critic thus seeks
the text's navel, the moment when any text will differ from itself,
transgressing its own system of values, becoming undecidable
in terms of its apparent system of meaning. "Reading must
always," says Derrida, "aim at a certain relationship, unper-
ceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he
does not command of the patterns of the language that he
uses. This relationship is not a certain quantitative distribution
of shadow and light, of weakness and force, but a signifying
structure that critical reading should produce."25 This undoing,
made necessary by the "trace," and so by the duplicitous
quality of words and texts, must not be confused with the
simple locating of a moment of ambiguity or irony that is some-
how incorporated into a text's system of (monological) mean-
ing; rather, it is the moment that threatens the collapse of that
entire system.
Having discussed some of the important insights and effects
of Derrideanism, I wish now to consider major charges levelled
at the position. Earlier I mentioned three specific charges
brought against Derrida and his followers (obscurity, nihilism,
and threatened destruction of humanistic values), and to these
I return.
Undeniably, Derrida's work, as well as that of his "disci-
ples," is demanding and difficult. It is also different from the
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prose we in America and England are accustomed to. I submit,
however, that Derrida et al. are not perversely obscure. Part of
the problem is that Derrida draws on authors we know hardly
at all, notably Nietzsche and Heidegger and, moreover, that he
deals with abstract issues alien to the Anglo-American empiri-
cal tradition. Another real difficulty lies, I think, in our expecta-
tions as readers, for most of us, more influenced by British
empiricism than we might care to admit, expect language, and
especially literary-critical language, to be a mirror reflecting
truly the nature and contents of the "object" being described.
Derrida's point, as we have seen, is precisely that writing is
never a simple means for the presentation of truth. What this
means, in part, is that even criticism and philosophy must be
read scrupulously and critically, teased for meaning; they must,
in other words, be interpreted and in exactly the same way as
poetry, for example. Language always carries the "trace,"
whether the text in question be poetic, critical, philosophical,
psychological, or what have you. Language may be a medium
in a ghostly sense (as Geoffrey Hartman puckishly suggests),
but it cannot be a medium in the sense of a neutral container
of meaning. Derrida and his followers not only advance this
argument, but they also frequently, increasingly, express these
points in the form in which they write. In Glas, for example,
Derrida consciously cultivates a plural style, a la Nietzsche, as
a way of confounding apparent opposites and switching per-
spectives.
Sometimes linked with the charge of obscurity is the claim
that Derrideanism leads to the abandonment of the usual inter-
pretive procedures. This claim, as well as the charges of nihil-
ism and antihumanism, is made by, among others, M. H.
Abrams in a response to J. Hillis Miller's review of the former's
Natural Supernaturalism. Abrams's essay, entitled "The
Deconstructive Angel," is perhaps the most influential attack
on Derrideanism to date.26 According to Abrams, deconstruc-
tive criticism places even the most arbitrary reading on an
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equal footing with the most rigorous, for there appears no way
of determining right from wrong readings. But Miller, for one,
explicitly denies that "all readings are equally valid or of equal
value. Some readings are certainly wrong. Of the valid interpre-
tations all have limitations. To reveal one aspect of the work of
an author often means ignoring or shading other aspects.
Some approaches reach more deeply into the structure of the
text than others."27 In practice deconstructive criticism is cer-
tainly not arbitrary or slipshod. A look at such deconstruction-
ists as Miller and de Man will show just how rigorous and
exacting such an interpretive procedure can be. The theory
itself, with which this practice is interimplicated, insists, despite
what Abrams says, on using customary interpretive proce-
dures. Deconstructive criticism goes with traditional reading,
preserving as well as undoing. According to Spivak, a decon-
structive critic first deciphers a text "in the traditional way," and
Derrida is even more direct on this point: "[Without] all the
instruments of traditional criticism . . . critical production would
risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say
almost anything. But this indispensable guardrail has always
only protected, it has never opened, a reading."28 Failing to
understand the "trace," Abrams, like other opponents of Der-
rida, focuses on the undoing side of the undoing/preserving
oscillation.
Should deconstruction allow for the creation in a text of
simply any meaning the reader or interpreter wished, it would,
I think, deserve the epithet "nihilism." I am giving the name
"nihilism" to that situation wherein the mind is regarded as the
arbiter, even the creator, of all values. According to Miller, in
a book written before he knew Derrida, "Nihilism is the nothing-
ness of consciousness when consciousness becomes the
foundation of everything."29 Though Miller himself has recently
and helpfully discussed nihilism (arguing that it is parasitically
encased in metaphysics), and though I shall return to the issue
in treating Miller in chapter 4,1 wish here to consider the ques-
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tion of nihilism in Derrida, hoping that we will emerge with a
better understanding of his position. I shall focus on nihilism in
the sense given above, believing that the results of such an
inquiry will at least suggest the way a response would go to
other aspects of nihilism.
As my discussion should have suggested, the original and
originating differentiation seems to generate the dream of pri-
mal and final unity, which is, however, always deferred, never
present here and now. We can never "make equal" or get
outside the generating system of differences to locate a refer-
ence that will bestow order and meaning. There is no Tran-
scendental Signified, we might say, only textuality (and
incarnation?). Myth, though, as Herbert N. Schneidau well
argues, serves to make us think that totalization and meaning-
fulness are possible, comforting us with reassurances regard-
ing a "cosmic continuum."30 But still the gap remains, no
matter how hard we try to close it. The humanistic tradition can
be described as one attempt at closure, positing a meaningful
world.
For Derrida, like Nietzsche before him, this attempt reveals
the force of desire and the will to power. Miller writes in his
review of Abrams's Natural Supernaturalism, the oxymorons
of which title express "the force of a desire" for unity: "The
reading of a work involves an active intervention on the part of
the reader. Each reader takes possession of the work for one
reason or another and imposes on it a certain pattern of mean-
ing." Miller goes on to point out that in the third book of The
Will to Power Nietzsche relates "the existence of innumerable
interpretations of a given text to the fact that reading is never
the objective identifying of a sense but the importation of mean-
ing into a text which has no meaning 'in itself.' "31 According
to Nietzsche, "Our values are interpreted into things"; " 'Inter-
pretation,' the introduction of meaning—not 'explanation' (in
most cases a new interpretation over an old interpretation that
has become incomprehensible, that is now itself only a sign)";
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"Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has
imported into them"; "In fact, interpretation is itself a means of
becoming master of something."32 Man gives—creates—
meaning, then, expressing a will to power as he attempts to
improve upon the way things are.
For Nietzsche and Derrida the question is what to do with the
recognition that meaning is a construct brought by the "sub-
ject," a fiction made by the force of our desire. Subjectivists
and at least some hermeneuticists and Bultmannians seem all
too ready to accept a situation which appears to privilege the
autonomous consciousness, reversing previous hierarchies
and installing fiction in the place of truth and reality. Taken only
so far, Nietzsche himself may be viewed as agreeing with this
sense of the fictionality of things, whereby "believing is see-
ing" and interpretation is all there is. Clearly, however, Derrida
is not nihilistic in the sense defined above, for he insists
throughout that consciousness is no origin, no foundation,
there being no foundation. He undoes the truth/fiction, reality/
consciousness polarities but not, with the advocates of the
autonomous consciousness, so as to set up the second term
in the place of the first. Fiction can no more exist without truth
than truth without fiction or presence without absence; they are
accomplices, the system of differences and the "trace" mak-
ing truth (im)possible. By the same token, the subject "in it-
self," as center, origin, and goal, is no more possible than the
object "in itself."
In Derrida, Miller, and others appears a radical under-
standing of the fictionality of things, which goes beyond nihilism
and the autonomous consciousness to a recognition of the
doubleness of what is, of the complicity of truth and fiction.
Deconstructionists wish to avoid the interpretive mastery or
closure that imports into texts and the world meaning as tran-
scendent truth or significance, outside the play of difference.
Dangers lurk, of course, including the strong possibility that
"the desire of deconstruction may itself become a desire to
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reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the
text what it 'does not know.1 " Even the deconstructive critic
forgets that his own text is necessarily self-deconstructed. He
assumes that he at least means what he says. Indeed, even if
he declares his own vulnerability, his statement occurs in the
controlling language of demonstration and reference. The situ-
ation is frustrating but humbling—and inescapable—allowing
still another glimpse of the vanity of human wishes. Struggling
with the desire of deconstruction, Spivak describes the situa-
tion as follows:
a further deconstruction deconstructs the deconstruction,
both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as
if she means what she says in her text), and as the plea-
sure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as indeed for any
deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and
grammatological structure that forever differs from (we
only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is
never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can
therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a
bind, in a "double (read abyssal) bind," Derrida's newest
nickname for the schizophrenia of the "sous rature." We
must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire
to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a
perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhab-
ited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or
deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the
metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what
declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction.33
Still, deconstruction may disillusion us about mastery as it
demonstrates just how precarious our grasp on meaning is.
We are and are not masters, therefore no masters. But we must
be careful not to fall into the trap of believing in linear progress,
supposedly resulting from this enlightenment and demystifica-
tion. Nor should we pine with a Rousseauistic (and humanist?)
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nostalgia for a lost security as to meaning which we never in
fact possessed. Rather than with either faith in progress or
nostalgia for "lost" presence, Derrida would have UF look with
"a Nietzschean affirmation—the joyous affirmation of the free-
play of the world and without truth, without origin, offered to an
active interpretation.... [This affirmation] plays the game with-
out security." This "interpretation of interpretation," Derrida
adds, which "affirms freeplay... tries to pass beyond man and
humanism, the name man being the name of that being who,
through the history of metaphysics or of ontotheoiogy—in other
words, through the history of all of his history—has dreamed
of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the
end of the game."34
For Derrida, as for Schneidau discussing the mythological
consciousness, the humanist tradition represents mastery, to-
talization, closure, nostalgia for a full presence, and the desire
of meaning as transcendent truth. The charge that Derrida
threatens this tradition is, obviously, valid. Yet, as we have
seen, that threat is by no means either nihilistic or simply nega-
tive. For many, Derrideanism offers a way through—if not out
of—what Schneidau calls "the bankruptcy of the secular-
humanist tradition."35 Indeed, in Sacred Discontent Schneidau
links Derrida with a very different tradition, the Yahwist-pro-
phetic, arguing that Derrida's work is consonant with the bibli-
cal message, which always goes counter to the mythological
sense of a "cosmic continuum." Derridean deconstruction,
according to Schneidau, is akin to the way in which the Bible
insists on the fictionality of things, alienating us from the world,
which it empties of "meaning," reminding us constantly of the
vanity of human wishes. Yet the Bible's attitude is always
ambivalent, at once criticizing and nourishing culture.
Schneidau's highly suggestive, and somewhat surprising, ar-
gument is far too complex for me to summarize here. A good
idea of the nature of that argument, however, may be gleaned
from the end of his chapter "In Praise of Alienation," which
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presents differance as far from nihilistic and which sees Der-
rida as, like the Bible, a positive alternative to mythological and
humanist understanding:
we are [always] open to sudden revelations of meaning-
lessness or arbitrariness.... Sooner or later we are
afflicted by the feeling that nothing matters, or "makes
any difference," i.e., that we are unable to supply the
differentiations which in primitive cultures are articulated
by myth, so that our lives and purposes are reduced to
entropy. We may flee to various cults, but doubt will have
its turn at these. Thus latent Yahwism works within us,
leavening all the lump. We are condemned to freedom,
not because God is dead but because he is very much
alive, as an agent of disillusionment in a basic sense. In
this condition, it is not remarkable that we are nihilistic:
what is remarkable is that we can become aware of it and
acknowledge intermittently the "nothingness of con-
sciousness when consciousness becomes the founda-
tion of everything." So with all self-deceptions: their
extent is not as remarkable as our awareness of them.
We have reached out for the apple of self-knowledge,
and in doing so have alienated God, nature, and each
other; but by pressing our self-awareness to its extreme,
where we become alienated from ourselves, we find that
this is not the end of the story. The Fall is only the begin-
ning of the Bible. To be thus "decentered" (and . . . to be
acutely conscious of the fictionality of things) is the pre-
condition of insight: thus it is a felix culpa, good news for
modern man of a somewhat unlikely kind.36
Whether Schneidau is right about the ultimately biblical and
Yahwist nature of Derrida's thought is a most important ques-
tion but beyond the scope of this work to determine. What we
can say here is that Schneidau does not come to grips with
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Derrida's insistence that differance "is not theological, not
even in the most negative order of negative theology. The latter
. . . always hastens to remind us that, if we deny the predicate
of existence to God, it is in order to recognize him as a supe-
rior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being."37 For our
limited purposes here, whether Schneidau is right or wrong
about Derrideanism (despite reservations I, for one, think he is
in the main correct) is less important than the possibility he
suggests of Derrideanism as an attractive, and positive, alter-
native to nihilism, the autonomous consciousness, and "the
bankruptcy of the secular-humanist tradition."
It may be, as Schneidau suggests, that Derrida offers a
long-awaited alternative to certain forms of nihilism. Certainly
the challenge he offers cannot be ignored. Since it is unlikely
that either benign neglect or wishing will make deconstruction
go away, we must come to grips with it, explore its implications,
and evaluate it fairly. There are signs that just this kind of
thoughtful analysis is under way in religion and theology as well
as in criticism and philosophy.38 Much remains to be done, the
work will be difficult, but the prospects are exciting.
2. Dehellenizing
Literary Criticism
In a recent essay, entitled "Fear and Trembling at Yale," Ger-
ald Graff lambastes some of today's leading literary critics,
principally the "Yale School": Harold Bloom, Paul de Man,
Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, and J. Hillis Miller. Graff
points to the supposed self-absorption of these critics, whose
"agony" as critics is said to be the main focus of their criticism;
and he remarks on their disjunctive and self-reflexive style, the
"creative" response they offer to texts, and their overriding
"rejection of objective norms of interpretation."1 These char-
acteristics, in his interpretation, reflect "modernism weary of
itself and knowing it, but not ready to strike out in a different
direction."2 That modernism seems to be epitomized, accord-
ing to Graff, in Derrida's hope, which I cited in the previous
chapter, for a "Nietzschean affirmation—the joyous affirmation
of the freeplay of the world and without truth, without origin,
offered to an active interpretation."3 Graff writes: "The 'free-
play of the world' is the randomness of a world without intrinsic
order or meaning; the 'active' interpretation is that which as-
serts the critic's freedom in this absurd universe—in contrast
to the bad faith of criticism that passively conforms to the text
or to its 'origin,' the 'author's intention.'"4 In the pages that
follow, I explore certain aspects of the work of the "Yale
School," particularly in light of the charges Graff brings, focus-
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ing on Hartman and Derrida. In the next two chapters, I shall
be more specific still, devoting a chapter each to Hartman and
Miller.
According to Bloom and Hartman, the battle of books im-
plied in Graff's discussion between practical, plainstyle, and
"objective" critics and their speculative, visionary, and her-
meneutical opponents may be the battle of the Ancients and
Moderns all over again.5 Like Swift's in A Tale of a Tub, which
engages an earlier battle of books, Graff's faith and that of
other plainstyle critics lies in reason, logic, and order—in the
classical or Hellenistic view of things. The example of Swift
may be instructive. I shall treat A Tale of a Tub at some length
in chapter 7, but here it may suffice to emphasize that no matter
how hard Swift tries in the Tale, order and control elude him,
the straight line he seeks always curves, and the difference,
indeed purity, he hopes for between order and chaos, reason
and madness is beyond his grasp: differences stubbornly
refuse to be clear, sharp, and total. The satirized Hack speaks
truth in spite of Swift when, for example, he observes "how
near the frontiers of height and depth border upon each other,"
adding that "one who travels the east [eventually reaches] the
west" and that "a straight line [will ultimately be] drawn by its
own length into a circle."6 Instead of classical unity and iden-
tity, the Tale reveals inevitable disunity and difference from
itself. In spite of his best efforts, then, Swift's text subverts the
classical hierarchies. Graff's work could be shown to do the
same.
But whether or not order and unity are possible, let alone
desirable, these characteristic features of Hellenism are the
desiderata for Swift and critics like Graff. Just as clearly, the
Yale critics question these and other classical virtues. I do not
think, however, that their opposition to the Ancient, classical,
Hellenistic view of things can be ascribed to modernism, one
feature of which is a "breakthrough" mentality. In fact, the
"Yale School" may be seen as opposing modernism as stren-
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uously as Graff (though from a different direction), but they do
more than swipe at classicism, a point perhaps to be expected,
given that their academic specialties center around the nine-
teenth century. Their efforts may be seen as directed toward
dehellenizing literary criticism, and this is one of their most
important shared characteristics.
Hartman has remarked that criticism is the last bastion of
neoclassicism, and he may be right. Poetry, the novel, and the
drama long ago threw over classicism and its valorization of
decorum, linearity, and centering—one has but to think of
Sterne, Joyce, and Beckett, among many others. Nietzsche
and Heidegger were no less anticlassical, and the same strain
appears prominently in twentieth-century theology, as in Rein-
hold Niebuhr's contention that "the classical culture, elabo-
rated by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, is a western and
intellectual version of a universal type of ahistorical spiritual-
ity."7
Hellenism is, of course, inseparable from humanism, and
Hartman, for one, believes "we are now nearing the end o f . . .
Renaissance humanism." In fact, he writes, the feeling among
literary critics and scholars for some time has been that "liter-
ary humanism was dead." The reason is not hard to find:
"given our present sense of the momentum in science, in poli-
tics, in the psyche—totalitarian terror, atomic terror, and
Freud's hypothesis of an instinctual drive unto death—given all
these types of holocaust, it is hard to maintain the humanist's
faith in the person: his responsibility, agency, and perfectibil-
ity, "s
Until recently, literary criticism had resisted these surround-
ing perspectives and pressures. Still, the predominant critical
mode, whether expressed by New Critics or historical schol-
ars, remains commonsensical, practical, and "objective." Crit-
icism, as practiced in the twentieth century, decides the
meaning of a text. According to one commentator, at least, a
text's "meaning" is the truth that, supposedly transcending the
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play of difference that constitutes language, lies behind or un-
der the textual surface.9 The belief in stable meaning remains
strong, and Graff is certainly not atypical in wishing for "objec-
tive norms of interpretation" nor in maintaining the critic's sub-
servience before a master-text, which, as Eliot insisted, he or
she is merely to elucidate. For Hartman, such a position is
reductive, criticism having more than a functional task. He
writes: "To put criticism at a Platonic remove from its object—
to consider it as referring to literature without being literary—
is to demoralize it as surely as art was demoralized (in theory)
by the Platonic notion of its remove from the archetype. Criti-
cism, in short, is not extraliterary, not outside of literature or art
looking in: it is a defining and influential part of its subject, a
genre with some constant and some changing features."10
Hartman's anticlassicism is no less apparent when he writes
that we should not "make a priori distinctions of a hierarchical
kind between the activities of the human mind by freezing them
into genres."11 Yet criticism continues to separate so-called
primary and so-called secondary texts in the name of differ-
ence, order, and purity. Hartman is clear on the point: "Defen-
sive about their function, [critics] normalize criticism at the price
of mystifying creative genius. It is as if the literary field were
being crassly divided into permissive creativity (fiction) on the
one hand, and schoolmasterly criticism on the other."12
In a lively, consciously playful ("I must pun as I must
sneeze"13), bricoleur style, Hartman by his excesses shatters
critical—and classical—decorum and thereby the generic and
hierarchical distinctions cherished by the classicist. He upsets
our expectations of what criticism is to be. Plainstyle criticism,
we know after reading Hartman and Derrida, is often precisely
that: a silver mediocrity. Isolated from and uncaring about the-
ory and Continental thought with its brooding speculations,
compartmentalized and safely removed from politics, philoso-
phy, and theology, and shorn of many intellectual and social
tasks, today's critic, at least in America and Britain, seems
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comfortably ensconced in the Lockean empirical tradition,
whether he knows it or not. The style is the man, and the critic's
is Gulliverian. No wonder Graff and others are so bothered by
the styles of Hartman and Bloom in particular.
Hartman's aniconic style creates the message. His critical
style decenters, tests limits, and breaks the clear lines that
have been drawn around the critical activity. In his view, criti-
cism must "cross over"—from America and England to the
Continent, from literature to philosophy, from the practical to
the theoretical, and, perhaps most radically, from "objective"
description and elucidation of a master-text to a recognition
that criticism too is creative and indeed fictional, differing from
the novel, say, in degree but not in kind. The effort is toward
demystifying criticism, certainly not purifying it. The possibility
of clear, classical distinctions among definite differences is put
inquestion as Hartman valorizes contamination. Hewrites.forex-
ample, that "criticism as commentary de linea always cros-
ses the line and changes to one trans lineam. The commen-
tator's discourse, that is, cannot be neatly or methodically sep-
arated from that of the author: the relation is contaminating and
chiastic; source text and secondary, though separable, enter
into a mutually supportive, mutually dominating relation."14
To account for this radical understanding of the collapse of
essential differences between literature and philosophy, fiction
and criticism, we go to Derrida and his demonstrations that
writing (Venture) is those texts which reveal their irreducible
doubleness. Alan Bass makes the point succinctly: "The 'dou-
ble science' is . . . the 'science of textuality,' giving a privileged
place to what was formerly called 'literature,' but can no longer
be called such when the relationship to truth and reality that
allegedly distinguished literary, scientific and philosophical
texts from each other breaks down as we are forced to rethink
the metaphysical concept of 'reality' in terms of textuality. What
becomes particularly revelatory for the 'double science' are the
ways of reading 'literary' texts that are governed by the classi-
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cal, metaphysical concepts of interpretation."15 In the situation
thus opened by Derrida, the old distinction between primary
and secondary loses meaning, for, as we have seen, differance
reveals differences within, thereby erasing the radical differ-
ences between. Hartman asserts, in fact, that "writing is living
in the secondary." He adds, "Things get crossed up in this
jittery situation."16
In refusing both to reify and to separate genres, disciplines,
and distinctions, Hartman rejects trie classical sense of unity
and totality. Like Derrida, he prefers the term text to book, for
the latter evokes "the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the
signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless
a totality constituted by the signified preexists it, supervises its
inscriptions and its signs, and is independent of it in its ideality.
The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality,
is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the encyclopedic
protection of theology and of logocentrism against the disrup-
tion of writing, against its aphoristic energy, and . . . against
difference in general."17 Texts thus are open, books closed. It
is appropriate that Hartman's last four "books," like most of
Derrida's, are collections of individual essays, written over a
considerable period of time and (most of them) published sep-
arately. One of Derrida's recent "books," Glas, which has
neither classical beginning nor end and which consists of two
columns running simultaneously on each page, continues this
decentering, detotalizing activity, advancing it to a new level.
The process may also be called dissemination, and it means,
to quote Roland Barthes, that "there is never at bottom, in the
world, but the writing of a writing: writing sends back always
finally to another writing, and the prospect of signs is in a way
infinite."18
The denial of an Ultimate or Transcendental Signified is
perhaps the most important effect of dissemination and differ-
ance. "Sign" has, of course, always implied the existence of
an intelligible "meaning," to which the sign itself refers. What
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is signified thus becomes a "center" which precedes or fol-
lows the sign as a ground. But if, as Saussure argued, signifi-
cation is determined by the system of differences wherein each
sign is inscribed, rather than by the presence of a signified
inside and outside language, then it is clear that language has
no center. Signifier and signified are both involved in differ-
ence. There is no Transcendental Signified, no fullness of pres-
ence—only difference. Armed with this powerful insight,
Derrida deconstructs logocentrism. That is, he effectively de-
stroys the crowning feature of Hellenism: the idea of the logos,
the transcendent principle of structure and order that conveys
meaning to secondariness. For the "Yale School" there is no
logos to which an epiphany might lead from an endless chain
of texts. In Hartman's words, "Writing is always theft or bricol-
age of the logos."19
These points provide additional insight into the style of the
Yale critics, roundly criticized by Graff and others. Their diffi-
cult, sometimes opaque styles not only force the reader to think
things out for himself, but they also frustrate the drive to tran-
scend the chain of signifiers and reach the signified, to "get the
meaning," as if that lay behind the text and governed it. The
Yale critics are frequently—and rightly—said to be unclear.
What is not sufficiently realized is that the concept of clarity as
generally understood may be possible only within the classical
conception of the sign, with the signifier on one side, the sig-
nified on the other, and the former always in the service of the
latter. For the Yale critics, a certain kind of clarity is neither
desirable nor possible.
In place of a logos, then, a lateral dance. Hartman in The
Fate of Reading summarizes the situation as follows, acknowl-
edging his own debt to Derrida: "The perpetually self-displac-
ing, decentering movement of the new philosophical style
shows that value is not dependent on the idea of some primary
or privileged text-moment: value is intrinsically in the domain of
the secondary, of Venture. Writing is a 'second navigation,' as
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Derrida has finely said. With this foregrounding of secondari-
ness I am in agreement."20
Is all this a confirmation of Graff's charges that with the
"Yale School" we are embroiled in an "absurd universe,"
where "the 'freeplay of the world' is the randomness of a world
without intrinsic order or meaning"? Because the world sug-
gested by the Yale critics is one without intrinsic order or
meaning, we are no longer in the presence of the Greek logos.
Derrida's and Hartman's is an anti-Hellenic world.
I mentioned earlier that Hartman regards literary criticism as
the last bastion of neoclassicism. It will perhaps surprise many
that theology has for some time been "declassicized," "de-
hellenized." I look now, however briefly, at the dehellenization
of theology, for such a consideration will help us understand
the project of dehellenizing literary criticism undertaken by the
Yale critics.
Though I cannot say when theology began to distinguish
Hebraic and Christian thinking from the inevitable Hellenic influ-
ence strongly felt in Paul's efforts at accommodation, my read-
ing has uncovered a concerted effort in the 1960s, which is,
interestingly, the period when Derrida was beginning to formu-
late his own attacks on logocentrism (and, as I will suggest, at
least some of the Yale critics were already engaged in anti-
Hellenic projects). No doubt the theological effort was in part
inspired, if not sanctioned, by the well-known work of Paul
Tillich, who sought to transcend theism and reach the "God
beyond God." To begin with a Roman Catholic example, Leslie
Dewart in The Future of Belief calls attention to the "progres-
sive dehellenization" of human consciousness and tries to link
up theology with that movement.21 This powerful trend, accord-
ing to Dewart, effectively spells the end of religion created in
the mode of Greek metaphysics, which can discern reality only
in ens, only in terms of the intelligible and that-which-is. Argu-
ing somewhat like the Anglican John A. T. Robinson in Honest
to God and Tillich in such works as The Courage to Be, Dewart
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insists that the question is whether God is present, not whether
He exists. Among the better-known Protestant anti-Hellenes is
Thomas J. J. Altizer, author of, among other books, The Gospel
of Christian Atheism. Like Dewart, Tillich, and others, Altizer
specifically attacks the Christian "bondage to a transcendent,
a sovereign, and an impassive God," which derives from the
"Greek metaphysical idea of God as an eternal and unmoving
Being."22 Going well beyond Hellenism, Altizer embraces
Nietzsche as a guiding spirit and celebrates the very chaos
Gerald Graff fears. Altizer writes: "Nietzsche's vision of Eternal
Recurrence records the chaos of a world that has fallen away
from its original center. It reflects a totality of perpetual and
meaningless flux; no longer is there a beginning or an end, or,
for that matter, a purpose or goal of any kind."23 In similar
fashion, the Catholic theologian John Dominic Crossan, who
has been influenced by Nietzsche, Borges, Barthes, and Der-
rida, has more recently and joyfully affirmed that "the Holy has
no such plan at all and that is what is absolutely incomprehensi-
ble to our structuring, planning, ordering human minds."24
Crossan's various efforts are directed at countering "the clas-
sical vision of a fixed center out there somewhere."25
The classical vision of a telos is connected in these theolo-
gians' minds with hubris. The Protestant secular theologian
Harvey Cox argues, in fact, that teleology reflects a "gnawing
mixture of hubris and wishful thinking." He explains, sounding
Crossan's note: "It is easy to see an element of hubris in
teleology. Man experiences himself as a purposeful creature.
Unable to believe that the vast cosmos around him is devoid
of such purpose, he projects onto it his own purposive style,
and sometimes assigns himself a crucial place in the telos of
the cosmos."26
Strange as it may appear to some, these theologians' rejec-
tion of the age-old mythological and Hellenic notion of a telos
and of an order ordained by God and built into the nature of
things stems from a recognition that such thinking is unbiblical.
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As Herbert N. Schneidau has well argued, "the classical logos
is none other than the philosophized version of the archaic
cosmic continuum"27—in other words, a patterned and closed
world, which allows man to "found" his existence in the nature
of things, thus giving his life meaning and comforting him. The
biblical vision, as Schneidau has demonstrated, is radically
different. Unsettling to the core, it is open rather than closed
and disconfirms rather than affirms structure; an agent of
man's disillusion, Yahweh is not to be identified with the idols
of the human mind, with nature, place, or structure of any kind:
He is known only by displacement, in His acts. He thus seems
present only in absence.
The differences between Hellenic and biblical thinking are
perhaps clearest with regard to the two understandings of
"word." The Greek term logos refers to the meaning, the or-
dered and reasonable content. There is no Hebraic equivalent
though davhar comes closest to our "word." Davhar, how-
ever, means not only "word" but also "deed." Borrowing from
Thorleif Boman and his authoritative study Hebrew Thought
Compared with Greek, Harold Bloom has drawn the following
contrast:
£>a//7ansatonce"word," "thing" and "act," and its root
meaning involves the notion of driving forward something
that initially is held-back. This is the word as a moral act,
a true word that is at once an object or thing and a deed
or act. A word not an act or thing is thus a lie, something
that was behind and was not driven forward. In contrast
to this dynamic word, the logos is an intellectual concept,
going back to a root meaning that involves gathering,
arranging, putting-into-order. The concept of davhar is:
speak, act, be. The concept of logos is: speak, reckon,
think. Logos orders and makes reasonable the context of
speech, yet in its deepest meaning does not deal with the
function of speaking. Davhar, in thrusting forward what is
44 Reading Deconstruction
concealed in the self, is concerned with . . . getting a
word, a thing, a deed out into the light.28
According to Boman, the terms davhar and logos illustrate
primary and crucial differences between Hebrew and Greek
thought: "on the one side the dynamic, masterful, energetic—
on the other side the ordered, moderate, thought out, calcu-
lated, meaningful, rational."29 To go a step further, the dyna-
mism of Hebraic thinking results in the genuinely open-ended
nature of the biblical sense of history in contrast to the pat-
terned, closed, and totalized nature of Greek thought. This
distinction in turn reflects the Greek emphasis on space as
opposed to the Hebraic and biblical stress on time. Boman
makes the point while drawing some of its important conse-
quences: "Our notion of eternity inherited from Plato . . . is
at base the same thing as the divine beyond . . . and is there-
fore rather more something spatial than something.temporal.
The Hebrew language has no word for the same notion; He-
brew equivalents for eternity are temporal to the extent that
they do not signify things beyond but things pertaining to this
life."30
I am suggesting what at least some of the Yale critics seem
aware of: their opposition to Hellenism and the classical logos
derives from notions strikingly similar to Hebraic and biblical
thought. Indeed, Bloom, who writes that he "prefers the moral-
ity of the Hebrew Bible to that of Homer" and "the Bible aes-
thetically to Homer," remarks in A Map of Misreading:
"Though he nowhere says so, it may be that Derrida is substi-
tuting davhar for logos, thus correcting Plato by a Hebraic
equating of the writing-act and the mark-of-articulation with the
word itself."31 Hartman makes a similar point about Derrida,
observing that he is, in several respects, "Hebrew rather than
Hellene: aniconic yet intensely graphic."32
In focusing in the following paragraphs on Derrida's Hebra-
ism, I do not want to minimize the importance in the other critics
of the parallels I have drawn. Nor do I mean to suggest that
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Derrida has overly influenced the other Yale critics in this mat-
ter. Actually, signs of Hebraism appear variously in Miller's
work in the 1960s, and as early as 1954 Hartman was writing
in The Unmediated Vision about immersion in experience itself
at the expense of a transcendent principle; Hartman propheti-
cally concluded, in fact, "The experiment has only started
which, clearing the mind for the shock of life, would in time
overcome every arbitrary god of the intellect, thus to achieve
a perfect induction and a faultless faith."331 use Derrida here
as a convenient synecdoche.
Derrida's Hebraism is particularly clear in two essays in
Writing and Difference. "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay
on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" begins with a well-
known quotation from Matthew Arnold: "Hebraism and Helle-
nism,—between these two points of influence moves our
world. At one time it feels more powerfully the attraction of one
of them, at another time of the other; and it ought to be, though
it never is, evenly and happily balanced between them." Der-
rida proceeds to analyze the Hebraic quality of Levinas's
thought, particularly in Totality and Infinity. Striking Hebraic
chords as he writes, Derrida says that Levinas "summons us
to a dislocation of the Greek logos, to a dislocation of our
identity, and perhaps of identity in general, and to move toward
what is no longer a source or a site . . . but toward an exhala-
tion, toward a prophetic speech already emitted not only
nearer to the source than Plato or the pre-Socratics, but inside
the Greek origin, close to the other of the Greek."34 In the other
essay to which I referred, "Edmond Jabes and the Question of
the Book," Derrida, following Jabes, aligns writing and Hebra-
ism, affirming "a certain Judaism as the birth and passion of
writing"35 Quoting from Jabes's Livre des questions, Derrida
adds that "Judaism and writing are but the same waiting, the
same hope, the same depletion."36
In Sacred Discontent, as I suggested in the previous chap-
ter, Schneidau argues that a fundamental congruence exists
between Derrida and the Bible. Schneidau demonstrates how
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Derrida's attack on logocentrism derives from the biblically
inscribed Western tradition of decentering. Derrida is, writes
Schneidau, "indebted to the Yahwist vision."37 The Yahwist
vision is stubbornly restless, probing, skeptical, constantly en-
gaged in an effort to demystify and demythologize, attempting
to reveal the constructedness and fictionality of all things. As
such, that vision is suggested in the vanitas vanitatum theme
of Ecclesiastes. Whatever its differences from the biblical tradi-
tion, the Derridean project bears an obvious similarity to it. The
effort, according to John Dominic Crossan, is to overcome
"worship of our own imagination" and find a God "who is
not our own projected vanity."38 According to Hartman, we
find in Paul de Man such a "religious sense of the vanity
of human understanding."39 An attack on man's pride and
on the belief in inevitable progress that will culminate in
man's eventual unfolding of all secrets of life is common to
the Bible and the Derridean vision. Like Crossan and Miller,
I believe, Schneidau finds Derrida a way beyond modern sub-
jectivism, nihilism, and belief in the autonomous conscious-
ness.
Certainly, from the perspective opened up by Schneidau,
we can begin to understand Derrida's attack on stable meaning
and the Transcendental Signified as like the theologians' impa-
tience with metaphysics. I suppose we can say that with both
the point to be questioned and even deconstructed is "is-
ness." If the theologians want to go beyond the God who "is,"
transcending as it were "the static 'is' as the normative predi-
cate for God,"40 their aim may not be so different from Der-
rida's, who denies that we can know anything outside the
endless chain of substitutions that are signs. We can know only
signs, one pointing to another within the field of substitutions.
Even within these sets of relations, nothing is stable because
of the "trace." The "trace" establishes difference within,
meaning that texts of whatever kind are divided, differ from
themselves, thus rendering stable and univocal meaning im-
possible.
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In place of stable meaning appears what Derrida calls "free-
play," a tremendously creative and exhilarating possibility. The
parallel seems close between the conception of freeplay and
the dehellenization of theology, which transforms the static
idea of God's omnipotence into a sense of the radical open-
ness of history. The result is similar: freedom, notably the free-
dom to make. "Freed of its sacred aura, the world can now be
recreated by man"; it is "totally open to future creation by
man. "41 Though the Yale critics would neither sloganize like
the theologian nor reify their conceptualizations, Altizer per-
haps comes closest to making explicit the parallel I have sug-
gested when he writes: "total affirmation of the world . . .
becomes possible only when the world appears as chaos, and
man is liberated from every transcendent root and ground."42
Such a position can be unsettling, as well as exhilarating.
But neither differance nor freeplay need arouse the cries of
nihilism coming from writers like Graff. Crossan, in fact, has
shown how the Bible is dis-seminatively fissured from within,
Jesus constantly engaging in freeplay, challenging, even
deconstructing the major traditions of Israel's inheritance, as
well as those of Christianity. The argument is hardly new, of
course, Nietzsche having written in The Will to Power: "What
did Christ deny? Everything that is today called Christian."43
Whether or not we are ready to hear Nietzsche, we should note
Crossan's argument as well as Andrew J. McKenna's account
of it in Diacritics. McKenna writes that Crossan has articulated
"Jesus' opposition to any notion of end and conceivably to any
determinate meaning whatsoever. The 'sign of contradiction'
fulfills his mission by his playful testimony to the contradiction
of signs."44 McKenna's own contribution, beyond Crossan, is
to take with appropriate seriousness Derrida's suggestion in
Glas to "perfect the resemblance between Dionysus and
Christ."45 McKenna thus returns us to Nietzsche, as do Altizer
and Derrida himself: "Jesus' indifference to dogma, etc., par-
takes for Nietzsche of his active indifference to difference: The
"glad tidings" are precisely that there are no more opposites'
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(Anti-Christ, No. 32). It is just this 'faith in opposite values,'
which Nietzsche reproaches to metaphysicians."46
Despite the similarities I have drawn, on one point at least
Derrida appears to differ profoundly from the radical theolo-
gians. For he denies over and over again that any such dehelle-
nizing can be complete and total. It is impossible to step
outside metaphysics; the attempt to do so will necessarily be
couched in the very terms the antimetaphysician aims to dis-
lodge. Thus, despite his claims to the contrary, Levi-Strauss,
for example, remains within the tradition he denies. Derrida
insists, therefore, that differance "has neither existence nor
essence. It belongs to no category of being, present or absent.
And yet what is thus denoted as difference is not theological,
not even in the most negative order of negative theology....
Not only is differance irreducible to every ontological or theo-
logical—onto-theological—reappropriation, but it opens up the
very space in which onto-theology—philosophy—produces its
system and its history."47 Derrida's rigorous and self-con-
scious attention to language thus allows for insight beyond the
point reached by the theologians.
Moreover, it would be easy enough to show that the opposi-
tions I have repeatedly drawn between Hellenism and Hebra-
ism are neither sharp nor complete. If the theologians, despite
their best efforts, cannot ever fully dehellenize theology, the
Hellenes themselves can be shown, like Swift, to differ from
themselves; in their texts will be found traces of the radically
other that in this instance, I have argued, is Hebraism. The point
is instructive for literary criticism. It can never be fully dehelle-
nized (or deconstructed) either. Though it can certainly
become more self-conscious than at present, it will, must re-
main impure, both the "Yale School" and the "classical crit-
ics" being inextricably involved with one another, bound
together in spite of themselves, requiring each other, like host
and parasite. In the final analysis, the dehellenizing of literary
criticism is as futile as it is inevitable. These points, and many
more, the Yale critics are well aware of.
3. Reader-Responsibility
Criticism:
The Recent Work
of Geoffrey Hartman
Even as reading as an activity has declined, the Age of the
Reader has arrived, at least so far as literary theory is con-
cerned. In what amounts to a virtual paradigm shift, emphasis
on the reader seems to have replaced focus on "the text itself."
Certainly reader-response criticism is now a burgeoning indus-
try, the past couple of years having produced several important
books dealing with the reader or the reading process. These
include Robert Crosman's Reading "Paradise Lost, " William
Beatty Warner's Reading "Clarissa," Suzanne Kappeler's
Writing and Reading in Henry James, Paul de Man's Allegories
of Reading, Umberto Eco's The Role of the Reader, Wolfgang
Iser's The Act of Reading, Stanley Fish's Is There a Text in This
Class?, and at least two collections of essays by several
hands, The Reader in the Text, edited by Susan Suleiman and
Inge Crosman, and Reader-Response Criticism, edited by
Jane P. Tompkins. The last two titles bring together essays
representing several theoretical orientations (from New Criti-
cism to structuralism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and
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deconstruction) and in so doing reveal some interesting com-
mon ground among competing positions.
As my inclusion of Paul de Man in the list above is meant to
suggest, the "Yale School," or "hermeneutical mafia," to
which de Man is said to belong, is importantly concerned with
the reader and the reading process, even if not directly linked
with reader-response criticism as commonly understood.
Books by these critics include, in addition to de Man's recent
book, Bloom's A Map of Misreading and Hartman's The Fate
of Reading, as well as a host of essays theoretical and critical
bearing on reading. Hartman's strong interest in understanding
reading continues undiminished in his two most recent books,
Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of Literature Today
(1980) and Saving the Text: Literature/Derrida/Philosophy
(1981). In this chapter I want to focus on these important texts,
destined, I believe, to make a difference in the way criticism is
regarded. I limit my study for both practical and strategic rea-
sons: others have written well on Hartman, and I have treated
much of his earlier work in the preceding chapter.1 I do not
mean to imply essential changes in Hartman, but it is particu-
larly his later efforts that have drawn heated remarks from
various commentators. I argue that Hartman, who resists the
usual labels assigning one to one school or another, now prac-
tices and enacts what may be called reader-responsibility criti-
cism (the term is mine, not his), that this differs in important
ways from reader-response criticism, and that Hartman's criti-
cism bears close analogies and reveals profound indebted-
ness to biblical, especially rabbinical, exegesis. I hope that one
result of my essay will be to reduce the charges of irresponsibil-
ity brought against Hartman and some others, who are fre-
quently said to indulge in "hermeneutical highjinks."2 The
claim bruited about is that the reader is no longer responsible
to the text, the (needless) worry that "the reader will be allowed
or encouraged to grant his unconstrained subjective re-
sponses the status of meaning."3
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For all the diversity in theoretical orientation that may reside,
however uncomfortably, under the umbrella of reader-
response criticism, it is clear that such criticism examines "au-
thors' attitudes toward their readers, the kinds of readers
various texts seem to imply, the role actual readers play in the
determination of literary meaning, the relation of reading con-
ventions to textual interpretation, and the status of the reader's
self."4 Though some such critics (e.g., Gerald Prince) focus on
the reader in the text, most reader-response critics assume
either the reader's dominance of the text (e.g., David Bleich
and Norman Holland) or the ideal reader's interaction with it
(Stephen Booth, Stanley Fish, Wolfgang Iser). Especially since
Steven J. Mailloux has helpfully detailed the "critical moves"
made in reader-response criticism in describing the interaction
of reader and text, 5 I shall keep my own description brief.
Generally, reader-response critics, including those in the last
category just listed, assume a reader who is an active partici-
pant in the reading process, not a passive observer. Preferring
a temporal rather than a spatial model of the reading experi-
ence, these critics are inclined to ask not "what a work
says or shows" but rather "what it does."e Meaning, in this
view, becomes "an event, something that happens, not on the
page, where we are accustomed to look for it, but in the interac-
tion between the flow of print (or sound) and the actively me-
diating consciousness of a reader-hearer." Indeed, "the mind
of the reader becomes the 'poem's scene.' " 7 As I have said,
variations occur, refinements are necessary in this description,
and many questions are raised that I cannot go into here, but
the above may serve at least as one context for considering
Geoffrey Hartman's reader-responsibility criticism.
In Criticism in the Wilderness, moreover, Hartman directly
treats aspects of reader-response criticism. For example, he
allows us a close glimpse of his response to such criticism
when he distinguishes his position from both objective and
subjective interpretation. These, he claims, "ignore equally the
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resistance of art to the meanings it provokes"; whereas objec-
tive interpretation "would regulate the understanding, so that
it does not waste itself," subjective interpretation "would
deregulate it, since the problem is not subjectivity but our over-
reaction to it, an excess of social rules and psychic defenses"
(p. 269). Hartman's alternative (he resists either/or choices),
about which more later, is a proposal for indeterminacy, a
concept which "explores the 'blind lawfulness' (Kant) of imagi-
nation, or how art allows the understanding to produce its own
form of meaningfulness" (ibid.). Elsewhere in Criticism in the
Wilderness, Hartman establishes some distance from what he
calls "reader reception," by which he means, first of all, the
Rezeptions-asthetik practiced by Hans-Robert Jauss but prob-
ably as well the better-known (at least in this country) reader-
response criticism of Fish, Iser, and others. "Reader
reception," Hartman says, smacks of accommodation: "of re-
storing public ability to respond to mythopoeic art" (p. 88).
Suspicious of accommodation and determined to preserve the
strangeness and alterity of art, Hartman writes in Saving the
Text that "critical readers resist the intuitive and accommodat-
ing approach, and chart the space between understanding and
agreement"; critical reading, he adds, "is not only the recep-
tion (Rezeption) of a text, but also its conception (Empfang-
nis) through the ear."8
At any rate, rather than on the reader, the reading process,
or response as these are defined by reader-response critics
mentioned above, Hartman stresses, and values, obligation.
Instead of response, understood as an emotional or intellectual
effect aroused in the process of reading, Hartman emphasizes
the reader's engagement, personal involvement, and account-
ability, the burden and "stress of vocation" that comes with
reading. Such a poem as "Leda and the Swan," he writes,
"obliges the reader to become active, even to risk something"
{CW, pp. 272-73). Believing that hermeneutics is "our daily
bread," Hartman tries to understand understanding and so is
not principally interested in explicating or even understanding
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a text as a distinct entity. He is more probing and philosophical
—more Germanic, if you will—than most reader-response crit-
ics. Taken with (and by?) ultimate questions, Hartman finds it
impossible, as well as undesirable, to "purify" literature of
philosophical or theological "contaminants."
Indeed, Hartman characterizes the critic as one who "re-
lates the adventures of his soul among masterpieces" {CW, p.
11). Appearing different from most deconstructionists, includ-
ing Derrida, whom he certainly admires, Hartman proceeds to
claim, like the so-called new hermeneuticists, that in criticism
"we deal not with language as such, nor with the philosophy
of language, but with how books or habits of reading penetrate
our lives" {CW, p. 203). To the reader, whether critic or not,
texts "call" and demand a response. Hartman uses various
terms, many of them religious and theological, to describe this
situation. He says that "testimony" is solicited, an "answerable
style" demanded, as the text "clarifies an existential situation:
it places the respondent who accepts the 'point' or 'charge' "
{CW, pp. 197, 167, 171). A real "burden" falls on the reader
or critic, for if "certain works have become authoritative, it is
because they at once sustain, and are sustained by, the read-
ers they find" {CW, p. 170). In Hartman's view, therefore, a
symbiotic relation occurs between texts and readers, each
requiring the other: the strength of books, he maintains, "is
measured by our response, or not at all" {CW, p. 177). Sought
by texts is a strong response, one that will likely lead to more
writing. "The difference that reading makes," Hartman con-
tends, "is, most generally, writing" {CW, p. 19). Reading and
writing are thus symbiotic also, for "reading at its closest leads
to the counter-fabrication of writing.... We cannot gain real
insight into an artist or ourselves by pure contemplation, only
by the contemplation that making {poesis) enables" {CW, p.
53).
About the kind of response texts demand Hartman is some-
what more specific. The critic's responsibility is, in part, to be
patient: to watch and wait in what Hartman, deeply Hebraic,
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variously describes as a threshold situation and as the wilder-
ness. The great temptation remains to imagine that the Prom-
ised Land lies just ahead, with access to it guaranteed by some
master theory (CW, pp. 130, 165, 185). Such theories offer
conclusions and close off "hermeneutical perplexity," and
Hartman believes that the negative is the only positive we have.
Unlike Matthew Arnold, who thought "our errand in the wilder-
ness would end," Hartman proclaims that "this wilderness is
all we have"; even so, "it is better that the wilderness should
be the Promised Land, than vice-versa" (CW, p. 15). Yet the
wilderness needs to be seen as it is and accepted. Commen-
tary's job, accordingly, is "to save the text by continuing it in
our consciousness" (CW, p. 268), and part of the reader's
responsibility is to "keep a poem in mind," for to do so "is to
keep it there, not to resolve it into available meanings" {CW,
p. 274). Hartman insists that major art calls for "exact witness
that cannot be co-opted" or merely accommodated (CW, p.
183).
The argument for "hermeneutical perplexity" necessarily
places a burden on the critical essay, which, says Hartman,
"stands at the very intersection of what is perceived to be a
past to be carried forward, and a future that must be kept
open" (CW, p. 199). In Criticism in the Wilderness, Hartman
devotes considerable attention to the essay, particularly in a
previously published chapter entitled "Literary Commentary as
Literature." Here he approvingly quotes Pater's contention that
the essay is "like that long dialogue with oneself, that dialectic
process, which may be coextensive with life. It does in truth
little more than clear the ground, or the atmosphere, or the
mental tablet" (CW, p. 193). Focusing on Lukacs's "The
Nature and Form of the Essay," Hartman, who elsewhere pun-
ningly refers to the usual scholarly article as "the definite arti-
cle," writes that "in an essayistic mode everything, including
the ending, is always arbitrary or ironic: the one question dis-
solves into the many, and even the external as distinguished
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from the internal interruptions serve to keep things open. The
consciously occasional nature of the essay prevents closure"
(ibid.). As a mode of writing, the essay bears an important
analogy to the concept of "hermeneutical perplexity," for the
essay "acknowledges occasionalism, stays within it, yet re-
moves from accident and contingency that taint of gratuitous-
ness which the mind is always tempted to deny or else to
mystify'' (p. 194). Linking his discussion of the essay to his own
work and specifically to the ideas suggested in his title, as well
as to his Hebraism, Hartman writes, "The essayist-critic . . .
cannot himself embody the idea. He heralds [Harolds?] it,
wakes our sense for it, but remains its precursor... the one
who foresees but is a threshold figure, like Moses or John the
Baptist" (ibid.).
The responsible critic, we may be tempted to conclude from
reading Hartman, writes in the essayistic mode, which is prob-
ing, open-ended, and inclusive, rather than in the form of the
book, which suggests, as Derrida contends, the totality of a
system. Accordingly, Hartman says of his own efforts in Criti-
cism in the Wilderness, echoing comments quoted above from
the discussion of Lukacs's essay on the essay: "I am describ-
ing a situation, and I have no specific remedy for it. It is only
the false remedies, the quack responses, one would be oppos-
ing" (p. 157). In a similar vein he declares later, "I want to
emphasize the problem rather than pretend to solve it" (p.
211), and at volume's end he writes, "I remain skeptical . . .
about the possibility of a truly comprehensive literary theory or
literary history" (p. 299). Indeed, one of Hartman's great
strengths is his refusal both to systematize and to reduce com-
plex works of art to simple meanings, choices, and responses.
Just as he willingly remains in the wilderness, so he does
without some "key" that might open a text or psyche, "slipping
'into all signifying lacunae' like a 'universal phallus' " {STT, p.
105). For Hartman, "if there is a key, the author has locked the
text and, as it were, thrown the key away—into the text"
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(ibid.). Perhaps, then, Susan A. Handelman is right when she
declares that reading Hartman "one does not feel as when
reading Bloom, or de Man, or Derrida that texts are being
processed through a pre-determined schema—and roughly
forced to yield up their meanings."9 The name for what Hart-
man does, I suggest, is reader-responsibility.
Enigmas abound in Hartman's work, his writing resembling
that of a bricoleur, certainly not an engineer. Quotations rang-
ing from Genesis to Genet and from Boehme to Smart intro-
duce sections of Saving the Text, and Hartman alludes to
scores of artists literary and graphic, apparently remembering
everything he has seen or read. It is obvious that Hartman
holds in mind those he treats directly and at some length, such
as Lukacs, Benjamin, Carlyle, Yeats, and Dickinson (his is not
a naively representational view of the critic's function) and that
he has been profoundly affected by reading Derrida (still, he
can write, for instance: "A restored theory of representation
should acknowledge the deconstructionist challenge as neces-
sary and timely, if somewhat self-involved—that is, only occa-
sionally reflective of analogies to its own project in religious
writing and especially in literary writing," STT, p. 121). Not so
obvious, perhaps, are several others whose work bears analo-
gies to Hartman's, work which he does not quite digest—nor
mean to digest. Among the more important are Gombrich and
his work on the psychology of perception and "the beholder's
share"; Jauss and reception-aesthetics; Jean Starobinski's re-
cently translated book which presents Saussure's work on
words within words {Words upon Words); Bakhtin and his
revolutionary sense of the dialogical nature of language; the
entire Germanic tradition of hermeneutics, from Dilthey to Bult-
mann, the "new hermeneutic" of Ebeling and Fuchs, and, of
course, both Gadamer and Heidegger; and not least, Martin
Buber, whose / and Thou is a call to relation, and to whom I
shall return shortly. Hartman broods over these and many other
texts, "keep[ing] in mind the peculiarity or strangeness of what
is studied" (CW, p. 26), not fully digesting them (his is also a
Deconstructive Reading 57
criticism of indigestion). As he puts it, "The interpreter now
evokes the writers of the past in such an engaged and personal
way that it is more difficult for us to 'digest' or 'assimilate'
them" (CW, p. 59).
Hartman's own term for his efforts, indebted to Hebraism, a
"hermeneutics of indeterminacy," connotes the sense of re-
sponsibility I am laboring to describe, for he proposes "a type
of analysis that has renounced the ambition to master or
demystify its subject" {CW, p. 41). Hermeneutics, he insists,
"is an art that grows out of perplexity, out of finding an enigma
where we expected a kerygma," and indeterminacy as a con-
cept "resists formally the complicity with closure implied by the
wish to be understood or the communication-compulsion asso-
ciated with it." Thus, continues Hartman, "Reading itself
becomes the project: we read to understand what is involved
in reading as a form of life, rather than to resolve what is read
into glossy ideas" {CW, pp. 271-72). Distinguishing his inter-
ests from typical reader-response criticism, Hartman explains
that "indeterminacy does not merely delay the determination
of meaning, that is, suspend premature judgments and allow
greater thoughtfulness. The delay is not heuristic alone, a de-
vice to slow the act of reading till we appreciate (I could think
here of Stanley Fish) its complexity. The delay is intrinsic: from
a certain point of view, it is thoughtfulness itself, Keats's 'nega-
tive capability,' a labor that aims not to overcome the negative
or indeterminate but to stay within it as long as is necessary"
{CW, p. 270). Indeterminacy, the essay, hermeneutical per-
plexity, the wilderness—do not these ideas point to a common
concern? Unlike many (most?) other critics, who quest for a
key to the Promised Land, Hartman appears remarkably pa-
tient in the wilderness—willing to remain "in the turn between
terms and words" or between words and the Word (577; p.
91).
Indeterminacy also produces contamination, contagion,
shuttling, symbiosis, or—to use one of Hartman's favorite
words—chiasmus. As he punningly remarks, "end" turns into
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"and" {STT, p. 30), and he suggests the general point when
he describes his own activity in the Introduction to Criticism in
the Wilderness: "I find myself following a personal and maca-
ronic procedure in this book. I allow a formal idea within critical
theory to elicit the analysis of a poem, and vice-versa; my
shuttling between, on the one hand, two critical traditions and,
on the other, works of art and works of reading, should be
deliberate enough to suggest that criticism is within literature"
(pp. 5-6). Just as reading cannot be purely separated from
writing, or the reader from the text, neither can literature from
commentary, literature from philosophy, or even the holy from
the profane. Reader and text, for example, simply "cross-
over": "criticism as commentary de linea always crosses the
line and changes to one trans lineam. The commentator's dis-
course, that is, cannot be neatly or methodically separated
from that of the author: the relation is contaminating and chias-
tic; source text and secondary text, though separable, enter
into a mutually supportive, mutually dominating relation" (CW,
p. 206). The result? "The situation of the discourse we name
criticism is, therefore, no different from that of any other. If this
recognition implies a reversal," Hartman contends, "then it is
the master-servant relation between criticism and creation that
is being overturned in favor of what Wordsworth, describing
the interaction of nature and mind, called 'mutual domination'
or 'interchangeable supremacy' " (CW, p. 259).
I have suggested reader-response criticism as a context in
which to consider Hartman's differential work on reading and
reader-responsibility. Now I would like, more briefly, to suggest
some contexts—and with them, philosophical and theological
implications—for a more precise understanding of Hartman's
call for responsibility. Though I will note some parallels and
analogues, I will not mainly be concerned with questions of
indebtedness; as I have already indicated, Hartman cannot
easily be labeled, he does not subscribe to any "master the-
ory," and so we hear in his texts many voices.
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We might begin this consideration with Hartman's remark in
Saving the Text on "how much responsibility is on the respon-
dent, on the interpreter. Dialogue itself is at stake" (p. 134). He
explains: "the literary text or artifact is a gift for which the
interpreter must find words, both to recognize the gift, and then
to allow it to create a reciprocating dialogue, one that might
overcome the embarrassment inspired by art's riddling
strength" (pp. 135-36). In other words, troth rather than truth:
"the ability to exchange thoughts in the form of words; to
recognize words of the other; or to trust in the words to be
exchanged. One breaks words with the other as one breaks
bread" (p. 137). Language being dialogical ("the genuine
logos is always a dia-logos," p. 109), relation is required,
and we begin to hear both Bakhtin and Buber. Indeed, Hart-
man's sense of responsibility bears a close analogy to Buber's
discussion of the centrality of "the unreliable, unsolid, unlast-
ing, unpredictable, dangerous world of relation," from which
man is said to flee in that false drive for "self-affirmation arising
out of the insecurity of life" which often leads to the having of
things.10 Hartman himself makes the connection in discussing
Bloom's use of Buber in his early book on Shelley: "Like Bu-
ber's 'I-Thou,' fundamental words of desire, of an apostrophe
that remains open because the desired 'Thou' is a relation and
not an object and cannot be fixed or imaged except as a
naturalized or neutered 'It,' so an intuition of the discontinuous,
fickle, yet transcendent character of relational bonds saves
Shelley from a belated and superficial allegory of love and a
sentimental worship of past myths" (CIV, p. 102). Though we
would all prefer (presumably) to have fixed identities and to
keep things "in place," preventing contamination or symbiosis,
crossing occurs, and moreover the text in Hartman's view is a
"Thou," a relation and not an object. The reader's responsibil-
ity is to preserve relation and "a reciprocating dialogue."
Because, in Hartman's view, "the genuine logos is always
a dia-logos," writing is "a sort of disaffiliation (a disclosure of
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the absence of a single father or unique logos)" (577; p. 121).
Hartman borrows Derrida's term for this situation, "dissemina-
tion": "that which does not return to the father" (577; p. 48).
Indeed, we must abandon "all hope of returning to the father
by imitating a Word that was 'in the beginning'"(p. 49),
for texts "are so separated from a direct logo-imitative intention
by [Derrida's] deconstructive readings that they cannot be re-
turned to the father: their author, or their author in heaven"
(p. 51). Words are thus, Hartman argues, scattered and
sown, and we must learn "how to reap a page" (the title of the
third chapter of Saving the Text).
The implications for the reader of the absence of the father
and of dissemination are, I take it, somewhat as follows (I draw
on Lacan here, as Hartman does): There being no final author-
ity present, no Transcendental Signified, determinate meaning
is impossible. Meaning is scattered, dispersed, any "key" hav-
ing been, as it were, "thrown away—into the text." "This er-
rancy of meaning cannot be gathered back: there is no certain
matrix. Language is error and cannot be purified" (577; p. 83).
As such major texts as The Odyssey, Hamlet, and Joyce's
Ulysses demonstrate, it is extremely difficult to bear the fa-
ther's absence, and indeed we usually try to fill the gap by
taking the father's place: in this case, positing determinacy
where none otherwise exists. Determinate meaning thus
becomes a performative act, but such an act is akin to the
suitors' usurpation of Odysseus's place in Ithaca and represents
self-affirmation and the negation of relation.11 In terms of read-
ing, it means a willful and egoistic imposition of closure and
determinacy, as well as a reductiveness that essentially elimi-
nates "the other." Hartman argues for and enacts, I believe, an
alternative via his "hermeneutics of indeterminacy." In the
terms I have been using in this essay, with the absence of the
father come enormous responsibilities for the reader (were
the father simply present, reading would be easy and effort-
less, consisting of obedience to directions). The reader must
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act for, not as, the absent father, not take his place but accept
-difference from him. The reader must, in short, carry on the
work of the absent father, reaping the page that has been sown
and left to grow, bearing the responsibility of work.
Indeterminacy, patient and watchful waiting, the reading of
signs—these are Jewish ideas and characteristic of "the peo-
ple of the book." Hartman's Hebraism, which I treated at some
length in the previous chapter, appears as well, I suggest, in
his opposition to turning "a book into a bible whose truth is
revealed rather than read" (STT, p. 86). It appears too in his
opposition to the Hellenic notion that the "spirit continually
comes to rest, or arrests itself, in an object" {STT, p. 84); just
as the Ark is always empty, so is the father absent and meaning
dispersed rather than arrested in an object. As Bloom has
written, meaning "is always wandering meaning, even as the
Jews were a wandering people."12 Like Buber, who so in-
fluenced the early Bloom, Hartman is more interested in rela-
tions than objects.
Hartman's reference in Criticism in the Wilderness to Beryl
Smalley's The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages allows me
to move to my last point. In discussing this matter of artistic
objects, Hartman makes this point, via Smalley, concerning
allegorical exegesis: " 'It is as though we were invited to focus
our eyes not on the physical surface of the object, but on infinity
as seen through the lattice' " (p. 236). Thus continues Hart-
man, " 'we are invited to look not at the text, but through it'—
which recalls William Blake's comment that the visionary poet
looks through rather than with the eye" {CW, p. 236). We hear
in such passages a Hebraic opposition to idolatry. If, as Hart-
man writes, Derrida's "Glas is of the House of Galilee," he is
himself the Wandering Jew (577; pp. 19, 144).
At any rate, Hartman's sense of reader-responsibility is
deeply indebted to the responsibility exhibited by biblical ex-
egetes, and he advocates a return to such practice. Thus in
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Criticism in the Wilderness, lamenting the fact of "so little ex-
egetical daring" (p. 4), he writes that "pleasure may return to
the critic if he imitates older, more sacred modes of commen-
tary" (p. 176). More specifically: "We can only urge that read-
ers, inspired by hermeneutic traditions, take back some of their
authority and become both creative and thoughtful.... The
rabbinical or patristic exegete was creative within a
scrupulosity as exacting as any invented by the extreme apos-
tles of the Catholic or Puritan conscience; he pretended not to
violate the letter of Scripture or else he took pleasure in the
strict counterpoint of letter and spirit, of apparent meaning and
recreative commentary" (p. 161). Hartman's description of the
interpreter calls to mind especially the Rabbis, for "as far afield
as their discussions carried them, no matter how many free
associations were spun out of a particular word or verse, the
Rabbis insisted on the letter; they never swerved from their
belief that the Oral tradition was embedded in the Written. They
maintained the general hermeneutical principle that 'no Biblical
text may be divorced from its simple meaning' but also that 'he
who translates a verse according to its literal form is a falsi-
fier.' "13 The way in which for Orthodox Judaism, as well as for
the Kabbalah, commentary was part of the text and the text part
of the commentary is, of course, like Hartman's sense that
criticism is already in literature. Moreover, to cite but one more
analogue, Rabbi Akiba, to whom Hartman is drawn (his recent
volume of poems is entitled Akiba's Children), seems to have
anticipated Hartman's insistence on hearing the words within
words, for Akiba "held that every verse, indeed every word,
letter, particle, conjunction, repetition, every flourish and horn
of each letter (and assuredly every phoneme) held many mean-
ings.""1
What appears in the Rabbis is also everywhere present in
Hartman: a rejection of "either/or" in favor of "both/and." For
while insisting on the letter, the Midrash "was concerned with
off-centered phenomena such as word-play, anagrams, acros-
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tics, bad jokes, things that seemed meaningless or insignifi-
cant."15 In continuing, in displaced fashion, this mode of
exegesis and hermeneutical speculation, Hartman exhibits re-
sponsibility to texts and to thought and understanding, shut-
tling between theory and practice, poems and ideas. His is
work of critical importance, his last two books especially ad-
dressing readers and the current critical crisis, in perhaps a
more responsible way than most of the rather shrill voices now
clamoring for priority with their essentially reductive systems
and keys to literary understanding. Hartman's plea for her-
meneutical patience and reader-responsibility is eloquent and
demanding. How do we answer his call?
4. J. Hillis Miller,
Deconstruction, and the
Recovery of Transcendence
Following publication of Charles Dickens: The World of His
Novels (1958), The Disappearance of God (1963), and Poets
of Reality (1965), J. Hillis Miller became known as one of the
most knowledgeable and articulate spokesmen for religion in
modern literature. These works, and others, not only testify
powerfully to Miller's interest as a literary critic in religious
questions, but they also reveal his own deep religious convic-
tions. A member of what was originally the Society for Religion
in Higher Education, Miller has frequently contributed to confer-
ences dealing with the growing interest in literature and reli-
gion, and his work has been reprinted in collections on religion
in modern literature.1 As he put it in a subtle and judicious
essay "Literature and Religion," written for the Modern Lan-
guage Association volume on Relations of Literary Study, "the
religious commitment of the critic, or lack of it, cannot be con-
sidered irrelevant to his work."2
Through the mid-1960s Miller wrote under the influence of
the important Swiss critic Georges Poulet, a practitioner of the
"criticism of consciousness." This critical method, which ex-
plores the existential situation of authors treated and which
seeks to identify the critic's consciousness with the author's, is
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particularly interested in metaphysical and ontological ques-
tions and seemed quite congenial to, if not constitutive of,
Miller's own religious inclinations. Beginning in the late 1960s,
however, as attested by The Form of Victorian Fiction (1968)
and the revision of an essay entitled "Georges Poulet's 'Criti-
cism of Identification,' " Miller came under the influence of
Jacques Derrida, the father of deconstruction. Thomas Hardy:
Distance and Desire (1970), and more than two dozen subse-
quent essays on a variety of topics, including the recently pub-
lished Fiction and Repetition (1982), reflect Miller's adoption of
deconstructive critical procedures. Indeed, Miller has to a large
extent been responsible for the growing prominence of decon-
struction in America.
Does Miller's switch from Poulet to Derrida and to the "tradi-
tion of difference" entail a marked change in religious outlook?
A careful study of Miller's criticism, both before and after this
conversion, may allow us to penetrate more deeply than has
been done before into the far-reaching implications of decon-
struction, as well as to shed light on the critical odyssey of
Miller himself.
As a way of beginning our consideration, I turn to one of the
more recent attacks on deconstruction, for the attack appears
in terms directly relevant to our concerns. Writing in the
Georgia Review, Harold Fromm discusses the supposed ab-
surdity and nihilism of this new movement: "When Derrida
speaks in Of Grammatology of the 'End of the Book and the
Beginning of Writing' he has described the present situation.
But when the integrative whole symbolized by the book turns
into the indeterminate and open-ended 'text' of 'writing,' we are
in a world without value." Fromm goes on, "In methodology
like this, the Logos has been discredited while in its place is
offered a plenitude of psychological detritus in which all data,
like sparrows and hairs, must not only be noticed but must be
cherished as well. And since they are not being cherished by
an absent God, they must be noticed and cherished by a seem-
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ingly present Man. Formerly, value was derived from present-
ness in the consciousness of God. Can equally plausible value
be derived from mere presentness in the consciousness of
Man?"3 Though Fromm's concern is admirable and his worry
perhaps understandable, his objection to deconstruction, at
least as embraced and practiced by Miller, is to those same
features of modernism this movement precisely appears to
confront. The charges Fromm brings against deconstruction
are, I shall attempt to show, based on a shallow understanding
of the principles involved. As a matter of fact, Fromm's attack
evidently stems from a desire to salvage transcendence; he
writes: "at present, in a period of 'absence,' with God beyond
the horizon, the very notion of transcendence becomes sus-
pect, if not unintelligible.... Without the assurance of 'pres-
ence,' it can no longer be believed that anything whatever
possesses unlimited value, nor do literary texts constitute an
exception."4 Actually, Miller's critical journey is an attempt to
recover transcendence, lost by modernism.
Miller's odyssey begins in his "Geneva" phase, which has
been studied by Sarah Lawall, Vernon Ruland, and Vincent B.
Leitch.5 Certainly a most important aspect of Miller's work in
this phase is the recent history of Western consciousness,
which he traces in The Disappearance of God and Poets of
Reality. Focusing on De Quincey, Browning, Emily Bronte, Ar-
nold, and Hopkins, the earlier book describes the absence of
God in the nineteenth century, culminating with the climax of
Hopkins's own spiritual journey, wherein he accepts the Catho-
lic doctrine of the Real Presence and so, according to Miller,
rejects "three hundred and fifty years which seem to be taking
man inexorably toward the nihilism of Nietzsche's "Gott ist
tot.' "6 But if Miller sees Hopkins and other nineteenth-century
writers "stretched on the rack of a fading transcendentalism,"
his own belief at the time "in a progressing history of meta-
physical insight,"7 leads him toward a presence which fills the
absence experienced by the Victorians. He thus ends The
Disappearance of God:
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Only in Browning, of the writers studied here, are there
hints and anticipations of that recovery of immanence
which was to be the inner drama of twentieth-century
literature. Browning alone seems to have glimpsed the
fact that the sad alternatives of nihilism and escape
beyond the world could be evaded if man would only
reject twenty-five hundred years of belief in the dualism
of heaven and earth. If man could do this he might come
to see that being and value lie in this world, in what is
immediate, tangible, present to man, in earth, sun, sea,
in the stars in their courses, and in what Yeats was to call
"the foul-rag-and-bone shop of the heart." But Browning,
like De Quincey, Arnold, Hopkins, and Emily Bronte, was
stretched on the rack of a fading transcendentalism, and
could reach a precious unity only by the most extravagant
stratagems of the spirit.8
In Poets of Reality Miller goes beyond the point described
here, tracing, in Conrad, Yeats, Eliot, Thomas, Stevens, and
Williams, a "journey beyond nihilism toward a poetry of real-
ity," a journey that the critic experiences from within and in-
deed parallels in his own being. The starting point, for the
twentieth century, is the recognition that God is dead, mur-
dered by humanistic egotism: "when God and the creation
become objects of consciousness, man becomes a nihilist.
Nihilism is the nothingness of consciousness when conscious-
ness becomes the foundation of everything. Man the murderer
of God and drinker of the sea of creation wanders through the
infinite nothingness of his own ego. Nothing now has any worth
except the arbitrary value he sets on things as he assimilates
them into his consciousness.... In the emptiness left after the
death of God, man becomes the sovereign valuer, the measure
of all things."9
Escape from subjectivism, according to Miller, involves "fol-
lowing the path of nihilism to the end, [whereby] man confronts
once again a spiritual power external to himself." Specifically,
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the mind must "efface itself before reality . . . abandoning the
will to power over things."10 Emerging here is a new ontology,
the idea of God resembling that discussed in the 1960s by such
theologians as Tillich, Altizer, and Dewart: "a God who is no
longer transcendent or supreme, but immanent and omnipres-
ent throughout reality."11 As Miller stresses "a new dimension
of intimacy"12 wherein mind and world unite, obliterating the
age-old dualism of subject and object, the idea of God reap-
pears under a new name, described now as the living presence
of reality. Thus, writes Miller, "God is not the stillness and
distance of transcendence, off somewhere beyond or above
his creation. He is everywhere, in all his plenitude. Eternity is
here and now, in each man's heart, in each grain of sand and
field mouse squeaking in the corn."i3 Just as the traditional
image of God as a being out there somewhere was being
excoriated by Bishop Robinson in Honest to God and the
"death of God" theologians, Miller was attacking idealist think-
ing. His position shines through when he asserts that "Eliot can
only become a Christian when he ceases to be an idealist."14
If Miller was committed to the idea of immanence even be-
fore he discussed its discovery in the six writers treated in
Poets of Reality, it was shortly after publication of that book that
he realized the inadequacy of this apparent solution. The point
is especially clear when Miller's treatment of William Carlos
Williams in that book is compared with that printed in 1970 in
a special issue of Daedalus. In the book he had written, "In the
work of Yeats, Thomas, and Stevens can be witnessed the
difficult struggle to go beyond the old traditions. Williams goes
farthest. He begins within the space of immanence and his
work is a magnificent uncovering of its riches."15 The 1970
essay takes up similar themes. In terms consonant with Poets
of Reality, Miller writes that "Spring and All is based on an
affirmation of the supreme value of presence and of the
present, and on a repudiation of all that is derived, repetitive,
and copied.... Authentic life exists only in the present moment
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of immediate experience." Miller argues, in fact, that Williams
rejects whatever stands between man and "the living mo-
ment": symbolism, subjectivism, supernaturalism. This project
Miller describes, somewhat problematically, as a version of the
"deconstruction of metaphysics."16 The result of Miller's return
to Williams becomes distinctly Derridean as he shows how
Williams's project fails. The hope had been for authentic cre-
ation, for the realization of a world pristine in its primal novelty.
Realized, however, is a repetition of the way it has always
been, a dead imitation. As in everything else, "like the tradition
lying behind it, [Williams's] theory of art is unable to free itself
from the theories it rejects."17
Williams's "break" with tradition, his deconstruction of
metaphysics, his attempt to grasp immediate presence—these
now point Miller in the direction charted by Derrida. Realizing
that such deconstruction as Williams thought he was accom-
plishing can never be complete, that the belief one has broken
out only reflects one's imprisonment, Miller writes, "like Aristot-
le's mimesis, Williams's imagination is both part of and more
than nature, both immediate and mediatorial—imitation, revela-
tion, and creation at once. Like the long tradition he echoes,
Williams remains caught in the inextricable web of connection
among these concepts."18 Revealed in Williams's predicament
is a point critical to Derridean thinking: the falsity of binary
oppositions and all dualisms, inscribed in the Western tradition,
because of the "trace." Rather than the triumph of one term of
an opposition over the other, as in our familiar dualisms, the
"trace," we now understand, keeps differance in play: the
terms are inextricably linked, the one requiring the other, like
host and parasite.19
Thus, contrary to the belief in progress and breakthrough
expressed in Poets of Reality, Miller now writes that there is at
once "both progress and stasis."20This is, in fact, the central
issue in the Daedalus essay, designed to show that Williams
did not, indeed could not wholly succeed in the project ap-
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plauded in the book. In place of progress, breakthrough, and
claimed undoing of traditions appears the humbling recogni-
tion that such undoing is also a preserving. Explaining the
peculiar operation of differance with regard to his own work in
the essay, Miller declares, "My interpretation, in its turn, both
destroys the text it interprets and, I hope, revivifies it. Such a
'deconstruction' puts in question the received ideas of our
tradition. At the same time my reading keeps the text alive by
reliving it. It works back through its texture, repeats it once
more in a different form, in a version of that transit through the
texts of our heritage called for by Jacques Derrida." There is
absolutely no "question of a breakthrough beyond metaphys-
ics or of a 'reversal of Platonism.' This reversal has been per-
formed over and over through the centuries, from the Stoics to
Nietzsche and the radical philosophers of our own day, and yet
Platonism still reigns There is no progress in human his-
tory, no unfolding or gradual perfection of the spirit. There are
only endlessly varied ways to experience the human situa-
t ion. '^
Interestingly paralleling the essay on Williams and com-
pleted around the same time is Miller's revision of a 1963 essay
on his old mentor, Poulet. In 1971 Miller reprints in shortened
and slightly revised form that earlier laudatory piece, adding
several pages of critical comment on Poulet to it and so drama-
tizing the Derridean position that one both undoes and pre-
serves, at once. Miller now understands that Poulet is driven by
the same desire as Williams: "the quality of presence. "22 But
again, despite his profound differences with Poulet, Miller
knows better than to set up himself or Derrida as the opposite
of Poulet. Statements like the following are crucial to an under-
standing of Miller's odyssey from "Geneva criticism" to decon-
struction: "It would seem that the tradition represented by
Derrida and that represented by Poulet must be set against one
another as an irreconcilable either/or. A critic must choose
either the tradition of presence or the tradition of "difference,1
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for their assumptions about language, about literature, about
history, and about the mind cannot be made compatible. The
more deeply and carefully one reads Poulet's criticism, how-
ever, the more clearly it emerges that it challenges its own
fundamental assumptions."23 Difference within thus mitigates
difference between. Moreover, though for Derrida not same-
ness but difference is primary, indeed originary, he shares with
Poulet the important "reliving of the fundamental texts of our
tradition,"24 preserving as he undoes.
Just as no simple negative relation exists between Derrida
and Poulet, so none exists between Miller's deconstructive and
his earlier criticism. Miller himself affirms the point in a new
preface written for the 1975 reprinting of The Disappearance
of God. He writes, "I am no longer quite the same person I was
when I wrote it, and I would not write it in quite the same way
today. [Still] I find myself... more or less in agreement with the
interpretations I proposed of my five authors."25 The conclu-
sion, in any case, is the same as that reached in the Williams
essay and the 1971 piece on Poulet: "it appears that the rela-
tion between my present work and that of over a decade ago
is more than simply negative. It may be in the nature of literature
that investigations of it initiated according to a given hypothesis
will lead, if carried far enough, to insights which call that hy-
pothesis into question." 26
Now, because of the "trace," the presence and immanence
Miller had earlier yearned for, and indeed posited, are appar-
ently inseparable from the absence and transcendence he
thought he was going beyond. Transcendence reappears,
however, not merely as the inescapable "opposite" of imma-
nence; it may be manifest also in deconstruction's basic
principle of undoing/preserving. Precisely in this fashion
deconstruction suggests, despite the charges of Harold
Fromm and others, one route to the recovery of transcendence
that Western man has long craved. For if undoing produces the
realization that what we thought of as ground, as reality, is no
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ground, then have we not with that awareness transcended the
"real," if only momentarily? With difference, of course, a gap
forever remains, completion and identity being impossible this
side of death.
Interestingly, as early as his first book, in 1958, Miller
glimpsed the sense of transcendence I am suggesting. There
he wrote, referring to Great Expectations, that Pip "must ac-
cept the fact that he can in no way transcend the gap between
'the small bundle of shivers growing afraid of it all and begin-
ning to cry' and the wind, sun, sky, and marshland, the alien
universe—in no way, that is, but by willingly accepting this
situation."27 In the same book, Miller even shows awareness
of the value in tracing nihilism through to the end, of the validity
of Chesterton's remark that you know nothing until you know
nothing, writing that "Dickens' last heroes and heroines come
back to life after a purifying descent into the dark waters of
death, but they come back to assume just that situation which
was given one in society. The difference is that their contact
with the negative transcendence has liberated them to a new
attitude toward their situation."28 Miller puts essentially the
same point in figurative terms, smacking of the biblical, in
discussing Our Mutual Friend: "When one has recognized that
gold is dust, one can go on to make gold of dust. Out of dust
can come gold, out of death, life. Gold forced upon us, or
accepted as an absolute value in itself, is dust, but so long as
we are free to value the world we can make gold."29
The significance of these crucial points concerning tran-
scendence Miller apparently did not at that time fully grasp; to
take one of his favorite metaphors, they were threads in the
critical fabric he wove, but not ones he chose to follow through
to their end. By the late 1960s Miller was more aware that
the way of seeing is all, and as a Derridean emphasized in
The Form of Victorian Fiction what he had previously only
glimpsed:
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Each man must return from an encounter with ["the ele-
mental realities of death, physical nature, and human
feeling"] to reengage himself in society. This new involve-
ment will be made from the perspective of a prior disen-
gagement which sees society as it is. This means
reentering society by improvising one's role in it as a
game. Society cannot be anything but a system of con-
ventional rules, exchanges, and substitutions which are
like metaphors. As long as a man takes the metaphor
as reality he is deluded. When he sees through the met-
aphor and takes responsibility for living according to it,
he is still caught in a play, but now he sees the game as
a game.30
Undoing/preserving, this vision is transcendent. It is thus liber-
ating, allowing one to build and create but always with the
awareness that that created is a human fabrication.
Clarification of, as well as support for, my point that decon-
struction hopes to recover transcendence appears if we
broaden our treatment to take in others influenced by Derrida.
In the work of one of these, John Dominic Crossan, a biblical
scholar and literary critic, the metaphor of play that Miller uses
in the quotation above functions to herald transcendence. Thus
Crossan writes in The Dark Interval: Towards a Theology of
Story, which I cited earlier in a different context, that "the
excitement of transcendental experience is found only at the
edge of language and the limit of story and . . . the only way
to find that excitement is to test those edges and those lim-
its."31 Parables do this supremely well, revealing the possibility
of transcendence. They
give God room. The parables of Jesus are not historical
allegories telling us how God acts with mankind; neither
are they moral example-stories telling us how to act be-
fore God and towards one another. They are stories
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which shatter the deep structure of our accepted world
and thereby render clear and evident to us the relativity
of story itself. They remove our defences and make us
vulnerable to God. It is only in such experiences that God
can touch us, and only in such moments does the king-
dom of God arrive.- My own term for this relationship is
transcendence.32
The point here is the subversion of final words about "reality,"
thus the recognition of the fictionality of all things, and the
freedom, the ability to let go, that follows therefrom.
Like Derrida and Miller, Crossan agrees with Roland Barthes
that "literature is unreality itself;... far from being an analogi-
cal copy of reality, literature is on the contrary the very con-
sciousness of the unreality of language. "33 He pursues this
insight, developing the implications of The Dark Interval, in a
book on comic eschatology in Jesus and Borges. Focusing
again on game and story, Crossan aims to dismantle es-
chatology and recover transcendence through an intense fo-
cus on biblioclasm. That is, he shows how Jesus extends
Mosaic iconoclasm into language itself; Jesus' language thus
"is an attack on form within all the major traditions of Israel's
inheritance. Such content is intrinsically eschatological, forcing
world and language to its knees before the aniconic God of
Israel."34 More specifically, insisting that it is "only by a full and
glad acceptance of our utter finitude [that we can] experience
authentic transcendence," Crossan seems to echo Miller. Je-
sus, he says, uses "paradoxical aphorism or antiproverb to
point us beyond proverb and beyond wisdom by reminding us
that making it all cohere is simply one of our more intriguing
human endeavors and that God is often invoked to buttress the
invented coherence. There is nothing wrong," adds Crossan,
"with making a whole of one's existence as long as one does
it in conscious knowledge that world is our supreme play and
that we encounter the Holy in its eschatology."35 As with Miller,
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then, transcendence reappears, this time as a leap into the
darkness, as a self-conscious way of seeing.
The work of Herbert N. Schneidau makes even clearer the
possible congruence of deconstruction and biblical thought. In
his marvelously rich and suggestive Sacred Discontent,
Schneidau brings into subtle and illuminating synthesis results
from biblical archaeology, contemporary anthropology, his-
tory, and literary criticism and argues Derrida's indebtedness
to the Yahwist vision. According to Schneidau, as I noted ear-
lier, the Bible, literature, and Derridean thought share a char-
acteristic ambivalence, what I have been calling the un-
doing/preserving central to deconstruction. Thus, just as the
Hebrews both criticize and nourish culture in their "sacred
discontent," so literature, in Pound's phrase, goes on trying to
"make it new" even as it knows the impossibility, bequeathing
to the West a strongly Hebraic sense despite Hellenistic influ-
ence.36 The key, as with Miller, Crossan, and Schneidau,
seems to lie in recognizing the fictionality of all things, by which
transcendence is achieved. Miller aligns himself directly with
the positions articulated by Schneidau and Crossan, writing in
"Tradition and Difference" that "there would appear to be no
escape from the prison of language except by way of a radical
theory of fictions and of the interpretation of fictions."37
With the condition carefully traced by Miller whereby the
human consciousness "becomes the foundation of every-
thing," man is in obvious need of such decentering as
Schneidau describes the Bible as providing. As we have seen,
deconstruction, like the Bible, becomes a valuable agent of the
demythologization of some of our most cherished stabilities.
We may gradually realize that our grand schemes of order are
fictional constructs made by ourselves and the vanity of human
wishes. Even the self that we seek to protect and that itself
seeks to be the measure of all things turns out to be a fictional
construct. For deconstruction, in contrast to the autonomous
consciousness of modernism, posits no single self but several
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selves. If the self is a linguistic construction, coming into being
in and through language rather than preceding and being sim-
ply expressed by language, we may have to rethink personality
in terms of personae.
Consonant with the biblical tradition, at least as it is de-
scribed by Crossan, Schneidau, and others, deconstruction
offers a way to transcend the nihilism that Miller finds in twen-
tieth-century life and literature and that Fromm for one con-
demns. Indeed, deconstruction appears to offer an alternative
to nihilism that escapes the difficulties posed by the "solution"
reached in Poets of Reality. For the immanence praised there
seems caught unaware in the metaphysical system of binary
oppositions and so trapped in desire of presence. Transcen-
dence, understood in the ways I have discussed, is rooted in
the necessary awareness both of the seductive and pervasive
lure of presence and of its impossibility. J. Hillis Miller may have
found attractive such transcendence as deconstruction points
to. He shows, in my view at least, continuing Christian concern.
PART TWO
Reading Deconstruction
Becomes
Deconstructive Reading

5. The Story of Error
Vincent B. Leitch's essay "The Lateral Dance: The Deconstruc-
tive Criticism of J. Hillis Miller" is an admirably full, sympa-
thetic, and therefore welcome treatment of this important critic
and of deconstruction generally.1 But despite Leitch's obvi-
ously wide reading in deconstruction and his close familiarity
with Miller's texts, he seems to have mistaken some crucial
points. Miller's response to Leitch in the same journal ("Theory
and Practice," pp. 609-14), though often helpful in quarreling
with emphases, may not confront forcefully enough certain
major problems. In order that these misconceptions not go
virtually unchallenged, I offer the following response. More is
at stake, however, than Leitch's apparent errors concerning
Miller and deconstruction. A close reading of the essays, espe-
cially as they are related to each other, involves us in such
large issues as the nature of choice, the relation of critic and
text, the possibility of reading, and the nature of error.
I begin with Leitch's account of Miller as a "nihilistic magi-
cian" (p. 603). Though Miller is obviously, and rightly, troubled
by this frequent charge, he neglects to make certain points in
response, and even his most forthright objection is not sharply
enough focused. I have argued in the previous chapter that
Miller's far-from-simple critical odyssey from "criticism of con-
sciousness" to deconstruction, from the prevailing influence of
Poulet to that of Derrida, traces an abiding concern, present
from the beginning, to find an adequate alternative to the nihil-
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ism of what is usually called modernity. Deconstruction may be
precisely that desired alternative, or at least the path toward it.
In a recent essay, "The Critic as Host," Miller makes a direct
assault on nihilism, showing how it is not the opposite but rather
the dark side of metaphysics, not outside but within metaphys-
ics.2 As he says in "Theory and Practice," "one of the aims of
deconstruction is precisely to free us from the false specter of
nihilism" (p. 613). Leitch, however, appears not to grasp how
nihilism and metaphysics inhabit each other, like "host" and
"parasite," terms that—as Miller demonstrates—have no
meaning in the other's absence. Rather than with nihilism,
deconstruction might better be associated with the "sacred
discontent" of the biblical (or at least Yahwist) vision, as I
suggested earlier.
Leitch's error concerning deconstruction and nihilism may
be taken as a synecdoche of other apparent confusions in the
essay. To see Miller and deconstruction as nihilistic is not only
to misconstrue them but also to write from and with the blind-
ness of the metaphysical tradition that Miller and his colleagues
put in question. This particular blindness appears throughout
Leitch's essay. Like that of another recent essay on Miller,3
Leitch's error often takes the form of projecting onto Miller the
very oppositional thinking that he himself exhibits but that Miller
and such fellow deconstructionists as Derrida and de Man are
engaged in deconstructing. In his response, Miller alludes to
the problem in objecting to Leitch's separating theory from the
particular readings he has produced. Unfortunately, Miller
does not develop the point. Development might, however, take
some such form as the following: Deconstructive criticism in-
volves at once and inextricably both theory and practice (this
involvement is a feature of Miller's own deconstructive la-
bors).4 Rather than related as hierarchical oppositions, as
Leitch suggests, theory and practice are regarded in decon-
struction as interimplicating each other. To separate them in
Leitch's fashion is to exempt theory from the necessity of inter-
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pretation, placing it outside the play of language as a control-
ling center, privileging it as a Transcendental Signified.
Discussing another but structurally similar issue, Miller makes
the point succinctly: "The relation is a triangle, not a polar
opposition. There is always a third to whom the two are related,
something before them or between them . . . across which they
meet."5 The "trace" may be this "third," keeping language
forever in play, insuring the perpetual oscillation of meanings,
and deconstructing our usual way of thinking in simple opposi-
tions, such as theory and practice. Leitch is both close to and
far from recognizing the fundamental point when he writes:
"Essentially, Derrida shows in Of Grammatology how certain
binary oppositions, especially 'nature/culture,' are illusory" (p.
599). The Derridean point is, of course, that all binary opposi-
tions are illusory. Because of the "trace" and differance, the
so-called oppositions are linked, each member having no
meaning without the other, indeed requiring the other. Is either
/or therefore really both/and?
At issue is the nature of choice. Glimpsed in Leitch's privi-
leging of theory, as well as in the question of nihilism, is the
commitment to either/or thinking that is stated explicitly else-
where in the essay. Leitch opens with an epigraph, one sen-
tence from a 1971 essay by Miller, "Georges Poulet's
"Criticism of Identification.' " Though I have already cited the
passage, I must here quote that sentence and the two sur-
rounding it:
It would seem that the tradition represented by Derrida
and that represented by Poulet must be set against one
another as an irreconcilable either/or. A critic must
choose either the tradition of presence or the tradition of
"difference," for their assumptions about language,
about literature, about history, and about the mind cannot
be made compatible. The more deeply and carefully one
reads Poulet's criticism, however, the more clearly it
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emerges that it challenges its own fundamental assump-
tions and that as his work gradually develops it encoun-
ters in its own way the same problematical issues which
are central for a critic like Derrida.6
Referring to the second sentence quoted here, Leitch com-
ments: "These words of J. Hillis Miller make us slightly uncom-
fortable because they demand that we choose one tradition or
another. Without question, the decision involves the 'whole
shebang.' This succinctly formulated 'either/or' choice not only
asks us to take a stand but foregrounds for us a fundamental
rift in contemporary critical theory" (p. 593). But does Miller's
text establish here an either/or situation and demand a simple
choice? I think not. The one sentence Leitch quotes may be a
statement affirming the necessity of choice, but then again it
may be only an elaboration from the point of view of the previ-
ous sentence. In the first case, the sentence Leitch quotes
would be seen as indicating Miller's own position but in the
second as merely exemplifying a position Miller does not ac-
cept. Especially in light of the "however" in the third sentence
I have quoted, the second appears a possible reading.
Other considerations support the argument that Miller does not
here simply place terms, influences, and traditions in either/or
opposition but rather sees their complications and recognizes
their involvement in one another. What, after all, is this particu-
lar essay by Miller? A reprinting of an earlier, laudatory essay
on Poulet with the addition of several pages of critical com-
ment, it is a dramatization of the undoing/preserving oscillation
that characterizes Miller's recent thinking and that of decon-
struction generally.7 As to the matter of the rival traditions,
perhaps, as Paul de Man puts it, they "compel us to choose
while destroying the foundations of any choice."8 We may have
to choose, in other words, but the choice is far from simple—
for reasons we may better understand as we continue our
reading of Leitch's essay.9
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Some disturbing implications of Leitch's understanding of
deconstruction emerge clearly by the end of his essay. Again
transferring his own "metaphysical" or logocentric perspective
to the texts being discussed, Leitch writes: "The deconstructer
does not simply enter a work with an attentive eye for the loose
thread or the alogical element that will decenter the text; he or
she intends beforehand to reverse the traditional hierarchies
that constitute the ground of the text" (p. 605). Evidently
Leitch's "deconstructer" is little interested in the text at hand,
which by his account is merely being used for an extrinsic—
and de-structive—purpose. The will of the "deconstructer" is
thus imposed, forced upon the text, for he or she treats it as
slave to the interpreter-master, establishing the will as a con-
trolling center, exempt like theory from the necessity of inter-
pretation. In this fashion the "deconstructer" halts the play of
language. Such is far from the goal of the deconstructive criti-
cism produced by Miller, Derrida, and de Man, at least as I
understand it. On this important point Miller writes in "Theory
and Practice": "the readings of deconstructive criticism are not
the willful imposition by a subjectivity of theory on the texts but
are coerced by the texts themselves" (p. 611).10
At least one other problem appears in my last quotation from
Leitch, and that is his desire "to reverse the traditional hierar-
chies." That desire reemerges later as he writes: "the project
of deconstruction is ultimately to . . . put . . . the 'tradition of
difference' in place of the now dominant 'tradition of pres-
ence' " (pp. 605-6). Though he wants to overturn more than
two thousand years of logocentric thinking, Leitch uses the
very language that confirms and perpetuates the tradition he
hopes to displace. This is "the impasse of deconstruction,"
which Leitch himself well describes: "Unable to go beyond
language, the deconstructer is compelled to use the concepts
and figures of the metaphysical tradition" (p. 606). True, but of
course the critic has the responsibility to be as scrupulous and
rigorous as possible and should not easily let pass as decon-
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struction what deconstruction precisely puts in question. To
return now to the previous quotations from Leitch: Like William
E. Cain, who, in his essay on Miller, looks toward "a thorough-
going deconstruction,"11 radically different from that of the
Yale group, Leitch would enforce closure. Aiming to undermine
and undo, Leitch seems not to realize that any undoing is also
and at once a preserving. To attempt merely to replace one
term in a hierarchy with another is to remain within hierarchical
and oppositional (that is, metaphysical, logocentric) thinking.
As Derrida makes clear in various texts, the "project" is not
simply to invert the hierarchy, which would only confirm the
categories, but to transform the notion of hierarchy itself. Ac-
cording to Derrida, overthrowing the hierarchy is only a "first"
(though of course necessary) step: "to remain in this phase is
still to operate on the terrain of and from within the decon-
structed system."12 Miller repeatedly makes the same point.
Note, for instance, his "Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure,
II," where he differentiates between "canny" (i.e., logical,
Apollonian) and "uncanny" (i.e., "tragic," Dionysian) critics,
momentarily reversing the hierarchy by which we customarily
elevate the "canny."i3 Then Miller proceeds to the step that
Derrida insists on but that Leitch and Cain neglect to take.
Rather than stop the movement once the reversal is effected,
Miller continues the play: just as he did in the 1971 essay on
Poulet and Derrida, Miller shows, by carefully attending to both
what a text declares and what it describes, how one is the
accomplice of the other; pressed sufficiently, the "uncanny"
turns into the "canny," the "canny" into the "uncanny."14 At
the very least this situation complicates the nature of choice.
What happens in "Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure, II"
and elsewhere in deconstructive criticism is thus much more
than, and different from, simple inversion. What distinguishes
deconstruction from what may be called de-struction is pre-
cisely that the movement or play does not stop with an initial
reversal. As with the "uncanny," the newly elevated term is
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reinscribed in the field of language and shown to oscillate
ceaselessly with its apparent opposite. Thus to reverse the
hierarchy only so as to displace the reversal; to unravel in order
to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Therefore, as
Miller wrote in 1970, there is no "question of a breakthrough
beyond metaphysics or of a 'reversal of Platonism.' This rever-
sal has been performed over and over through the centuries,
from the Stoics to Nietzsche and the radical philosophers of
our own day, and yet Platonism still reigns."15
The point I wish to stress is not simply that Leitch has mis-
taken certain important directions in deconstruction. We ap-
proach the more interesting, and revealing, questions when we
recognize the nature of Leitch's errors and understand that his
text also "challenges its own fundamental assumptions." In
spite of his obvious desire to be "uncanny" and to align himself
with the "tradition of 'difference,' " he displays the very think-
ing he opposes, his text describing an argument that links him
with the tradition of identity and presence. Indeed, the two
traditions are at war in his essay. This means, for one thing, that
Leitch's essay both affirms and denies its declared argument
concerning the possibility of a clear and simple choice be-
tween, for instance, rival traditions. "The Lateral Dance" is,
then, unreadable: its described argument contends with the
declared argument, and there is no way to assign priority or
determine preference. As to the errors, they are more than
errors of "fact" to be empirically checked and perhaps cor-
rected; they are of such a kind as to tell a story. In this case,
a story of error becomes the story of error. Leitch's essay tells
the story of error, of the inevitability of error due to the dialogi-
cal (both/and) nature of literary texts and to our choosing
between two equally cogent but mutually exclusive meanings,
either of which can be deconstructed and put in question in
terms of the other.
Suppose, though, that Leitch could be prevailed upon to
rewrite his essay, taking account of my criticism above, elimi-
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nating the "factual" errors noted, and being less "metaphys-
ical" in his declarations. Would that less mystified version also
be the story of error? Leitch himself suggests that it would, in
discussing "the impasse of deconstruction." I have made the
same claim. The existence of Miller's own essays, on which
Leitch's is based, and of Miller's response provides a good
opportunity to verify that claim. As we shall see, Miller's own
texts, including "Theory and Practice," do not escape the wan-
dering of "truth." In no sense can they stand as primary truth
over against his commentator's secondary errors. Even though
Miller fully grasps deconstructive principles that Leitch appar-
ently misunderstands, he nonetheless produces similarly bifur-
cated texts. Though the critic has the responsibility to be as
wary and as rigorous as he possibly can, the issue is notfinaliy
one of competence, enlightenment, or will. It is perhaps only
the degree of obviousness with which the error is committed.
And indeed, no less than Leitch's essay, Miller's texts are the
story of error.16
To illustrate the point I choose first a passage in Miller's
essay "Ariachne's Broken Woof," from which Leitch quotes.
There Miller writes: "Deconstruction . . . attempts to reverse the
implicit hierarchy within the terms in which the diaiogical has
been defined. It attempts to define the monological, the logo-
centric, as a derived effect of the diaiogical rather than as the
noble affirmation of which the diaiogical is a disturbance, a
secondary shadow in the originating light. Deconstruction at-
tempts a crisscross substitution of early and late."17 Though
the last sentence here suggests the endless oscillating move-
ment that I described above, the first seems to sanction
Leitch's conclusion that deconstruction is a de-structive
"project." In that first sentence (the only one Leitch quotes),
Miller states a willingness simply to reverse hierarchies, rather
than proceed from that necessary step to reinscribe the rever-
sal. Like Leitch's, Miller's text thus describes the kind of think-
ing that his essay elsewhere—and mainly—confronts and puts
in question.
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The same is true of Miller's response to Leitch. Like all other
texts, "Theory and Practice" is heterogeneous, containing as-
sumptions that challenge its own argument, not mere contra-
dictions but internal, fundamental differences that put the entire
argument in question. Consider the following statement, which
I quoted earlier: "the readings of deconstructive criticism are
not the willful imposition by a subjectivity of theory on the texts
but are coerced by the texts themselves" (p. 611). Obviously,
Miller wants to challenge Leitch's notion that in deconstruction
readings are subject to the interpreter's will. But his "correc-
tion" is the flip-side of Leitch's error. That is, in denying that
texts are slaves to the interpreter-master and his imported the-
ory by simply inverting Leitch's hierarchy, retaining the either
/or choice, and making the interpreter slave to the text-master,
Miller exhibits again the kind of thinking that we found in
Leitch's essay. For Miller in this passage the choice is simply
either/or: are readings "coerced" by the texts themselves or
by the interpreter and his theory? Thus Leitch's essay and
Miller's response posit two either/or choices that differ only in
respect to the preference stated. Hierarchized thinking remains
intact.
In the oscillating movement between "opposed" terms that
defines deconstruction, however, the relationship between
critic and text is understood differently, indeed differentially.
Seeking neither to destroy nor to refute and under no illusion
about setting up a new "answer," deconstruction, as I under-
stand it, is simply a quest. A quest that is also a question,
deconstruction requires a movement and an asking, a willful
movement and a willful imposition of the question by a will-ing
critic. To ask a question of a text is an attempt to coerce a
response; it is an attempt to make the "respondent" willing to
answer. But the response from the text, which is also will-ing,
is incomplete at best, and that serves merely to create addi-
tional questions. Imposition thus occurs, and it comes from
both critic and text. What emerges is a battle of wills between
text and critic—a dialogue of questions that is a mutual coer-
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cion. Mutually dependent on language, critic and text question
each other, read each other. They are thus caught in an inevita-
ble and ceaseless oscillation in which neither text nor critic
dominates, acts as master to the slave-other.
This last point is necessarily applicable to Leitch's essay and
to Miller's response: neither is master or slave to the other.
Together the essays dramatize the oscillating struggle for mas-
tery that exists between critic and text as Leitch reads Miller,
who in turn reads him. And each essay is, in its own way, the
story of error, a wandering, an allegory. By now we understand
that the real quest(ion) is not of an error to be corrected. Error
—wandering (and wondering)—is inevitable, no matter how
careful and rigorous one is. Deconstruction looks at (theoria)
error, reading the story told by the wandering of "truth," and
is itself just as error-ridden as any other writing. De Man makes
the last point succinctly; dealing with rhetorical defigurations,
he writes that deconstructive readings are "powerless" to pre-
vent "in their own discourse, and to uncross, so to speak, the
aberrant exchanges that have taken place." They can only
repeat what "caused the error in the first place. They leave a
margin of error, a residue of logical tension that prevents the
closure of the deconstructive discourse and accounts for its
narrative and allegorical mode."18 The essays by Leitch and
Miller tell this story.
PART THREE
Deconstructive Reading

6. Reading and/as Swerving:
The Quest(ion) of Interpretive
Authority in Dryden's
Religio Laid
As I have argued in a recent book, in Religio Laid Dryden
cleverly and skillfully uses the "layman's faith" tradition, trying
to deflect it from its inherent individualism to a ringing celebra-
tion of an ultimate authority outside the self.1 Like many other
texts of the Augustan period, Dryden's layman's faith is de-
signed to convince man of his own insufficiency and to "guide"
him "upward" so that he recognize his absolute dependency
on God. Despite man's vain, proud attempt to soar "by his own
strength to Heaven" and "not be Oblig'd to God for more" (II.
62-63), Dryden argues, we can finally expect little relief "from
humane Wit": "sadly are we sure / Still to be Sick, till Heav'n
reveal the Cure" (II. 118-20).2 That cure is Scripture, the "Will
reveal'd" (1.123), and Religio Laid enacts a movement taking
the reader, via its several specific arguments, to that text as the
authoritative Word of God. Attempting to be authoritative itself
in reading that authority, Religio Laid focuses on problems in
reading and interpretation.
Reading Henry Dickinson's recent translation of Father
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Richard Simon's Critical History of the Old Testament, Dryden
writes, "bred" his own efforts in Religio Laid (I. 226), and we
shall see that, just as Dryden reads "against the grain" of this
Catholic book, finding it, in spite of itself, a description of the
way "Jewish, Popish, Interests have prevail'd, / And where
Infallibility has fail'd" (II. 250-51), our own close attention to
Dryden's text will reveal a description that fundamentally chal-
lenges his declarations. The relationship between declaration
and description, text and reader, one reading and another, is
our concern here. Though what I write here differs considerably
from what I have written elsewhere on the poem, I do not think
the relation between that earlier writing and the present simply
negative (the situation is obviously analogous to Miller's rewrit-
ing of his essay on Poulet). Such relations are, at the very least,
complicated.
Both the poem that is Religio Laid or A Laymans Faith and
its prose Preface stress that Scripture is "the Canon of our
Faith" and that as such "in all things needfull to Salvation, it is
clear, sufficient, and ordain'd by God Almighty for that pur-
pose" (p. 102). By so asserting, Dryden says, he has "un-
avoidably created to my self two sorts of Enemies: The Papists
indeed, more directly, because they have kept the Scripture
from us, what they cou'd; and have reserv'd to themselves a
right of Interpreting what they have deliver'd under the pretense
of Infaiibiiity: and the Fanaticks more collaterally, because they
have assum'd what amounts to an Infaiibiiity, in the private
Spirit: and have detorted those Texts of Scripture, which are
not necessary to Salvation, to the damnable uses of Sedition,
disturbance and destruction of the Civil Government" (ibid.).
Several points are to be noted here, including the political
nature of Dryden's concern, his implicit claim that essential
parts of Scripture are so clear as to offer no opportunity
for misreading and abuse, and, most important, the close
similarities Dryden finds between the Papists and the Fanat-
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ics. In his view the issue is one of authority: is the biblical
text itself the final authority, or does that reside in either the
church or the private spirit, the Papists having declared an
infallibility in the former, the Fanatics a like infallibility in the
latter?
According to Dryden, the Bible, the ultimate authority, has
long been enslaved to the will of one or another powerful force.
In keeping Scripture from the laity, the Catholics enslaved both
text and lay readers to the interpretive authority of the clergy.
Dryden writes:
In times o'ergrown with Rust and Ignorance,
A gainfull Trade their Clergy did advance:
When want of Learning kept the Laymen low,
And none but Priests were Authoriz'd to know:
When what small Knowledge was, in them did dwell;
And he a God who cou'd but Reade or Spell;
Then Mother Church did mightily prevail:
She parcel'd out the Bible by retail:
But still expounded what She sold or gave;
To keep it in her Power to Damn and Save:
Scripture was scarce, and as the Market went,
Poor Laymen took Salvation on Content;
As needy men take Money, good or bad:
God's Word they had not, but the Priests they had.
Yet, whate'er false Conveyances they made,
The Lawyer still was certain to be paid.
In those dark times they learn'd their knack so well,
That by long use they grew Infallible:
At last, a knowing Age began t' enquire
If they the Book, or That did Them inspire:
And, making narrower search they found, th6 late,
That what they thought the Priest's, was Their Estate:
Taught by the Willproduc'd, (the written Word)
How long they had been cheated on Record.
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Then, every man who saw the Title fair,
Claim'd a Child's part, and put in for a Share:
Consulted Soberly his private good;
And sav'd himself as cheap as e'er he cou'd.
(II. 370-97)
When the Protestants broke free of Catholic domination and
Scripture was put "in every vulgar hand," "each presum'd he
best cou'd understand" it, the result being that "The Common
Rule was made the common Prey" (II. 400-2). Now "The
Spirit gave the Doctoral Degree: I And every member of a
Company I Was of his Trade, and of the Bible free" (II.
406-8.) Unwilling to content themselves with "Plain Truths,"
the newly freed slaves thus repeated their former masters'
tactics and actions, similarly occluding the Word of God
through an "itching to expound" (II. 409-10). Dryden con-
cludes, therefore:
So all we make of Heavens discover'd Will
Is, not to have it, or to use it ill.
The Danger's much the same; on several Shelves
If others wreck us, or we wreck our selves.
(II. 423-26)
The historical sketch Dryden gives shows, then, that the text,
in his view the true authority, has long been enslaved to the
reader, whether Catholic churchman or Protestant layman. The
text itself, of course, has a will, and Dryden specifically refers
to Scripture as a will. Naturally conflict results when God's will
and the human will meet. Dryden's aim is to subject the latter
to the authority of the former.
I hope it is clear that the terms of power and struggle are the
text's and not simply my own. They also appear, incidentally,
in the commendatory poems affixed to early editions of Religio
Laid. In one of these, John Lord Vaughan writes that, thanks
to Dryden's efforts, "Freely we now may buy the Pearl of price"
Deconstructive Reading 95
(1.17), and in another, Thomas Creech asserts that "Trium-
phant Faith now takes a nobler course, / Tis gentle, but resists
intruding force" (II. 5-6); Dryden, he claims, has freed the laity
"from a double Care" (I. 19).3 And in the last of these verses,
the Earl of Roscommon writes:
While mighty Lewis finds the Pope too Great,
And dreads the Yoke of his imposing Seat,
Our Sects a more Tyrannick Power assume,
And would for Scorpions change the Rods of Rome.
That Church detain'd the Legacy Divine;
Fanaticks cast the Pearls of Heaven to Swine:
What then have honest thinking men to doe,
But chuse a mean between th' Usurping two?
(II. 1 1 - 1 8 )
Religio Laid thus addresses the far-reaching implications of
the freedom of interpretation ushered in by Protestantism. In-
deed, Dryden espouses an essentially lay position on reading
Scripture, certainly rejecting the interpretive authority of the
church and the priesthood. But he also denies the authority of
the individual reader, minimizing the authority of the church not
in order to set up "a Pope in every private mans breast"4 but
only to elevate the Ultimate Authority, which is God alone. Thus
he insists on the authority of the text itself. Confronting both the
Catholic position that Scripture is unclear even on essential
points and so in need of priestly interpretation as well as the
Miltonic argument, in De Christiana Doctrina, that "Scripture is
merely an external guide that must give way to the Spirit within
us,"5 Dryden writes:
The Book's a Common Largess to Mankind;
Not more for them [the Catholics] than every Man
design'd:
The welcome News is in the Letter found;
The Carrier's not commission'd to expound.
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It speaks it Self, and what it does contain,
In all things needfull to be known, is plain.
(II. 364-69)
He thus argues that the layman have access to Scripture and
that he accept responsibility for allowing the text to "speak
itself." Directed toward his particular ends, Dryden's argument
is the Protestant one of Archbishop Tillotson that "our Principle
is, That the Scripture doth sufficiently interpret it self, that is, is
plain to all capacities, in things necessary to be believed and
practised" and of the Dissenter Henry Care that "the Infallible
Rule of the Interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture it self."6
The usual name for the Protestant principle alluded to by Tillot-
son and Care and operative in Religio Laid is Scriptura sola.
Dryden bases his particular argument for the ultimate au-
thority of Scripture on its supposed clarity and self-sufficiency:
because the text "speaks it Self, and what it does contain, /
In all things needfull to be known, is plain," the reader cannot
claim interpretive authority—unless in blatant and perverse
willfulness; and as we saw earlier, Dryden suggests in the
Preface that the essential parts of Scripture are so plain as to
make misreading next to impossible, no matter how strong the
desire. As a reader himself, now responding in writing to his
reading of Dickinson's translation of Father Simon's seminal
scholarly work on the Old Testament, Dryden claims that "from
Sacred Truth I do not swerve" (I. 455). As a matter of fact, his
own effort in Religio Laid is intended as a parallel to the
claimed plainness, directness, and literalness of Scripture:
"this unpolish'd, rugged Verse, I chose; / As fittest for Dis-
course, and nearest Prose" (II. 453-54).
Dryden's aim is, of course, to keep readers from swerving
from "Sacred Truth," as he claims he has been able to do. But
in the Preface he indicates that it is not merely misreading and
willfulness that blot out the Word of God; there is something
dangerous and diverting about language itself which allows
swerving to occur: and that is figuration. To be direct and
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unswerving, Dryden writes, one must avoid figurative lan-
guage: "The Expressions of a Poem, design'd purely for In-
struction, ought to be Plain and Natural, and yet Majestick: for
here the Poet is presum'd to be a kind of Law-giver, and those
three qualities which I have nam'd are proper to the Legislative
style. The Florid, Elevated and Figurative way is for the Pas-
sions; for Love and Hatred, Fear and Anger, are begotten in
the Soul by shewing their Objects out of their true proportion;
either greater than the Life, or less; but Instruction is to
be given by shewing them what they naturally are" (p. 109).
Though in Religio Laid Dryden relies heavily on figuration
(see the exordium, for example) and definite emotional ap-
peals, carefully modulating the strength and intensity of his
declamations (e.g., II. 64-65, 93-98), in this passage he op-
poses to each other the legislative and the figurative, imply-
ing that they are essentially different and that they can be
kept distinct. Dryden claims to be a truth-teller and law-giver
himself, repeating the Scriptural message. In the mastery
his friend Roscommon spoke of in a commendatory poem
("Begone you Slaves, you idle Vermin go, / Fly from the
Scourges, and your Master know," II. 1-2), the legislative
poet moves into the center occupied by God and His
Scripture.
Yet—apparently in spite of himself and certainly in more
than one way—Dryden does swerve. The question is whether
he swerves "from Sacred Truth," but then perhaps God's text
swerves also. In approaching an answer, we might note, first,
that at a crucial point in his argument, Dryden swerves, ac-
knowledging that, despite his claims, the Protestant principle of
Scriptura sola is finally unsatisfactory. Indeed, Dryden's action
reveals that this vaunted principle is vulnerable in precisely the
way his opponents claimed—on the fundamental issue of
Christ's nature. (Incidentally, I make many of these points in my
book on Dryden, though I did not at the time grasp their decon-
structive force.7) The turn occurs in Dryden's response to the
following issue:
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We hold, and say we prove from Scripture plain,
That Christ is GOD; the bold Socinian
From the same Scripture urges he's but MAN.
Now what Appeal can end th' important Suit?
Both parts talk loudly, but the Rule is mute.
(II. 311-15)
Dryden then proceeds:
Shall I speak plain, and in a Nation free
Assume an honest Layman's Liberty?
I think (according to my little Skill,)
(To my own Mother-Church submitting still)
That many have been sav'd, and many may,
Who never heard this Question brought in play.
Th' unletter'd Christian, who believes in gross,
Plods on to Heaven; and ne'er is at a loss:
For the Streight-gate wou'd be made streighter yet,
Were none admitted there but men of Wit.
The few, by Nature form'd, with Learning fraught,
Born to instruct, as others to be taught,
Must Study well the Sacred Page; and see
Which Doctrine, this, or that, does best agree
With the whole Tenour of the Work Divine:
And plainlyest points to Heaven's reveal'd Design:
Which Exposition flows from genuine Sense;
And which is forc'd by Wit and Eloquence.
(II. 316-33)
Without any apparent doubt regarding Christ's divinity, these
verses reveal Dryden's failure, indeed his powerlessness, to
deny that even such passages in Scripture as those treating of
Christ's nature are susceptible of more than one meaning—this
in spite of Dryden's repeated claim that Scripture "In all things
needfull to be known, is plain." In shifting the grounds of the
Deconstructive Reading 99
discussion from the particular question posed to the quite
different and broader claim that a limited core of belief is essen-
tial for salvation, Dryden reveals that for him Scripture alone is
not able, after all, to settle all necessary questions and cannot,
therefore, serve as the desired final judge and authority.
Other swerves occur as a result of the play of figurative
language—precisely what Dryden wanted to avoid. The desire
to avoid the emotional intensity and the falsifying of figurative
language, which is widely thematized in the Restoration (and
elsewhere), is, of course, impossible. The desire itself, far from
negligible, may be self-subverting, revealing the absence of
nonfigurative language: one cannot "desire that with which one
coincides." Thus the starting point is the desire of nonfigurative
language, that is, the lack of nonfigurative language.8
It seems, moreover, that Dryden can only be indirect and
figurative in describing the "Letter" and the supposed direct-
ness of God. That is, in spite of his desire and his expressed
intention, Dryden writes figuratively about the putative plain-
ness of Scripture, swerving from the desired literalness that
supposedly characterizes the Bible. One brief passage will
establish the point. After arguing that the written word is more
reliable than the voice of (Catholic) tradition, itself said to be
fundamentally implicated in error, Dryden reverts to the privi-
leging of voice, which Derrida labels "phonocentrism," char-
acteristic of the Western mind. According to Derrida, the voice
is a sign of immediacy and presence, which is, of course, also
signaled in the desire for the literal. Dryden writes, indeed, as
we have already noted, that Scripture "speaks it Self." He
thus tropes, turns, swerves, using the very figurative language
he has sought to avoid. Though literalness is one of Dryden's
major desiderata, and standards, in Religio Laid, his text can-
not signify literally but only metaphorically, and so subject and
mode are not mutually expressive. If the above is an accurate
account of Dryden's text, declared intentions being subverted
by his language, what happens to the truth-claims of the master
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master-text, God's "Willproduc'd," even that name for which
is a metaphor?
In any case, the power of figurative language is everywhere
present in Religio Laid, and Dryden is powerless to control it
—which is not to say either that another, perhaps more skillful
writer could control it or that Dryden is the simple slave of
language. The ceaseless play of language may be approached
in several ways. As Paul de Man has taught us, the power of
figurative language can be read in even an apparently innocu-
ous rhetorical question. De Man cites the example of Archie
Bunker being asked by his wife Edith (the dingbat) whether he
wants his bowling shoes laced over or laced under, to which
Archie responds with the question "What's the difference?" As
de Man writes, that question "did not ask for difference but
means instead 'I don't give a damn what the difference is.' The
same grammatical pattern engenders two meanings that are
mutually exclusive: the literal meaning asks for the concept
(difference) whose existence is denied by the figurative mean-
ing."9 One could easily enough show the power of the rhetori-
cal question in, for example, Yeats's "How can we know the
dancer from the dance?" (as de Man does) or in the frequent
recurrence of Archie Bunker's question in Madame Bovary (as
I hope to do elsewhere).
Consider now what happens in Religio Laid as a result of
a rhetorical question. The passage I refer to ostensibly partici-
pates in the poem's thematic development and purposive
movement, which takes the reader from a sense of imagined
self-sufficiency to complete reliance on God. Dryden writes:
"How can the less the Greater comprehend? / Or finite Rea-
son reach Infinity? I For what cou'd Fathom GOD were more
than He" (II. 39-41). At stake is nothing less than the relation
between God and man, which has occasioned Dryden's entire
effort.
As rhetorical questions, the first two lines I quoted have both
literal and figurative meanings. Rather than different perspec-
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tives that may ultimately be reconcilable, these meanings ap-
pear mutually exclusive. The figurative meaning of the
rhetorical questions does not ask for a positive response, one
that would detail the specific ways in which "the less" could
comprehend "the Greater. " The figurative meaning, instead,
asserts that man cannot comprehend God and that it is, in fact,
foolhardy even to ask the question since "finite Reason" obvi-
ously cannot "reach Infinity." But the literal meaning of the
lines insists on an answer, one that would deny the assertion
of the figurative, describing the ways in which man can come
to comprehend God.
At stake here is not one or two lines but the entire poem, for
"two entirely coherent but entirely incompatible readings" of
Religio Laid hinge on these lines, "whose grammatical struc-
ture is devoid of ambiguity, but whose rhetorical mode turns the
mood as well as the mode of the entire poem upside down."10
Certainly, one may read Religio Laid, as I have done above
(and elsewhere), as an eloquent declaration of man's need to
rely completely, in faith, on God, from whom he is so far dis-
tanced as to be unable to comprehend Him or His (to man's
limited understanding) inscrutable ways. But the literal mean-
ing of line 39, at least, undoes that entire scheme. Indeed, each
detail of the poem may be read as supporting the divergent
interpretation that man can come to comprehend "the Greater. "
The key here would be the idea that man comprehends God
insofar as He has chosen to reveal Himself through the media-
tion of Scripture, and that point apparently finds expression in
such lines as the following:
Vain, wretched Creature, how art thou misled
To think thy Wit these God-like Notions bred!
These Truths are not the product of thy Mind,
But dropt from Heaven, and of a Nobler kind.
Reveal'd Religion first inform'd thy Sight,
And Reason saw not, till Faith sprung the Light.
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Hence all thy Natural Worship takes the Source:
Tis Revelation what thou thinkst Discourse.
(II. 64-71)
But if man can comprehend God, even if the means be a gift
from God Himself, then man is hardly so distanced from Him
as Dryden has suggested, and finite reason has at the very
least approached the Infinite.
Yet the figurative meaning of the questions in lines 39-40
makes it impossible to decide that this interpretation of the
poem is preferable. The lines I quoted above can just as easily
be read as a definite indication of the unbridgeable distance
(and difference) between man and God. What de Man writes
about Yeats's "Among School Children" is thus applicable to
a large extent to Religio Laid: "The two readings . . . engage
each other in direct confrontation, for the one reading is pre-
cisely the error denounced by the other and has to be undone
by it. Nor can we in any way make a valid decision as to which
of the readings can be given priority over the other; none can
exist in the other's absence."11 Religio Laid thus maintains
that man can and cannot fathom God. Who, then, is master, or,
better, what is the precise relation between man and God?
Perhaps we can reach, if not an answer, at least a better
understanding of the question by continuing our reading of line
39, in which the syntax complicates considerably the rhetoric.
Indeed, the syntax produces two quite different readings (much
as grammar produces two different readings of such lines as
"God's Word they had not, but the Priests they had"): in
addition to the reading I have been assuming (how can man
comprehend God?), there is the possibility the line asks how
God can comprehend man. Not a likely reading, admittedly,
though it acquires some cogency when we note that the verb
"comprehend" means to take in, embrace, include, as well as
to understand. In any case, this second meaning of the verb
complicates even further the meaning of line 39, for, assuming
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at least for the moment that the syntax is to be understood in
the more likely way, the line would be seen as asking how "the
less" can include "the Greater." This meaning of the verb
could, then, join with a literal meaning of the rhetorical question
in putting in doubt any absolute distinction between man and
God—or slave and master or even reader and text. Though
Dryden declares that if man can fathom God, he is then more
than God, his poem describes a situation of mutual need and
dependency. The point is significantly strengthened in that Dry-
den uses the comparative degree in the line, referring to God
as "the Greater, " to man as "the less. " This usage interimpli-
cates man and God, for as described neither can exist in the
other's absence.
If God cannot be thought apart from man, and vice versa,
then, to return to the question on which we noted a swerve,
what of Christ? He is evidently the God-man, but then so is
every other human being, each of whom carries a "trace" of
God, who carries a "trace" of man. In a radical sense, the
space separating God and man is bridged, the Gospel being
the good news, as Nietzsche wrote, that there are no more
opposites.12
There no longer appears an ontological absolute authority
distinct from man to which man must subject himself. The
hierarchy Dryden seeks to preserve breaks down; indeed, hier-
archization breaks down. But that effect results not from Dry-
den's named opponents who would dethrone God and install
man in His place but from the play of language which shows
God and man to be inextricably related to each other, the
"center," as it were, including in "itself" the margin and so
being originarily decentered and not "itself."
Likewise Religio Laid: it is heterogeneous, dialogical, bifur-
cated, different from "itself," for what the text describes differs
from, indeed wars with, what it declares. As a consideration of
its concepts, figures, and the relation between them makes
clear, the poem contains mutually exclusive meanings. It is
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therefore unreadable in the sense that no complete under-
standing, no fully present comprehension is possible. Religio
Laid is the story of the wandering of its meaning. The Bible,
the story of the wandering of the People of the Book, must be
similarly unreadable: it can be no more direct and unswerving
than Dryden's own text. Figuration, or swerving, subverts de-
clared meanings, and so reading as commonly understood
plainly is made both impossible and possible.
7. Allegory of Blindness
and Insight:
Will and Will-ing
in A Tale of a Tub
Whatever reader desires to have a thorough comprehen-
sion of an author's thoughts, cannot take a better method,
than by putting himself into the circumstances and pos-
tures of life, that the writer was in upon every important
passage as it flowed from his pen, for this will introduce
a parity and strict correspondence of ideas between the
reader and the author, (p. 265)
They will furnish plenty of noble matter for such, whose
converting imaginations dispose them to reduce all things
into types; who can make shadows, no thanks to the sun,
and then mould them into substances, no thanks to phi-
losophy; whose peculiar talent lies in fixing tropes and
allegories to the letter, and refining what is literal into
figure and mystery, (p. 342)
The true illuminated (that is to say, the darkest of all)
have met with such numberless commentators, whose
scholastic midwifery hath delivered them of meanings,
that the authors themselves perhaps never conceived,
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and yet may very justly be allowed the lawful parents of
them, the words of such writers being like seed, which,
however scattered at random, when they light upon a
fruitful ground, will multiply far beyond either the hopes or
imagination of the sower, (pp. 339-40)
Whatever difference may be found in [commentators']
several conjectures, they will be all, without the least
distortion, manifestly deducible from the text. (p. 339)1
These passages from throughout A Tale of a Tub illustrate
a number of its characteristic features, including its complexity
and sophistication and its central thematic concern with read-
ing and interpretation.2 They also suggest some of the ways in
which this strange and discomfiting Venture ("book" hardly
seems appropriate, though "text" will perhaps do, for it is often
impossible to decide who is writing here) resembles and antici-
pates several recent critical and theoretical positions. The first
example I provided bears a striking affinity with the so-called
criticism of consciousness of such "Geneva critics" as
Georges Poulet, which has also been called "the tradition of
identity."3 Indicative of the (mis)readings of their father's will in
the Allegory of the Coats and the Three Brothers, my second
example reminds one of both Harold Bloom's willful mispri-
sions and the recent fascination, in structuralism and decon-
struction alike, with rhetoric understood as the study of tropes.
If a similar parallel suggests itself in my last example, the third
one anticipates both Geoffrey Hartman's general call to return
to allegoresis and exegetical modes of interpretation and his
specific advice on "how to reap a page" in Saving the
Text.''
Even apart from these striking echoes, which tempt one to
a metaleptical reversal of influence, thinking of the Tale as
repeating what has recently been written, this puzzling and
amazing text sounds themes now popular and often valorized.
For example, when the Tale admits that "how to analyze the
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tub, was a matter of difficulty" (p. 263), we are likely to read
this as the self-reflexivity now often prized in "primary" and
"secondary" texts alike as well as a direct reference to the
Hack's attempt to deflect the "grandees of Church and State"
from "pickfjng] holes in the weak sides of Religion and Govern-
ment" (ibid.)- Moreover, the Tale's frequent contradictions
of itself, or at least the Hack's contradictions of himself, will
immediately suggest to the reader familiar with deconstruction
"the critical difference" that is inevitable in all texts, made of
language and so bifurcated and dialogical.5
But if those given to "hermeneutical highjinks"6 are quick to
value A Tale of a Tub as prescient and insightful, indeed as
deconstructing the idea of the book as a totality, a more tradi-
tional critic will just as quickly object that these supposed in-
sights are being satirized. Rather than Swift's own points, they
are evidently part of the madness characteristic of the Hack,
who intimates that his own imagination is "exceedingly dis-
posed to run away with his reason . . . upon which account, my
friends will never trust me alone, without a solemn promise to
vent my speculations in this, or the like manner, for the univer-
sal benefit of human kind" (p. 336). A deconstructionist like
Paul de Man might retort, however, that Swift is of course blind
to such insights as my opening quotations provide, his text
precisely being most insightful in those areas in which the
"mad" Hack is most vigorously satirized.7 Yet, because it ridi-
cules such textual difference as deconstructive readings pro-
duce, A Tale of a Tub may complicate de Man's well-known
account of the play of textual blindness and insight. Still, by
means of close attention to both its declaration and its descrip-
tion of author-reader relations, I shall argue that the Tale is
precisely an allegory of blindness and insight, telling the story
of their crossing.
Though the Tale is frequently read as a satire on Modern
writing, the Hack being, for example, unable to adhere to "what
is to the purpose" (p. 317), ultimately admitting, in fact, that he
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is "now trying an experiment very frequent among modern
authors; which is to write upon Nothing; when the subject is
utterly exhausted, to let the pen still move on" (p. 352), it is
principally concerned with abuses in reading. Linking the satire
on the "numerous and gross corruptions in Religion and Learn-
ing" (p. 243) and so the Allegory of the Coats and the Three
Brothers with the digressions, in fact, is interpretation, the main
issue treated in both "parts" of the Tale. The Tale thus partici-
pates in that important but little-studied Augustan interest in
reading and interpretation that Dryden makes the center of
attention in Religio Laid, which can be read as a layman's
approach to reading. The Tale may even be "about" the effort
to read and a satire on the perhaps inevitable desire to reduce
and make comprehensible.8
In certain respects, the positions of Swift and his cousin
Dryden are similar, even though the latter is lashed in the Tale:
both worry about the disturbing and disrupting power of figura-
tive language, and both desire as a supposed bulwark against
figurality an unthreatening literalness. As we have seen, Swift
opposes "the converting imagination," which "fix[es] tropes
and allegories to the letter, and refin[es] what is literal into figure
and mystery." Those who thus give rein to the fancy are among
those who "have spiritualized and refined [their writings] from
the dross and grossness of sense and human reason" (p.
274). Because then—so the argument goes—Swift values rea-
son, "the senses, and common understanding," which leads
one to pass his "life in the common forms" (p. 331), he prefers
the plain, literal sense, as in the father's directions concerning
his will (about which more shortly) to the allegorical and
"mythological" readings produced by "the converting imagi-
nation." Incidentally, this valorization of literal readings inter-
estingly coincides with Swift's frequent literalizing of
metaphors; characteristic of his writing generally, literalizing
occurs in the Tale when, for example, Peter is said to value
most "a certain set of bulls" (p. 300; the reference is of course
Deconstructive Reading 109
to Papal bulls), when the Hack describes his "dissectfjon of] the
carcass of human nature" (p. 307), and when the Hack expati-
ates on his "histori-theo-physi-logical account of zeal, showing
how it first proceeded from a notion into a word, and from
thence in a hot summer ripened into a tangible substance" (p.
314). Common to Swift's preference of the literal and his fre-
quent literalizing of metaphors is de-mystification.
But unlike Dryden, who believes that Scripture at least is so
plain and clear as to require no interpretation, Swift nowhere
in the Tale suggests any hope that plain and clear language will
yield unequivocal meaning. Rather, he focuses on the ways by
which even supposedly plain meanings are abused, con-
verted, and willfully misread. Well aware of how texts can be,
and frequently are, mauled and used for one's own purposes,
Swift urges final recourse to authorial intention. He makes the
point forcefully in the "Apology" (for example, pp. 248, 253)
and repeats it, generalized, as in the note on p. 340: "Nothing
is more frequent than for commentators to force interpretation,
which the author never meant."
The point emerges most clearly in the Allegory of the Coats
and the Three Brothers (writing an allegory, Swift obviously
distinguishes between allegorized reading and the reading of
allegory9). "Once upon a time," the story begins, there was a
certain man with three sons, who on his deathbed bequeathed
to them three coats, along with his will containing "full instruc-
tions in every particular concerning the wearing and manage-
ment of your coats" and commanding that they "live together
in one house like brethren and friends" (pp. 280-81). Though
the brothers soon fall out with each other in a dispute over the
will, it is plain and clear. According to the Hack, "it consisted,"
in fact, "wholly in certain plain, easy directions about the man-
agement and wearing of their coats, with legacies and penal-
ties, in case of obedience or neglect" (p. 342). Influenced by
Peter, the well-read brother familiar with Aristotle's de Inter-
pretatione (p. 286), the brothers find it possible, because desir-
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able, to read into and out of the will whatever they decide upon.
For one example of Peter's willful misreading, consider the
following passage, which describes the brothers' allegorizing
in order to authorize their desire for the expressly forbidden
silver fringe:
"Item, I charge and command my said three sons to wear
no sort of silver fringe upon or about their said coats,"
etc., with a penalty in case of disobedience, too long here
to insert. However, after some pause the brother so often
mentioned for his erudition, who was well skilled in criti-
cisms, had found in a certain author, which he said
should be nameless, that the same word which in the will
is called fringe, does also signify a broom-stick, and
doubtless ought to have the same interpretation in this
paragraph. This, another of the brothers disliked, be-
cause of that epithet silver, which could not, he humbly
conceived, in propriety of speech be reasonably applied
to a broom-stick; but it was replied upon him, that this
epithet was understood in a mythological and allegorical
sense. However, he objected again, why their father
should forbid them to wear a broom-stick on their coats,
a caution that seemed unnatural and impertinent; upon
which he was taken up short, as one that spoke irrever-
ently of a mystery, which doubtless was very useful and
significant, but ought not to be over-curiously pried into,
or nicely reasoned upon. And in short, their father's au-
thority being now considerably sunk, this expedient was
allowed to serve as a lawful dispensation for wearing their
full proportion of silver fringe, (p. 288)
Later, Peter's interpretive authority having been questioned
and the other two brothers having gained complete access to
the will, Jack, not so different from his learned brother after all,
"began to entertain a fancy that the matter was deeper and
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darker, and therefore must needs have a great deal more of
mystery at the bottom" (p. 342). He sets out, therefore, to
"prove this very skin of parchment to be meat, drink, and cloth,
to be the philosopher's stone, and the universal medicine"
(ibid.). Having decided beforehand that the will is not what it
plainly is, Jack finds it easy, as Peter did, to make that will into
whatever he wills: "He had a way of working it into any shape
he pleased; so that it served him for a nightcap when he went
to bed, and for an umbrella in rainy weather."
That the text at the center of this critical maelstrom is a will
is another literalization of a metaphor and, I suggest, an exam-
ple of Swift's insight (Dryden, as we saw, uses the same meta-
phor in Religio Laici); Swift's Tale literalizes the universal
situation I described in "The Story of Error" as "a dialogue of
questions that is a mutual coercion." Indeed, in the Allegory of
the Coats and the Three Brothers, between the father, on the
one hand, and the three sons, on the other, and then later
among the sons themselves occurs a battle of wills, and that
representation becomes an allegory of the will and the will-ing
involved in the reading of any text. Every textual field is, in fact,
constituted as a battle of wills, claims of authority, and the force
of desire. In Swift's Allegory, the text left to the sons is a will
—in more than one sense—imposed by the authority of the
father in an effort to coerce them to do what he desires; even
after he leaves them, he wills to exercise authority over them.
But the sons, like all other readers, have wills and desires of
their own, and so the battle is joined. Another way to put this
perhaps, as I suggested in the two previous chapters, is to say
that we witness in the Allegory a typical opposition between
master and slave, authority being at stake. The father wills to
be master, but the sons resist the slavery his authority would
impose, restricting them to following the letter of his law, that
is, to a simple execution of his "plain and easy directions." As
happens whenever such oppositions exist, first one and then
the other side gains the upper hand, the slave eventually be-
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coming master and repeating the tyranny. It is not long, there-
fore, before "their father's authority" is "considerably sunk."
Of course, the desire of mastery, no matter in whom, repre-
sents precisely the lack of mastery, for "it is not possible to
desire that with which one coincides."10 To modify a well-
known Derridean point, "Without the possibility of difference,
the desire of [mastery] as such would not find its breathing-
space." According to Derrida, that means that "this desire
carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction. Difference
produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it
makes impossible."11 If this begins to sound like the Hack's
subversion of logic, that may be just the point.
Swift, of course, sides with the father, or the author, in this
agonistic struggle for author-ity. Indeed, in terms of interpretive
strategy, the reader, says Swift, should always seek the inten-
tions—or authority—of the author in his quest to understand a
text. Reading becomes, then, exactly that effort to achieve
coincidence or harmony that is expressed, though in perhaps
exaggerated fashion, in one of the quotations from the Tale I
used as an epigraph: "Whatever reader desires to have a
thorough comprehension of an author's thoughts, cannot take
a better method, than by putting himself into the circumstances
and postures of life, that the writer was in upon every important
passage as it flowed from his pen, for this will introduce a parity
and strict correspondence of ideas between the reader and the
author" (p. 265). Presented satirically, this passage neverthe-
less emerges as at least close to Swift's own desire that the
reader seek and then adhere to authorial intention. But, it
should be noted, the point concerning parity is misleading, for
the reader is here being advised to submit himself or herself
totally to the author, denying himself totally, emptying himself,
as he occupies another's space, body, and mind.
A Tale of a Tub thus focuses on the relation of author and
reader, insisting on the former's authority and pointing to the
dangers when the reader "usurps" that authority. So far, how-
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ever, we have read only a part of the story the Tale tells, having
attended to the text's declarations. We must try to be as rigor-
ous as the text and so should attend as well to its figurative
language. We have already seen, of course, that the Tale is
built, despite Swift's preference for the literal, on word play:
there is the play not only on will but also on author and author-
ity.12
The Tale provides a chain of passages perhaps continuing
this play of words (and sounds) but certainly relating writing to
riding. Begin with this passage, which opens Section XI: "in
writing it is as in travelling: if a man is in haste to be at home
. . . if his horse be tired with long riding and ill ways, or be
naturally a jade, I advise him clearly to make the straightest and
the commonest road, be it ever so dirty. But then surely we
must own such a man to be a scurvy companion at best" (p.
341). Other passages also employ the rider/horse analogy.
First, a passage comparing the relationship of mind to its
thoughts with that of rider to horse: "And whereas the mind of
Man, when he gives the spur and bridle to his thoughts, doth
never stop, but naturally sallies out into both extremes of high
and low, of good and evil; his first flight of fancy commonly
transports him to ideas of what is most perfect, finished, and
exalted" (p. 324). Second, a passage presenting the relation-
ship of reason to imagination as analogous to that of rider to
horse: "I myself . . . am a person, whose imaginations are
hard-mouthed, and exceedingly disposed to run away with his
reason, which I have observed from long experience to be a
very light rider, and easily shook off" (p. 336). Third, the well-
known passage that continues at least the imagery of mounting
but inverts the (proper) relationship described in the previous
quotation: "But when a man's fancy gets astride on his reason,
when imagination is at cuffs with the senses, and common
understanding, as well as common sense, is kicked out of
doors, the first proselyte he makes is himself" (p. 331). By
means of the figures employed, Swift rigorously argues that the
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mind and the reason must not allow its thoughts and the imagi-
nation to have free rein, run away, and so usurp proper author-
ity. Properly ordered, reason mounts and rides the imagination;
madness occurs when that order is inverted and imagination
takes the place of reason.
Now consider the following passage, in which the same
figurative language we have been reading is used to present
directly the relationship of reader to writer: "Among these last
[handles for catching hold of mankind], curiosity is one, and of
all others affords the firmest grasp: curiosity, that spur in the
side, that bridle in the mouth, that ring in the nose, of a lazy and
impatient and a grunting reader. By this handle it is, that an
author should seize upon his readers; which as soon as he has
once compassed, all resistance and struggling are in vain, and
they become his prisoners as close as he pleases, till weari-
ness or dullness force him to let go his grip" (p. 350). There
is no question here of the reader-horse running away with the
writer-rider or of taking his place. The passage says, however,
that the writer should hold fast the reader by means of the
latter's curiosity. It says something else: though the reader, like
the fancy or the imagination or the thoughts, must be governed,
the reader is essential. In the terms of the passage quoted,
reading is being mounted; if it is an act of being controlled by
the author, it is also that author's means of conveyance along
the journey that is writing. Without the reader, then, the writer
cannot move. The writer needs the reader. The relationship of
writer to reader may be one of master to slave, but it is at least
complicated by the situation of need it describes.
The language Swift employs to present the writer-reader
relationship is, of course, sexual. In "mounting" the reader, the
writer assumes the supposed sexual authority of the male,
occupying the male's position in relation to the female position
of the reader. The following passage, which opens with the
paradoxical relationship of blindness to insight, raising again
the question of Swift's own blindness and insight, explores
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most thoroughly the links among writer/reader, master/slave,
and male/female:
Wise philosophers hold all writings to be fruitful in the
proportion they are dark; and therefore, the true illumi-
nated (that is to say, the darkest of all) have met with such
numberless commentators, whose scholastic midwifery
hath delivered them of meanings, that the authors them-
selves perhaps never conceived, and yet may very justly
be allowed the lawful parents of them, the words of such
writers being like seed, which, however scattered at ran-
dom, when they light upon a fruitful ground, will multiply
far beyond either the hopes or imagination of the sower,
(pp. 339-40)
We must read carefully this difficult passage. Though Swift
desires that the natural parent have the authority, his language
complicates the matter considerably. First, Swift concedes a
good bit in turning immediately to the question of the "lawful,"
that is, the merely conventional or socially established. More-
over, his figures carry him well beyond, and indeed counter to,
his apparent intentions, for as with the previous passage we
read, the writer no longer appears as independent, autono-
mous authority. According to this passage, indeed, the writer-
male sows his seed, which requires for growth and devel-
opment the fertile ground that is the reader-female. In this
situation of partnership described by Swift's figurative lan-
guage, the reader is just as important as the writer, the mother
as the father. But the passage directly confronts another, re-
lated, and more immediate point, and that concerns the relation
among writer, words, and meanings. A note following the word
"seed" in the passage claims that "nothing is more frequent
than for commentators to force interpretation, which the author
never meant." Likewise, the main passage asserts that com-
mentary "delivers" texts of meanings "the authors themselves
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perhaps never conceived." That is, commentary is creative,
bringing out of the text what the author never put in. Yet the
passage proceeds to grant that, even so, the author is the
lawful parent because words are like seed. Here the passage
obscures the crucial distinction between the author as male
sowing his sperm-seed and author as sower of words as seed.
But if words are like seed, and not just the male seed, they are
no longer within the author's range of authority and control.
Though the male may be said to have authored another being,
no matter how scattered his seed was, what authority can
seed, or words, claim? Surely not that of the sower, whose
function is minimal. If the author is, then, like the sower of seed,
rather than a father, his authority regarding the words sown or
their meanings is negligible. If this is true, then contrary to
Swift's claim, interpretations are not forced: words being free,
freeplay reigns. Parentage is thus questioned, and so is the
authority of the author. What we have here is evidently an
example of what the text itself calls "uncontrollable demonstra-
tion" (p. 260).13
In "A Digression concerning Critics" occurs another ques-
tioning of author-ity and a subversion of logic. According to the
Hack, the Moderns "have proved beyond contradiction, that
the very finest things delivered of old, have been long since
invented, and brought to light by much later pens; and that the
noblest discoveries those ancients ever made, of art or of
nature, have all been produced by the transcending genius of
the present age" (pp. 292-93, italics added). What was earlier
delivered has recently been invented. The present has pro-
duced, that is, made, the discoveries past ages offered. The
later pen (or penis) has authored what had been much earlier
delivered. Is this satirized passage insightful or merely mad in
its deconstruction of author-ity?
Logic is, of course, similarly flouted elsewhere in A Tale of
a Tub. Homer, for example, that "tolerable genius," is blasted
for his "many gross errors": not only did he "read but very
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superficially either Sendivogius, Behmen, or Anthroposophia
Theomagica," but—"a fault far more notorious to tax this au-
thor with"—Homer also reveals "gross ignorance in the com-
mon laws of this realm, and in the doctrine as well as discipline
of the Church of England" (pp. 308-9). There is no denying the
Hack's general madness, for as Swift presents him, his fancy
has gotten astride his reason and has driven out the "common
understanding."
We can now see, however, thanks especially to the work of
Derrida, de Man, and others, that what the Hack says, though
presented as madness by the satirist, contains much insight.
As Barbara Johnson puts it, a deconstructive reading shows
"the necessity with which what [an author] does see is system-
atically related to what he does not see."14 In the Hack, as in
Swift's own declarations, appears a complex mixture of blind-
ness and insight, which complicates the usual binary opposi-
tion. The supposedly insightful (i.e., satirical) text may then
appear most blind in condemning the blind but insightful Hack.
A Tale of a Tub itself makes the point when the Hack comments
upon "how near the frontiers of height and depth border upon
each other," how "one who travels the east [eventually runs]
into the west," and how "a straight line [is eventually] drawn by
its own length into a circle" (pp. 324-25). Blindness and insight
appear to relate to each other as do fancy and reason, slave
and master, female and male, reader and writer, reading and
writing. In this situation the will is a very complicated text.
8. "Grac[ing] These Ribalds":
The Play of Difference in Pope's
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot
An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot is normally read as Pope's defense
of himself and justification of his satire, as—in other words—
his apologia pro satura sua. In the prose "Advertisement" that
precedes the poem, Pope describes his aim, in fact, in legal
terms as an indictment, establishing an adversarial situation
and pitting himself and his word against certain others, their
charges, and their "truth": "This Paper is a Sort of Bill of
Complaint, begun many years since, and drawn up by snatches,
as the several Occasions offer'd. I had no thoughts of pub-
lishing it, till it plees'd some Persons of Rank and Fortune
. . . to attack in a very extraordinary manner, not only my Writ-
ings (of which being publick the Publick judge) but my Person,
Morals, and Family, whereof to those who know me not, a truer
Information may be requisite."1 After making clear his own
desire to tell the truth, Pope proceeds to describe himself as
"divided between the Necessity to say something of Myself,
and my own Laziness to undertake so awkward a Task." This
confession of self-division is perhaps more suggestive, and
important, than has hitherto been recognized. These two kinds
of difference, that external form consisting of difference be-
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tween (say) Pope and those he indicts, and the internal form
representing self-division and rendering certain conventions
problematical, will be my focus here. I shall attend, that is, to
the story told by the play of difference in Arbuthnot. My effort,
hardly exhaustive, will be exploratory and speculative.
I begin with Pope's defense, which consists in large part of
a series of strategies designed to establish him as a "good
man." He differentiates, for example, his background, motives,
and character from those of "the Race that write" (I. 219),
maintaining that, unlike the "Clerk, foredoom'd his Father's
soul to cross, / Who pens a Stanza when he should engross"
(II. 17-18), he "left no Calling for this idle trade, / No Duty
broke, no Father dis-obey'd (II. 129-30). Depicting himself
as a good man, Pope claims to rise above the level of "slashing
Bentley" and "piddling Tibalds" (I. 164), proceeding to ad-
duce a list of illustrious friends to prove the difference; from
them, he asserts, "the world will judge of Men and Books, /
Not from the Burnets, Oldmixons, and Cooks" (II. 145-46).
Pope focuses strategically on this matter of friendship as a
means of establishing his virtue and his difference. Perhaps his
most effective and economical rhetorical use of friendship ap-
pears in the choice of John Arbuthnot as "recipient" of his
"epistle" and as interlocutor. As is well known, Pope draws on
a tradition suggested in Ecclesiasticus 6:16 ("A faithful friend
is the medicine of life") and developed by Plutarch, who, in a
disquisition entitled "How to Know a Flatterer from a Friend,"
uses as a recurrent motif the comparison of a good friend to
an able physician. Of course, Arbuthnot was by profession a
physician (he had, in fact, been physician to Queen Anne), and
if one accepts the view expressed by Sir William Temple, Pope
is especially blessed in having a doctor as a friend: "In all
Diseases of Body and Mind, 'tis happy to have an able Physi-
cian for a Friend, or a discreet friend for a Physician; which is
so great a blessing that the Wise Man will have it to proceed
only from God."2That Arbuthnot was a satirist as well as a
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physician (he wrote the History of John Bull, coauthored with
Pope and Gay Three Hours after Marriage, and was a member
of the Scriblerus Club) allows Pope to suggest also the familiar
notion that the satirist is, despite appearances to the contrary,
a physician and a friend.3 Finally, because Arbuthnot was
widely respected, Pope is able to draw on a tradition perhaps
deriving from Aristotle's Ethics and to suggest that his friend-
ship with such a man evidences his own virtue.4 When this
good man speaks in the poem as interlocutor, therefore, his
words carry considerable weight and authority. In his five short
"speeches," Arbuthnot urges caution and restraint, warning
against the naming of individuals (II. 75-78, 101-4), but he
also assists in his friend's satire on Sporus (II. 305-8).
The terms this particular friend enables Pope to exploit,
"physician," "satirist," and "friend," serve indeed as focal
structuring devices for the defense. The idea that links the first
two here, "friend" is also the concept that differs from while
connecting two other terms crucial to the poem's thematic
development and Pope's strategies of defense. The terms ap-
pear together in lines 206-7: "A tim'rous foe, and a suspicious
friend, / Dreading ev'n fools, by Flatterers besieg'd." Pope, of
course, opposes "friend" to "foe," and the other term, "flatter-
ers," is both distinguished from and linked to "foes"; indeed,
the construction of line 104, which brings together the conclu-
sion of Arbuthnofs warning concerning names and Pope's
response thereto, illustrates the similarity and difference of the
terms: " 'But Foes like these!'—One Flatt'rer's worse than all."
Pope's claims may, then, be described as follows: Because the
satirist is a physician of sorts, he is ultimately a friend, even of
those he lashes, intending to cure them of their follies and
vices: "This dreaded Sat'rist Dennis will confess / Foe to his
Pride, but Friend to his Distress" (II. 370-71). A satirist obvi-
ously differs from a flatterer, who, Pope insists, is ultimately a
foe (Bufo well illustrates the point).
Though I have no doubt oversimplified in summarizing, the
above represents, I think, Pope's basic line of argument in An
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Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot. Indeed, Pope's defense exhibits many
of the qualities Margaret W. Ferguson claims as characteristic
of the tradition of defenses of poetry; being classifiable as
neither disinterested art nor disinterested critical commentary,
becoming in fact "active rather than passive advocates for
what we might call the claims of the ego," these defenses,
according to Ferguson, act as "protection against external
threats to the ego's task of defending itself against internal
threats." It is impossible to do justice here to Ferguson's subtle
and complex argument, and I have no intention of trying to
apply her arguments to Arbuthnot in any consistent way,
though a certain parallel will emerge between my argument
below and her claim that the usual poetic defense "involves a
complex double movement of attack and courtship."5 But of
course, Pope's "Bill of Complaint" is more than merely defen-
sive. To use J. Paul Hunter's helpful terms, in this poem satiric
apology turns into satiric instance6—one of several turns we
shall consider. From the very beginning, indeed, Pope is con-
cerned to draw straight, distinct, and unmistakable lines be-
tween himself and those others.
The poem opens, of course, with Pope seeking shelter from
the would-be poets who besiege him wherever he goes. In
escaping into his own home, Pope signals the desire for physi-
cal distance that is itself a sign of his desire for literary and
moral differentiation. Outside, he maintains, with the poetasters
lunacy rages, from which he would sequester and protect him-
self. The immediate danger Pope fears is contamination or
infection; thus he laments, "What Drop or Nostrum can this
Plague remove?" (I. 29). This seemingly innocent metaphor,
like all other figures, carries great weight, for the medical
plague has become, as here, a metaphor for a social plague.
Indeed, it functions as a "generic label for a variety of ills that
. . . threaten or seem to threaten the very existence of social
life."7 In texts as divergent as Oedipus Rex, Troilus and Cres-
s/da, and Camus's 1948 novel, the plague acts as part of a
thematic cluster that involves epidemic contamination and
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eventually the dissolving of differences. If Pope cannot cure the
plague or be inoculated against it, he can at least reduce the
possibility of infection by quaranteening himself and perhaps
thus maintaining the difference that the plague threatens to
collapse.
Pope preserves his difference not only by escaping from the
"plague" but also by establishing his difference from others
who, he argues, lack sufficient difference. The desire to
differentiate himself takes several forms. Some of these we
have already glimpsed, including the differences in back-
ground, motive, and character he draws between himself and
"the Race that write." Naming is another basic means of
differentiation, perhaps the simplest, and Pope indulges in
naming the specific targets of his satire, despite Arbuthnofs
warnings. Pope's most elaborate and effective means of
differentiation, which happens to be his main offensive strat-
egy, the famous linked portraits of Atticus, Bufo, and Sporus,
is designed to advance the defensive strategy of establishing
Pope as an alternative—indeed, as a true friend and a good
man.
Before turning to these portraits, it is necessary to examine
carefully Pope's desire for difference and the implications of his
wish for clear and absolute distinctions. Such desire appears
to be masculine, Pope wanting from the outset to establish
what he later calls his "manly ways" (I. 337). To be a good
man and a true friend is, according to Pope's strategy, to be
distinct, to possess a clear identity—in short, to be different.
Difference is the male quality, the presence of the penis.
Pope's fear of the loss of difference may be seen, then, as fear
of the loss of his maleness, or castration. It is the fear that he
will become, in fact, what Sporus was turned into: an in-differ-
ent male, a male who was castrated and then treated as a
woman, "one vile Antithesis. / Amphibious Thing!" (II. 325-
26). In Pope's case, however, it is not so much castration as
intercourse with him, feminized, that threatens: "What Walls
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can guard me, or what Shades can hide? / They pierce my
Thickets, thro' my Grot they glide" (II. 7-8). The judgment
rendered by Pope, after being "Seiz'd and ty'd down to judge"
(I. 33), certainly carries sexual overtones: '"Keep your Piece
nine years'" (I. 40), an imagined suitor's reaction to which
extending the implication (" The Piece you think is incorrect:
why take it, / I'm all submission, what you'd have it, make it, '"
II. 45-46). Feminized, Pope withdraws from these suitors
and their assaults, declaring in the poem's opening lines,
"Shut, shut the door, good John! fatigu'd I said, / Tye up the
knocker, say I'm sick, I'm dead," "knocker" perhaps being the
penis.
, The enigmatic feminization, or attempted feminization, of
Pope cannot be understood, I contend, apart from the meta-
phorical treatment of writing in Arbuthnot. Pope of course
claims that, whereas for the "Witlings" writing is a compulsion
and a drive akin to madness, for him it is both a burden and
a moral obligation. He also treats writing in sexual terms, as
when he notes that "ev'ry Coxcomb knows me by my Style"
(I. 282) and when he counsels to "'Keep your Piece nine
years, Piece" being both the written text and the sexual
instrument and "Style" suggesting the stylus or penis. The
references to Gildon's "venal quill" (I. 151), to Bufo "puff'd by
ev'ry quill" (I. 232), and to "each gray goose quill" that a
patron may bless (I. 249), as well as to "slashing Bentley" (I.
164), indicate the relation of pen to penis—writing, according
to Freud, entailing "making a liquid flow out of a tube onto a
piece of white paper" and so assuming "the significance of
copulation."8 The mob of would-be poets courting favor and
Pope are thus said "To spread about the Itch of Verse and
Praise" (I. 224). Pope makes clear that the writer with his
pen(is) seeks pen-etration and satisfaction. As a result of
Pope's own (masculine) writing, moreover, "Poor Cornus sees
his frantic Wife elope, / And curses Wit, and Poetry, and
Pope" (II. 25-26).
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Further, Pope depicts his own reception as a writer in terms
that define writing as a masculine act and the response to a
writer as feminine. Pope indeed describes his own writing in
sexual terms ("The Muse but serv'd to ease some Friend, not
Wife," I. 131), the suggestion of homosexuality being (anach-
ronistically) supported by the statement that his friends "left me
GAY" (I. 256). If writing and writers are masculine, and the
response sought feminine, we can appreciate why Pope as
would-be patron, courted for favor, is being treated as female.
He becomes the sexual object pursued by the "Witlings."
Recalling the Freudian implications of eyes and sight, we
can appreciate too the nature of Pope's withdrawal from the
poet-suitors as he summarizes that withdrawal: "I sought no
homage from the Race that write; /1 kept, like Asian Monarchs,
from their sight" (II. 219-20). Withdrawing, Pope refuses to
mingle with the poetasters. He thus rejects the role of woman
they seek to impose upon him: he will not be turned into their
lover, their host, their patron.
Pope attempts, then, to preserve his difference (phallus) in
the face of the dunces' aim to make him a patron-woman who
can satisfy their desires as writer-males. He preserves his
difference not only by withdrawing but also by establishing
clear and distinct difference from others. Pope's most effective
strategies of differentiation, and his most strenuous attacks,
occur in the portraits of Atticus, Bufo, and Sporus, in which the
language of sexuality and the sexuality of language are unmis-
takable.
The first portrait is of Atticus, whom Pope lashes for his
failure to achieve distinct identity:
. . . were there One whose fires
True Genius kindles, and fair Fame inspires,
Blest with each Talent and each Art to please,
And born to write, converse, and live with ease:
Shou'd such a man, too fond to rule alone,
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Bear, like the Turk, no brother near the throne,
View him with scornful, yet with jealous eyes,
And hate for Arts that caus'd himself to rise;
Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer,
And without sneering, teach the rest to sneer;
Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,
Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike;
Alike reserv'd to blame, or to commend,
A tim'rous foe, and a suspicious friend,
Dreading ev'n fools, by Flatterers besieg'd,
And so obliging that he ne'er oblig'd;
Like Cato, give his little Senate laws,
And sit attentive to his own applause;
While Wits and Templers ev'ry sentence raise,
And wonder with a foolish face of praise.
Who but must laugh, if such a man there be?
Who would not weep, if Atticus were he!
(II. 193-214)
Different from the manliness Pope praises, Atticus appears
weak, indistinct, unwilling to take a definite stand. He accedes
to flattery, and if he attacks, it is barely. Unable to be really
different, Atticus is not sufficiently masculine. Lacking in confi-
dence, he fears competition for "the throne" and indeed hates
the very "Arts" by which he has "risen" to that place.
With the second portrait the situation is more complicated.
From more than one perspective Bufo is the central portrait—
and arguably the most important difference Pope establishes
in Arbuthnot. Bufo's importance derives in part from his simi-
larity to Pope, particularly as the poet appears early on in the
poem, courted by the flattering dunces. Pope's aim, of course,
is to claim essential difference in this situation of similarity,
thereby differentiating himself as true friend from the false
friend (and foe) that Bufo the patron is. The theme of the portrait
thus concerns the relationship of flatterer and flattered or, to
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use analogous terms, host and parasite. Clearly, the plagues
of poetasters surrounding Bufo, like "the Race that write"
courting Pope, are parasites. But just as clearly the patron-
flattered-host Bufo functions also as a flatterer-parasite on what
initially appear to be parasite-poetasters: for if as host Bufo
feeds the "undistinguish'd race" of "Wits," he is fed in turn by
the very parasites he feeds, feeding on the parasites, changing
places with them in a "see-saw between that and this" (I.
323), and so finally becoming identifiable as neither simply
parasite nor host, flatterer nor flattered, but as both.
Proud, as Apollo on his forked hill,
Sate full-blown Bufo, puff'd by ev'ry quill;
Fed with soft Dedication all day long,
Horace and he went hand in hand in song.
His Library, (where Busts of Poets dead
And a true Pindar stood without a head)
Receiv'd of Wits an undistinguish'd race,
Who first his Judgment ask'd, and then a Place:
Much they extoll'd his Pictures, much his Seat,
And flatter'd ev'ry day, and some days eat:
Till grown more frugal in his riper days,
He pay'd some Bards with Port, and some with Praise,
To some a dry Rehearsal was assign'd,
And others (harder still) he pay'd in kind.
Dryden alone (what wonder?) came not nigh,
Dryden alone escap'd this judging eye:
But still the Great have kindness in reserve,
He help'd to bury whom he help'd to starve.
(II. 231-48)
The sexual language we have noted elsewhere in Arbuthnot
appears here, too. For the portrait treats the relationship of
male-female, as well as that of patron-poet and parasite-host.
As the opening lines of the portrait indicate, what Pope feared
does happen to a patron: "full blown" and "puff'd by ev'ry
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quill," Bufo becomes female in hosting the would-be poets. Yet
he gets his revenge on the emasculating writers by becoming
the castrated-castrating woman, for in his library (or womb) lie
"dead" poets, including Pindar, who "stood without a head."
Are these writers merely "spent"? Or is it that, feminized, Bufo
feminizes, turning the masculine writer into a female if he is
allowed to have his way? Perhaps it is both. With the male-
female relationship, in any case, as with those others it treats,
the Bufo portrait dramatizes the turning of one thing into an-
other, destabilizing, indeed, differences usually arrested as
distinct oppositions.
If Atticus is neither quite one thing nor fully another, neither
adequately friend nor identifiably foe, Sporus is, more dramati-
cally than Bufo, both one thing and another. According to one
of the shrewdest commentators on the poem, Sporus is, there-
fore, "the very reverse of the divine reconciliation of oppo-
sites."9 Assumed to represent John Lord Hervey, well known
for effeminacy of both manner and appearance, Sporus is an
"Antithesis" and an "Amphibious Thing," both male and
female, oscillating "between that and this":
Yet let me flap this Bug with gilded wings,
This painted Child of Dirt that stinks and stings;
Whose Buzz the Witty and the Fair annoys,
Yet Wit ne'er tastes, and Beauty ne'er enjoys,
So well-bred Spaniels civilly delight
In mumbling of the Game they dare not bite.
Eternal Smiles his Emptiness betray,
As shallow streams run dimpling all the way.
Whether in florid Impotence he speaks,
And, as the Prompter breathes, the Puppet squeaks;
Or at the Ear of Eve, familiar Toad,
Half Froth, half Venom, spits himself abroad,
In Puns, or Politicks, or Tales, or Lyes,
Or Spite, or Smut, or Rymes, or Blasphemies.
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His Wit all see-saw between that and this,
Now high, now low, now Master up, now Miss,
And he himself one vile Antithesis.
Amphibious Thing! that acting either Part,
The trifling Head, or the corrupted Heart!
Fop at the Toilet, Flatt'rer at the Board,
Now trips a Lady, and now struts a Lord.
Eve's Tempter thus the Rabbins have exprest,
A Cherub's face, a Reptile all the rest;
Beauty that shocks you, Parts that none will trust,
Wit that can creep, and Pride that licks the dust.
(II. 309-33)
According to Aubrey Williams, the name "Sporus" derives
from the youth that the emperor Nero caused to be castra-
ted and then, treating him as a woman, eventually married.10
Certainly, Pope's portrait presents Sporus as having lost his
difference. He seems, in fact, to have succumbed, somewhat
like Bufo, to pressures Pope has resisted, and that failure in
Sporus no doubt accounts in part for the vigor of Pope's attack.
Sporus both attacks and flatters, and so his efforts evidently
cancel each other out. He is self-divided, opposing forces col-
liding within him. According to Pope, he is, then, impotent and
empty.
Taking the portraits together, we notice a certain progres-
sion: whereas Atticus is not male enough, Bufo appears femi-
nized, and Sporus is divided, being both male and female. The
straight lines Pope has sought blur in Atticus, curve in Bufo,
and become indeterminate, undecidable in Sporus. To them
Pope aims to be an effective alternative, with his "manly
ways." He has, of course, acted in an apparently "manly" way
in setting up these differences in hopes of preserving his differ-
ence. Having established that difference, in part by showing his
difference from those lacking difference, Pope now exhibits
some interesting differences from himself, at least from himself
as he has appeared in the poem.
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Though they are by no means radical breaks, important
differences appear immediately following the Sporus portrait.
To begin with, there is the change to third-person narration,
indicative of the indirectness that replaces the directness we
have noted. The accompanying change in tone is also marked,
Pope now appearing patient and long-suffering, receiving
rather than giving blows and apparently no longer so intent on
the kind of differentiation evident earlier. For "Virtue's better
end" (I. 342), he claims, he withstood
The distant Threats of Vengeance on his head,
The Blow unfelt, the Tear he never shed;
The Tale reviv'd, the Lye so oft o'erthrown;
Th' imputed Trash, and Dulness not his own;
The Morals blacken'd when the Writings scape;
The libel'd Person, and the pictur'd Shape;
Abuse on all he lov'd, or lov'd him, spread,
A Friend in Exile, or a Father, dead.
(II. 348-55)
Two verse paragraphs later Pope extends the argument, main-
taining that he has actually befriended his attackers:
Full ten years slander'd, did he once reply?
Three thousand Suns went down on Welsted's Lye:
To please a Mistress, One aspers'd his life;
He lash'd him not, but let her be his Wife:
Let Budget charge low Grubstreet on his quill,
And write whate'er he pleas'd, except his Will;
Let the Two Curls of Town and Court, abuse
His Father, Mother, Body, Soul, and Muse.
(II. 374-81)
The shift in these paragraphs in tone and from first- to third-
person are but two of several significant internal differences
that the remainder of the poem develops. To continue, the
verse paragraph from which I have just quoted closes with
Pope's praise of his father and mother for their tolerance and
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forbearance—qualities the son has not displayed, at least
through the Sporus passage. Whereas the poet passed judg-
ment, assigned blame, and launched often-scathing attacks,
his "Father held it for a rule / It was a Sin to call our Neighbour
Fool, / That harmless Mother thought no Wife a Whore" (II.
382-84). Obviously, such passages are designed to show the
injustice of the attacks on Pope's family, but I think more is
going on. For one thing, the following portrait of Pope's
deceased father develops the differences between father and
son, offering, indeed, a clear criticism of the poet as he ap-
peared earlier in the poem. Presented as a kind of hero, the
elder Pope is given the name the poet had sought for himself:
"The good Man" (I. 395). Hero and vir bonus, the father is yet
a naif: unlike his son, he was never involved in civil or religious
controversy and never offered such a "Bill of Complaint" as is
An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot. In phrases that inevitably recall his
earlier depiction of "this long Disease, my Life" (I. 132), Pope
even contrasts his father's lifelong healthfulness with his own
illness and physical deformities:
Born to no Pride, inheriting no Strife,
Nor marrying Discord in a Noble Wife,
Stranger to Civil and Religious Rage,
The good Man walk'd innoxious thro' his Age.
No Courts he saw, no Suits would ever try,
Nor dar'd an Oath, nor hazarded a Lye:
Un-learn'd, he knew no Schoolman's subtle Art,
No Language, but the Language of the Heart.
By Nature honest, by Experience wise,
Healthy by Temp'rance and by Exercise:
His Life, tho' long, to sickness past unknown,
His Death was instant, and without a groan.
(II. 392-402)
Pope proceeds to pray that he be allowed to live and die like
his father; if so, "Who sprung from Kings shall know less joy
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than I" (II. 404-5). His father thus represents for Pope simplic-
ity, naturalness, and innocence of discord, strife, and rage—
in short, the pastoralism that the poet supposedly forsook as
"not in Fancy's Maze he wander'd long, / But stoop'd to Truth,
and moraliz'd his song" (II. 340-41). Whether Pope now
wishes to return to "Fancy's Maze," there appears a nostalgic
longing for simplicity and escape that connects with the desire
evidenced in the poem's opening to get away from the
"plague" of poetasters. Though he sought to appear "the
good man," Pope now appears different from "the good man."
What does this say about his effort to establish and preserve
his difference?
We approach an answer to that question by noting that Pope
seems desirous of leaving behind the burden of writing, a
masculine activity that is in the poem, as we have seen, aggres-
sive, differentiating, and indeed divisive. In deemphasizing
writing, Pope seems to put penis, as well as pen, away, for very
little sexual language appears in later sections of Arbuthnot.
Withdrawing from writing-sex, Pope, "sick of Fops, and Poetry,
and Prate, / To Bufo left the whole Castalian State" (II. 229-
30). Having done so, he turns to his surviving but aged mother.
Despite his earlier resistance to the attempted feminization of
him, as well as his determined insistence on his "manly ways,"
Pope now depicts himself as nurse and mother to her. In effect,
he changes places with his mother:
Me, let the tender Office long engage
To rock the Cradle of reposing Age,
With lenient Arts extend a Mother's breath,
Make Languor smile, and smooth the Bed of Death,
Explore the Thought, explain the asking Eye,
And keep a while one Parent from the Sky!
(II. 408-13)
At poem's end, then, Pope evidently rejects the divisive life
of writing for the immediacy, naturalness, and supposed peace
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of home and family. Pope thus withdraws, adopting his father
as model and ideal and apparently hoping to repeat the inno-
cence he represents. In so doing, Pope completes, it seems,
the pattern established at the opening of the poem. But much
more is happening, as we have begun to see. In several ways
Pope comes to differ from "himself," appearing divided, just
as his poem does. Pope implicitly admits that his desire of
difference has produced precisely difference from at least one
major ideal and goal. Moreover, shortly after adopting his fa-
ther as ideal, Pope—in a quite different sense—adopts his
mother, indeed mothering her; though his father is an ideal
(even if nonassertive, nondifferentiating, and so only problem-
atically masculine), Pope becomes a mother. If this is so, if
difference thus plays with our desire, what difference does the
desire of difference make in those oppositions around which
Arbuthnot is constructed?
It begins to appear that binary oppositions are illusory. Con-
sider, for instance, Pope's desire all along to project "manly
ways" and to resist the feminization apparent in the poetasters'
efforts to make him their patron. In spite of himself, Pope re-
veals throughout certain supposedly feminine traits. For as he
defends his hard-hitting truth-telling, Pope resembles a co-
quette: he asks, coyly, "You think this cruel?" (I. 83) and
"Whom have I hurt?" (I. 95). Further, when he admits, "If
wrong, I smil'd; if right, I kiss'd the rod" (I. 158), the double
entendre establishes his own position as female. Moreover,
the act of withdrawing, apparent in the opening couplet and
culminating in Pope's focus at poem's end, seems a feminine
act. Pope not only withdraws, of course, but, as we have seen,
he also becomes nurse and mother. Thus differentiating, a
masculine act, and withdrawing, a feminine one, result in the
same loss of difference and the turn into the femininity Pope
sought to avoid.
But "turn" can be misleading if it suggests a change from
one stable and absolute identity into another. "Oscillation" may
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be better, for even when female qualities seem most apparent
in Pope, they exist alongside and in oscillation with masculine
ones. There are no absolute differences—and so no radical
breaks in Arbuthnot before and after the Sporus portrait. Thus,
even as he adopts his father as (nonassertive and nondifferen-
tiating) model and ideal, Pope continues the (masculine) desire
of clear, straight lines, for he posits his father as an absolute:
innocent, simple, and natural. Pope thus substitutes one kind
of absolute, one kind of distinctiveness, for another.
It seems that male and female qualities are actually cotermi-
nous in Pope as appears at poem's end when he is both drawn
to his father and acts as mother. This is, of course, precisely
what Pope objected to (and perhaps feared) in Sporus espe-
cially. It is to the Sporus portrait that I want now, in concluding,
to return.
The internal split within the antithetical Sporus is obvious,
but what that self-division signifies—and implies for Pope's
own situation—may not be. Does it spell emptiness and impo-
tence, as Pope declares? To begin with, consider that the
name "Sporus" also suggests "spore," which comes from the
New Latin spora (seed, spore), which derives from the Greek
sense of both seed and the act of sowing, itself traceable to the
word speirein, meaning "to sow." A spore is "a primitive usu-
ally unicellular resistant or reproductive body produced by
plants and some invertebrates and capable of development
into a new individual in some cases unlike the parent either
directly or after fusion with another spore" (Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary). Whereas Sporus as a historical refer-
ence suggests the doubleness Pope emphasizes in the por-
trait, the etymology of the word denotes fertility and pro-
ductiveness. This second, positive meaning is always in the
word as a shimmering or trace that prevents the meaning from
lying still or being unequivocal.
Though we may insist, with Pope, on Sporus' impotence, we
can also insist on his at least potential fertility. That potential
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may, in fact, be seen as realized in Pope's satire. For within the
poem the fertility is no longer merely potential but manifest and
productive of satire. In a sense, Pope places Sporus, though
not unproblematically, in the role of male to Pope's own female
ability to produce.
The negative side of the coin that is Sporus, which repre-
sents Pope's declaration of Sporus' lack of difference as impo-
tence, is simply but half the story. The other side shows how
an internal split, an oscillation "between that and this, " can be
positive and productive. The self-division satirized in Sporus is
an analogue of, among other things, the internal split in Pope's
poem between the (negative) declaration concerning Sporus
and the (positive) description that has emerged through our
reading. There are other internal splits, as we have seen, both
Pope and his poem being fissured and self-divided, oscillating,
just like Sporus, "between that and this." Produced in each
of these cases is a "both/and" situation, a dividing that is also
a joining. If identities are thereby nullified, so are absolute
differences. Left are relations, made possible by the "trace" of
the "one" in the "other." The structure thus revealed "allows
an osmotic mixing, making the stranger friend, the distant near,
the Unheimlich heimlich ... without, for all its closeness and
similarity, ceasing to be strange, distant, and dissimilar."11
Absolute difference such as Pope sought, we can now under-
stand, must result in loss of difference; only relation preserves
difference. Strangely, it seems, Sporus is the truth that Pope
denies. The textual situation of undecidability between Sporus
as potential and as impotent emerges, then, as an analogue,
like the "trace-structure" of the word "Sporus," of the
"both/and" nature Pope (satirically) ascribes to him. Is Sporus
the "trace-structure"? In any case, instead of a vigorously
masculine activity, writing emerges as another name for the
"trace-structure" and for the modes of self-division Arbuthnot
presents and enacts.
If an "uncanny antithetical relationship," resulting from
inevitable internal fissure, thus "reforms itself in each polar
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opposite when that opposite is separated out," subverting or
nullifying "the apparent unequivocal relation of polarity,"12
then Pope's relationship to the mob of would-be poets, as well
as to Atticus, Bufo, and Sporus, is rendered problematical.
Unwilling patron, Pope is nonetheless host to the parasites
(and therefore feminine) in at least the sense that they "live"
inside his poem, taking life from it and being preserved in it, a
point Pope himself suggests when he writes, "Ev'n such small
Critics some regard may claim, / Preserv'd in Milton's or in
Shakespeare's name" (II. 167-68). Thus "the Burnets, Old-
mixons, and Cooks, " as well as Atticus, Bufo, and Sporus, are
given life by Pope even as he "destroys" them. There appears
to be no undoing, or satirizing, that is not also a preserving. A
similarly oscillating relationship obtaining between host and
parasite, it is impossible to decide whether Sporus, for exam-
ple, is the parasite within the host-text that is Pope's poem or
the host on which that text feeds. Like Bufo, who is fed by his
parasite-hosts, Pope himself can be seen as perhaps not much
less parasite than host. He needs the dunces just as they need
him. Without them, he could not, of course, turn satiric apology
into satiric instance.
Despite, then, Pope's desire for, and efforts toward, abso-
lute difference, he is finally and always already related to all
those from whom he would distance and differentiate himself.
The "trace" prevents both absolute difference and distinct
identity, ensuring relation, for a "trace" of the "other" lies in
the "same" and vice versa. The "trace," always "present" in
writing, graphic or otherwise, is responsible for the play of
difference that, in Arbuthnot, produces the relation, the
mingling, and the intercourse that Pope would avoid.
9. The Vanity of Human Wishes:
A Conclusion in Which
Nothing Is Concluded
The desire of a conclusion is as understandable as it is wide-
spread. If we say such desire is natural, that may be revealing,
for nature appears connected with our tendencies to mytholo-
gize or mythify. We naturally want (desire as well as lack) the
comfort and solace afforded by a (fantasized) world in which
conclusions are possible. As has been frequently suggested in
the preceding chapters, however, such definiteness is impossi-
ble. In a recent essay entitled "Living On" Derrida has gone so
far as to problematize even the seemingly indisputable opposi-
tion life/death.1 The question of style is inescapable here. As
I suggested earlier, the style of deconstruction is essayistic,
precisely because, as Geoffrey Hartman remarks, the "con-
sciously occasional nature of the essay prevents closure": "in
an essayistic mode everything, including the ending, is always
arbitrary or ironic: the one question dissolves into the many,
and even the external as distinguished from the internal inter-
ruptions serve to keep things open."2 Yet we continue to hope
for, and expect, with Swift and Pope, straight lines, clear-cut
choices, distinct identities, and absolute differences. (The
reader will determine for himself or herself the relation of the
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tentative, the conventional, and the ironic in these hopeful con-
cluding remarks.) Part of the immense potential and value of
deconstruction lies in its Bible-like demonstration of the vanity
of such human wishes.
To think about the vanity of human wishes, particularly after
essays on Dryden, Swift, and Pope, is inevitably to call to mind
Samuel Johnson, on whom the reader should logically expect
a next essay in a more systematic account. Dr. Johnson wrote,
of course, "The Vanity of Human Wishes" as well as the prose
narrative Rasselas, both of which imitate the thought and spirit
of the Book of Ecclesiastes. With some desire to suggest what
might have been (and yet is), I invoke Johnson as a way of
returning attention to Restoration and eighteenth-century texts.
I hope that, along with some other recent writers, I have been
able to advance the wedge slowly being driven into the mono-
lithic—and essentially closed—scholarship on this crucial pe-
riod in the history of English literature.
Generally we have imagined the Augustans either to be like
us in their enlightenment or else totally other (for instance,
quasi-medieval). But the certainties of our scholarship have
begun to appear illusions, and Augustan texts now seem in-
sightful to the extent that their own supposed certainties are
rare. We may yet have much to learn from the Augustans, and
if so deconstruction may be our route to that new old knowl-
edge. So we can hope that further work will be done on Augus-
tan texts, informed by deconstructive theory and practice.3
I hope, however, that if these essays have any impact, it will
not be limited to Augustan studies. In addition—I hope—to
shedding light on deconstruction and to inviting further work on
Dryden, Swift, Pope, Johnson, and others, these essays enact,
of course, a particular way of reading and pose some large
questions about the ways we read and the responsibilities
reading entails. Just as Derrida uses "writing" as a metaphor,
so I regard "reading" as a powerful metaphor for a wide range
of human activities. Deconstruction involves a particular way of
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seeing, and thus it has implications for the way we live. Indeed,
the implications of certain themes recurring in this book are
far-reaching. Not the least of these concerns difference, the
desire of difference (an ambiguous enough phrase), and the
dangers of difference. Further consideration of these matters
should be fruitful, particularly if informed by not only the work
of Derrida and other deconstructionists but also the recent
efforts of Ren6 Girard and Bernard-Henri Levy.4 Of course, as
indicated in my essay here on An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, itself
influenced by Girard's work, difference cannot be well consid-
ered apart from the issue of relation and relationality. One
hardly has to be Nietzschean to understand the extent and
depth of the biblical call to relation (rather than opposition or
difference), and of course that biblical position is echoed in,
among others, Marxism; consider for example, Robert Sayre's
recent description of the Marxist position: "Men become what
they become only together, in relationship to other men. The
idea of the 'natural' individual existing at man's historical begin-
nings is a bourgeois myth of the eighteenth century."5 Impor-
tant common ground thus appears in perhaps unexpected
places, and so the need is great for careful analysis of differ-
ence and relation in the Bible, Marxism, feminism (as the previ-
ous chapter should have suggested), and deconstruction—the
rewards to be hoped for are also great. The same may be true
in such Augustan writers as Pope, whose texts, we have begun
to realize, offer valuable insight into that "enigmatic system of
relatedness in which [man] is enclosed." If I may continue
quoting Maynard Mack discussing King Lear, we may be able
to grasp Pope's acknowledgment that man's fate "comes into
being with his entry into relatedness, which is his entry into
humanity."6 In any case, deconstruction has implications well
beyond the narrowly textual.
Despite what its opponents claim, then, deconstruction in-
volves both a centrifugal and a centripetal movement. It moves
both outward and inward, being neither simply Hellenistic nor
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Hebraic in its direction. Such complications profoundly chal-
lenge our habitual ways of thinking, and they are unsettling to
all of us, no matter how enlightened we believe ourselves to be.
Like Yahweh, deconstruction acts as an agent of disillusion-
ment, revealing the vanity of human wishes—and hopes.
The repeated hopes to which I have given expression in this
(non)conclusion attest to the strength of illusion, the persis-
tence of hope and vanity, and the nature of desire. "Ye who
listen with credulity to the whispers of fancy, and pursue with
eagerness the phantoms of hope; who expect that age will
perform the promises of youth, and that the deficiencies of the
present day will be supplied by the morrow. . . . " 7 Yet I believe
the effects of deconstruction are demonstrated too, problema-
tizing that congenial opening of Rasselas. Does not the Bible
teach us, as deconstruction does, that hopelessness is as illu-
sory as "the phantoms of hope"? Is not deconstruction, like the
biblical "vision," a quest(ion)? "Henceforth, so that God may
indeed be, as Jabes says, an interrogation of God, would we
not have to transform a final affirmation into a question?"8
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letin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 32 (Jan. 1979), 17: "The
range of viable alternatives in literary methodology has become bafflingly
large. These alternatives can, so it seems, hardly be reconciled in some grand
synthesis. II fautchoisir."
10. See also ibid., pp. 13-32.
11. Cain, "Deconstruction in America," p. 381.
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12. Derrida, Positions, p. 42. Various other texts might be cited here, but
see especially Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 81.
13. Miller, "Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure, II," Georgia Review, 30
(1976), 330-48.
14. The point is that which Miller also makes in the new Preface written for
the 1975 reprinting of The Disappearance of God (pp. xii-xiii), which I quoted
in the previous chapter.
15. Miller, "Williams' Spring and All and the Progress of Poetry," p. 430.
16. Cain has noted a number of "contradictions" in Miller's texts but has
not read the allegory in/of these texts.
17. Miller, "Ariachne's Broken Woof," Georgia Review, 31 (1977), 59-
60.
18. De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 242.
Chapter 6
1. The Faith of John Dryden: Change and Continuity (Lexington: Univ.
Press of Kentucky, 1980). See also my essay "Dryden's Religio Laid: A
Reappraisal," Studies in Philology, 75 (1978), 347-70.
2. The text used throughout is The Works of John Dryden, ed.
E. N. Hooker, H. T. Swedenberg, Jr., et al., II (Poems, 1681-1684, ed. H. T.
Swedenberg, Jr.) (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1956-). I identify the
poem by line number, the prose Preface by page number in this edition.
3. I quote the commendatory verses, here and below, from the second
volume of The Works of John Dryden, cited above.
4. The Several Ways of Resolving Faith By the Controvertists of the Roman
and Reformed Religion, 2ded. (London, 1682), pp. 59-60; quoted in The Faith
of John Dryden, p. 91.
5. I quote Stanley Fish's description of his 1980 NEH Summer Seminar on
"Milton and the Fall into Reading."
6. Tillotson, The Rule of Faith: or an Answer to the Treatise of Mr.
I. S. entituled, Sure-footing, Etc. (London, 1676), p. 106; Care, Utrum Hor-
um: or, The Nine and Thirty Articles of the Church of England, At large re-
cited ... (London, 1682), p. 17; quoted in The Faith of John Dryden, p.
90.
7. See, esp., pp. 91-95.
8. See Johnson, "Translator's Introduction," Dissemination, p. xi, and
Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 143.
9. De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 9.
10. Ibid., p. 12.
11. Ibid.
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12. See Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, no. 32, and McKenna, "Biblioclasm,"
pp. 15-29.
Chapter 7
1. The text of A Tale of a Tub used throughout is "Gulliver's Travels" and
Other Writings, ed. Louis A. Landa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), with page
references given in my text.
2. I have discussed this issue, in somewhat similar but briefer terms, in
"Interpretation and Meaning in/4 Taleofa Tub," Essays in Literature, 8 (1981),
233-39.1 have found the following studies particularly useful in threading my
way through the maze of Swift's text: Ronald Paulson, Theme and Structure
in Swift's "A Tale of a Tub" (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1960), and John
R. Clark, Form and Frenzy in "A Taleofa Tub" (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press,
1969).
3. See Miller, "Georges Poulet's 'Criticism of Identification,' " pp. 191-
224, and "Tradition and Difference," pp. 6-13.
4. Hartman, Saving the Text.
5. See, in this connection, Barbara Johnson, The Critical Difference: Es-
says in the Contemporary Rhetoric of Reading (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 1980).
6. Hartman's term; see Criticism in the Wilderness, p. 226.
7. See de Man's Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contem-
porary Criticism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971).
8. See the unpublished essay by my former student Michael Kilduff entitled
"Satire of Reading: Swift's A Tale of a Tub."
9. On this point, as well as others relating to the Tale, see Maureen Quilli-
gan, The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1979).
10. Johnson, "Translator's Introduction," Dissemination, p. ix.
11. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 143.
12. See also Quilligan, The Language of Allegory, pp. 66-67, for such
wordplay as that on "textus" as both coat and text.
13. Swift does attempt to limit his points in the passage quoted to "such
writers" as "the true illuminated." I argue that the issue is not the degree of
authorial "sense" and control but language itself.
14. Johnson, "Translator's Introduction," Dissemination, p. xv.
Chapter 8
1. The text of Pope used throughout is the fourth volume of the Twicken-
ham Edition of The Poems of Alexander Pope: Imitations of Horace, ed. John
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Butt, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969); in quoting the "Advertise-
ment" I reverse italics and Roman. Pope's admission that he wrote Arbuthnot
"by snatches" has not deterred critics from arguing that the poem is a unity.
See, for example, Elder Olson, "Rhetoric and the Appreciation of Pope,"
Modern Philology, 37 (1939-40), 13-35, and Elias F. Mengel, Jr., "Patterns of
Imagery in Pope's Arbuthnot," PMLA, 69 (1954), 184-97.
2. The Works of Sir William Temple (London, 1720), I, 289.
3. The point is made by, among many others, Dryden; see " OfDramatic
Poesy" and Other Critical Essays, ed. George Watson (New York. Outton,
1962), II, 138.
4. Here, and throughout this paragraph, I draw on the important discussion
by Peter Dixon, The World of Pope's Satires (London: Methuen, 1968).
5. Margaret W. Ferguson, "Border Territories of Defense: Freud and De-
fenses of Poetry," in The Literary Freud: Mechanisms of Defense and the
Poetic Will, pp. 149-80. The quoted passages are from pp. 153, 155, and 159.
6. J. Paul Hunter, "Satiric Apology as Satiric Instance: Pope's Arbuthnot,"
Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 68 (1969), 625-47.
7. Rene Girard, "The Plague in Literature and Myth," in his "To Double
Business Bound" (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), p. 138.
8. From "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety," quoted in Spivak, "Transla-
tor's Preface," Of Grammatology p. xlvii. That the penis was represented as
a quill in Pope's time is indicated in, for example, Sawney and Co/ley (1742),
and Other Pope Pamphlets, ed. W. Powell Jones. The Augustan Reprint Soci-
ety, No. 83 (Los Angeles, 1960).
9. Thomas E. Maresca, Pope's Horatian Poems (Columbus: Ohio State
Univ. Press, 1966), p. 71. For other psychological readings of the Sporus
passage, see Dustin H. Griffin, Alexander Pope: The Poet in the Poems
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 172-90, and John Trimble, "The
Psychological Landscape of Pope's Life and Art," Diss. California-Berkeley
1971
10. Williams, ed., Poetry and Prose of Alexander Pope (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1969), p 207 n
11. Miller, "The Critic as Host," p. 221
12. Ibid.
Chapter 9
1. Jacques Derrida, "Living On. Border Lines," trans. James Hulbert, in
Deconstruction and Criticism, pp. 75-176.
2. Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness, p. 193.
3. To such texts, I hope we can begin to understand, a both/and perspec-
tive should be brought. Consider the case of Pope, for instance. Rather than
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a clear choice between competing "approaches" or methodologies, Pope's
poetry itself requires what I call reader-responsibility criticism, and that in-
volves at least three (related) phases: (1) traditional-formalist, attending to what
Walter A. Davis calls the immanent purposive movement of the text; (2) perfor-
mative-response, which attends to both the dramatic act the poetry performs
and the ways the reader is drawn in and directly involved; and (3) the decon-
structive, attending to the differential play of language, which inevitably sub-
verts the text's declarations. With Pope, at least, deconstruction, so often
accused of licentious irresponsibility, emerges as an aspect or phase of re-
sponsible criticism. See Davis, The Act of Interpretation; in addition to reader-
response criticism, consider the authorial-performative model, indebted to the
later Wittgenstein and persuasively argued by Charles Altieri, Act and Quality:
A Theory of Literary Meaning and Humanistic Understanding (Amherst: Univ.
of Massachusetts Press, 1981); and see my prolegomenon to a book on Pope,
"Pope's Poetry and the Reader's Responsibilities," College Literature, 9
(1982), 83-96.
4. SeeGirard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977), "To Double Business Bound" and Des
choses cach6es depuis la fondation du monde (Paris: Grasset, 1978); and
Levy, The Testament of God. See also Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans.
Lawrence R. Schehr (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1982).
5. Sayre, Solitude in Society: A Sociological Study in French Literature
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978), p. 3.
6. Mack, "King Lear" in Our Time (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
1965), p. 37.
7. Samuel Johnson, The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia, ed.Gwin
J. Kolb (Arlington Heights, III.: Harlan Davidson, 1962), p. 1.
8. Derrida, "Edmond Jabes and the Question of the Book," in Writing and
Difference, p. 78.
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